制造商资金约束下供应链融资补偿契约研究
发布时间：2018-12-08 14:20
【摘要】：如今,经济全球化的快速发展,越来越多企业通过扩大生产规模,扩宽销售渠道,加大对技术投入等手段来抢占市场份额。但从企业自身来看,这一系列措施都需要大量资金投入,一旦出现资金链断链,就会对整个供应链的稳定性造成影响。目前,针对制造商资金不足的情况,主要有两种解决途径:一是下游零售商向制造商预付部分或全部货款融资;二是通过金融机构或互联网金融提供的借贷融资。在只考虑制造商和零售商组成的两级供应链中,制造商为核心企业且因抢占市场份额存在资金约束,导致无法生产出最优订货量。在此背景下,本文充分考虑在基本供应链模型基础上,根据供应链利润最大化建立了目标利润函数,运用Stackelberg博弈模型,发现当制造商资金不足时,会造成下游供货链断裂,影响供应链协调。于是,从两种不同渠道融资补偿模式进行分析:一是向零售商融资,即通过给予零售商相应批发价折扣,以及分担因市场随机需求不确定性带来的损失,补偿零售商放弃市场投资的回报。二是借助P2P借贷平台融资,及通过给予P2P借贷平台融资利率以及分担因平台贷款所带来的风险损失,作为补偿P2P借贷平台贷款的回报。首先,在零售商融资补偿模式下,主要是在基本供应链模型上,考虑损失分担比以及批发价折扣补偿两个参数,通过研究这两个参数之间的关系,做出最优决策。研究表明,当两个参数之间满足某种关系时,制造商能够有充足的资金保证生产,供应链达到协调,利润达到帕累托最优。其次,在P2P借贷平台融资模式下,在无担保无抵押的P2P借贷平台融资中,先引入制造商违约率、贷款损失率以及融资利率三个参数,构建P2P借贷平台融资决策模型,在根据违约率考虑制造商承担贷款风险损失比补偿参数,进一步优化模型。研究表明,当参数之间满足某种关系时,制造商资金问题得到解决,供应链达到协调。然后,通过对比分析两种融资补偿模式发现,都能实现供应链协调,但融资模式选择主要取决于零售商融资补偿中损失分担比和P2P借贷平台贷款风险损失率。最后,通过算例对文章中的两种融资契约参数模型进行了验证,并分析了对供应链各成员利润的影响。
[Abstract]:Nowadays, with the rapid development of economic globalization, more and more enterprises seize market share by expanding production scale, broadening sales channels and increasing investment in technology. However, from the point of view of the enterprise itself, this series of measures need a large amount of capital investment, once the chain of funds broken, it will affect the stability of the entire supply chain. At present, there are mainly two ways to solve the problem of the shortage of capital for manufacturers: first, the downstream retailers provide partial or full loan financing to the manufacturers; the other is the loan financing provided by financial institutions or Internet finance. In a two-tier supply chain consisting only of manufacturer and retailer, the manufacturer is the core enterprise and has financial constraints because of preemption of market share, which leads to the inability to produce the optimal order quantity. Under this background, based on the basic supply chain model, the objective profit function is established according to the profit maximization of the supply chain, and the Stackelberg game model is used to find that when the manufacturer is short of funds, the downstream supply chain will break. Affect supply chain coordination. Therefore, this paper analyzes two different ways of financing compensation: one is financing to retailers, that is, by giving retailers corresponding wholesale price discounts, and sharing the losses caused by the uncertainty of random demand in the market. Compensate retailers for giving up market investments. The other is to make use of P2P lending platform to raise funds, and to compensate P2P loan platform by giving P2P loan interest rate and sharing the risk loss caused by the loan. First of all, in the retail financing compensation model, mainly in the basic supply chain model, considering the loss sharing ratio and wholesale discount compensation two parameters, through the study of the relationship between the two parameters to make the optimal decision. The results show that when the relationship between the two parameters is satisfied, the manufacturer can have sufficient funds to ensure production, supply chain coordination, and profit to Pareto optimal. Secondly, in the P2P lending platform financing mode, in the unsecured and unsecured P2P lending platform financing, the manufacturer default rate, loan loss rate and financing interest rate are first introduced to construct the P2P lending platform financing decision-making model. According to the default rate, the risk loss ratio compensation parameter is considered, and the model is further optimized. The results show that when the parameters satisfy a certain relationship, the manufacturer's capital problem is solved and the supply chain is coordinated. Then, through the comparative analysis of the two financing compensation models, it is found that both can achieve supply chain coordination, but the choice of financing model mainly depends on the loss sharing ratio in the financing compensation of retailers and the loan risk loss rate of P2P lending platform. Finally, the two financing contract parameter models in this paper are verified by an example, and the influence on the profit of each member of the supply chain is analyzed.
【学位授予单位】：重庆交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F274
[Abstract]:Nowadays, with the rapid development of economic globalization, more and more enterprises seize market share by expanding production scale, broadening sales channels and increasing investment in technology. However, from the point of view of the enterprise itself, this series of measures need a large amount of capital investment, once the chain of funds broken, it will affect the stability of the entire supply chain. At present, there are mainly two ways to solve the problem of the shortage of capital for manufacturers: first, the downstream retailers provide partial or full loan financing to the manufacturers; the other is the loan financing provided by financial institutions or Internet finance. In a two-tier supply chain consisting only of manufacturer and retailer, the manufacturer is the core enterprise and has financial constraints because of preemption of market share, which leads to the inability to produce the optimal order quantity. Under this background, based on the basic supply chain model, the objective profit function is established according to the profit maximization of the supply chain, and the Stackelberg game model is used to find that when the manufacturer is short of funds, the downstream supply chain will break. Affect supply chain coordination. Therefore, this paper analyzes two different ways of financing compensation: one is financing to retailers, that is, by giving retailers corresponding wholesale price discounts, and sharing the losses caused by the uncertainty of random demand in the market. Compensate retailers for giving up market investments. The other is to make use of P2P lending platform to raise funds, and to compensate P2P loan platform by giving P2P loan interest rate and sharing the risk loss caused by the loan. First of all, in the retail financing compensation model, mainly in the basic supply chain model, considering the loss sharing ratio and wholesale discount compensation two parameters, through the study of the relationship between the two parameters to make the optimal decision. The results show that when the relationship between the two parameters is satisfied, the manufacturer can have sufficient funds to ensure production, supply chain coordination, and profit to Pareto optimal. Secondly, in the P2P lending platform financing mode, in the unsecured and unsecured P2P lending platform financing, the manufacturer default rate, loan loss rate and financing interest rate are first introduced to construct the P2P lending platform financing decision-making model. According to the default rate, the risk loss ratio compensation parameter is considered, and the model is further optimized. The results show that when the parameters satisfy a certain relationship, the manufacturer's capital problem is solved and the supply chain is coordinated. Then, through the comparative analysis of the two financing compensation models, it is found that both can achieve supply chain coordination, but the choice of financing model mainly depends on the loss sharing ratio in the financing compensation of retailers and the loan risk loss rate of P2P lending platform. Finally, the two financing contract parameter models in this paper are verified by an example, and the influence on the profit of each member of the supply chain is analyzed.
【学位授予单位】：重庆交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F274
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4 周婧s，
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