制造商规模不经济的链与链竞争两部定价合同

发布时间：2018-10-23 07:03

【摘要】：基于链与链数量竞争及制造商生产规模不经济的环境,以批发价格合同为基准,探索两部定价合同选择的绩效改进条件、博弈均衡特征和局限性,并进一步分析市场竞争强度、规模不经济参数对合同选择行为的影响.研究发现:不管竞争对手供应链是否采用两部定价合同,本供应链通过采用两部定价合同并把固定收费调节在适当范围内,可使制造商和零售商同时实现帕累托(Pareto)绩效改进.值得指出的是,通过适当调节固定收费,两部定价合同成为实现制造商和零售商帕累托绩效改进的占优均衡合同,但该固定收费的选择严重依赖于竞争强度和规模不经济的程度.当规模不经济程度相对较强且严重依赖于数量竞争强度时,两部定价合同是实现供应链系统绩效改进的占优均衡合同.
[Abstract]:Based on the environment of chain and chain quantity competition and the uneconomical scale of manufacturer's production, based on the wholesale price contract, this paper explores the performance improvement conditions, game equilibrium characteristics and limitations of the selection of two pricing contracts, and further analyzes the market competition intensity. The influence of scale uneconomical parameters on contract selection behavior. It is found that whether the rival supply chain adopts two pricing contracts or not, the supply chain can achieve Pareto (Pareto) performance improvement by adopting two pricing contracts and adjusting the fixed charges within an appropriate range. It is worth noting that by properly adjusting fixed charges, the two pricing contracts have become dominant equilibrium contracts for the improvement of Pareto performance of manufacturers and retailers. But the choice of the fixed fee depends heavily on the intensity of competition and the degree of uneconomic scale. When the scale uneconomic degree is relatively strong and depends heavily on the intensity of quantitative competition, two pricing contracts are dominant equilibrium contracts to improve the performance of supply chain system.
【作者单位】：电子科技大学经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(70932005);国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772070)
【分类号】：F274;F224

【共引文献】