不对称信息下双渠道供应链激励机制研究

发布时间：2018-12-18 16:23

【摘要】：基于由单个制造商和单个零售商组成的双渠道供应链系统,研究了不对称信息下激励机制设计问题。首先分析了对称信息下供应链处于集中和分散两种模式时的成员最优决策;其次分析了不对称信息下零售商服务水平为私人信息时制造商的激励机制设计问题,运用委托-代理理论建模,运用泛函极值理论求解;最后通过实例仿真分析,验证了激励机制对于提高供应链绩效的合理有效性。
[Abstract]:Based on a two-channel supply chain system composed of a single manufacturer and a single retailer, the incentive mechanism design under asymmetric information is studied. Firstly, the optimal decision of the members of the supply chain in centralized and decentralized mode under symmetric information is analyzed. Secondly, this paper analyzes the incentive mechanism design problem of manufacturer when the retailer service level is private information under asymmetric information, and applies principal-agent theory to model and use functional extreme value theory to solve the problem. Finally, the simulation results show that the incentive mechanism is reasonable and effective to improve the performance of supply chain.
【作者单位】：北京科技大学数理学院;
【分类号】：F274

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