基于供应链金融的分销链融资研究

发布时间：2019-01-19 09:20

【摘要】：对于分销链中处于中间位置的分销商而言,其上游厂家和下游客户都是实力雄厚的大企业,为了合作分销商常常要接受对自身不利的条件。例如核心企业为实现自己的财务经济性往往加快把库存转移给分销商或推迟向供应商付款,挤压上下游资金,迫使分销商延迟结算或高成本借款、供应商延迟采购原材料。这对议价能力弱的小分销商而言,在上游企业先款后货和下游企业先货后款的双重压力下,其大部分资产都是预付账款、存货和应收账款的形式,占用了大量流动资金,以往稳定的模式却带来了企业的资金困境。分销商若以自身的实力和信誉基础进行融资不仅效率低而且成本高,其资金流动性不足势必成为核心企业的销售瓶颈。本文建立了核心企业及其分销商和下游客户组成的三级分销链,通过引入供应链金融,研究如何改善处于中游位置并受到上下游企业双重资金挤压的分销商的现金流状况。首先,从分销链视角,分析应收账款延迟支付方式带给分销商的现金流风险。基于现金循环周期理论,建立分销商的现金流风险模型。研究应收账款每期付款比例、现金折扣和贴现率及其变化关系对净现金流入风险的影响。其次,基于应收账款质押进行分销链的融资分析。建立供应链金融下的应收账款融资和传统应收账款融资的博弈模型。指出供应链金融思路下的应收账款融资更具帕累托效率。然后考虑债务人的还款意愿,根据债务人对应收账款的还款比例与质押率关系,建立银行、分销商、零售商三方的期望收益矩阵,从银行为代表的金融机构和分销链上的节点企业两个角度作了深入探讨。最后进行了实例分析。论文主要研究结论有:提出企业管理应收账款的最优收账政策组合,以便减小延迟支付方式带来的现金流风险;给出银行开展应收账款质押融资业务可参照的质押率公式。并就开展应收账款质押贷款为分销商和银行分别提供相关建议。
[Abstract]:For the distributor in the middle position in the distribution chain, the upstream manufacturer and downstream customer are both powerful large enterprises, in order to cooperate the distributors often have to accept the unfavorable conditions to their own. For example, in order to achieve their own financial economy, core enterprises often speed up the transfer of inventory to distributors or delay payment to suppliers, squeeze upstream and downstream funds, force distributors to delay settlement or high cost loans, and suppliers delay purchasing raw materials. For small distributors with weak bargaining power, most of their assets are in the form of prepaid accounts, inventory and accounts receivable, taking up a large amount of liquid capital under the dual pressure of upstream and downstream enterprises. The past stable mode has brought the enterprise's capital predicament. If distributors rely on their own strength and credibility to finance not only low efficiency but also high cost, the lack of liquidity is bound to become the sales bottleneck of core enterprises. In this paper, a three-level distribution chain of core enterprises, their distributors and downstream customers is established. By introducing supply chain finance, this paper studies how to improve the cash flow of distributors who are in the middle position and are squeezed by the double capital of upstream and downstream enterprises. First of all, from the perspective of distribution chain, the paper analyzes the cash flow risk brought by delayed payment of accounts receivable to distributors. Based on the cash cycle theory, the cash flow risk model of distributors is established. This paper studies the effect of payment ratio of accounts receivable, discount rate and discount rate on net cash inflow risk. Secondly, the financing analysis of distribution chain based on the pledge of accounts receivable. The game model of accounts receivable financing and traditional accounts receivable financing under supply chain finance is established. It is pointed out that the accounts receivable financing in supply chain finance is more efficient than Pareto. Then considering the debtor's willingness to repay, according to the relationship between the debtor's repayment ratio and the pledge rate, the expected income matrix of banks, distributors and retailers is established. This paper probes into the financial institutions represented by the banks and the nodal enterprises in the distribution chain from two angles: one is the bank and the other is the node enterprise in the distribution chain. Finally, an example is given. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: the optimal collection policy combination of enterprise management accounts receivable is put forward in order to reduce the cash flow risk brought by delayed payment, and the pledge rate formula for banks to carry out accounts receivable pledge financing is given. And the development of accounts receivable pledge loans for distributors and banks to provide relevant advice.
【学位授予单位】：天津大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F274;F832.4

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