分销供应链中竞争零售商联盟的稳定性

发布时间：2018-09-04 19:46

【摘要】：针对由单一供应商和三个相互竞争零售商组成的两层分销供应链系统,在三种不同的博弈框架下,采用合作博弈论中短视的Nash稳定性概念与远视的最大一致集(LCS)概念研究了供应商与不同零售商联盟间的定价博弈,分别讨论了不同类型零售商联盟的稳定性。发现不论是在供应商处于领导地位,还是在零售商处于领导地位的市场中,当竞争强度较弱时,大联盟不是短视零售商联盟的稳定结构,却有可能是远视零售商联盟的稳定结构;当竞争强度较强时,则无论是短视零售商还是远视零售商都以大联盟为稳定结构,但是,在供应商处于领导地位的市场中,远视零售商形成大联盟的阈值较高;在供应商和零售商地位相同的市场中,大联盟则是远视零售商和短视零售商共同的稳定结构。
[Abstract]:For a two-tier distribution supply chain system consisting of a single supplier and three competing retailers, under three different game frameworks, By using the concept of short-sighted Nash stability in cooperative game theory and the maximum consistent set (LCS) concept of hyperopia, the pricing game between supplier and different retailer alliance is studied, and the stability of different types of retailer alliance is discussed respectively. It is found that, whether in the market where the supplier is in the leading position or in the market where the retailer is in the leading position, when the competition intensity is weak, the large alliance is not the stable structure of the short-sighted retailer alliance. But it may be the stable structure of the hyper-vision retailer alliance. When the competition intensity is high, both short-sighted retailers and far-sighted retailers take the big alliance as the stable structure, but in the market where the supplier is in the leading position, In the market where suppliers and retailers have the same position, the big alliance is the common stable structure of hyper-vision retailers and short-sighted retailers.
【作者单位】：华南理工大学工商管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金重点项目(71131003) 教育部人文社科基金资助项目(13YJC630075) 教育部博士点基金(20100172110032)
【分类号】：F224;F274

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