供应链企业碳减排投资策略选择与行为演化研究

发布时间：2018-10-08 10:27

【摘要】：基于当下气候变暖的背景中有社会责任感的消费者对低碳产品有特殊偏好的情境,研究上游企业主导的供应链在面对具有低碳产品偏好的市场消费者时,上下游企业的减排投资行为与策略。依照Stackelberg博弈模型,构建上下游企业采用不同的行为策略的支付矩阵。进而,应用演化博弈理论中双种群演化博弈模型分析得到上下游企业减排投资行为的演化稳定策略:当需要较大的投资或者下游企业分担减排成本意愿较强时,由处于主导地位的上游企业实施投资减排是稳定的;当需要较小的减排投资或者下游企业分担减排成本意愿较弱时,上下游企业组成的供应链中必然会有一个企业实施减排。最后,指出了减排投资系数和下游企业分担投资成本比例的不同对演化博弈稳定均衡的影响。
[Abstract]:Based on the situation that consumers with social responsibility have special preference for low-carbon products in the context of climate warming, this paper studies the upstream enterprise-led supply chain when facing market consumers with low-carbon product preference. The investment behavior and strategy of upstream and downstream enterprises. According to Stackelberg game model, the payment matrix of upstream and downstream enterprises adopting different behavior strategies is constructed. Then, the evolutionary stability strategy of upstream and downstream firms' emission reduction investment behavior is obtained by applying the two-species evolutionary game model in evolutionary game theory: when larger investment is needed or when downstream firms are more willing to share the cost of emission reduction. It is stable to implement investment emission reduction by upstream enterprises in the leading position. When small emission reduction investment is needed or the willingness of downstream enterprises to share the cost of emission reduction is weak, there will inevitably be an enterprise in the supply chain composed of upstream and downstream enterprises to implement emission reduction. Finally, the paper points out the influence of the investment coefficient of emission reduction and the proportion of investment cost shared by downstream enterprises on the stable equilibrium of evolutionary game.
【作者单位】：天津大学管理与经济学部;
【基金】：国家自然基金资助项目(71072155,71202086)
【分类号】：F274;X196;F224.32

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