基于战略顾客行为的不同权力结构下供应链绩效研究
发布时间：2019-01-22 18:22
【摘要】：随着零售商在规模、信息获取和贴近消费市场的优势地位不断凸显,加之信息技术的高速发展及市场环境的日益变化推动了供应链相关经济力量的巨大变革,导致市场的抗衡势力优势从制造商转向了零售商。市场势力向下游转移主要体现在出现了制造商主导、权力对等及零售商主导的三种不同权力结构供应链。而零售业频繁打折促销活动把顾客训练的日趋理性及战略性,增大了直接面对消费者的零售商的抗衡势力,加剧了零售商与制造商的利益冲突与渠道争夺,使得供应链成员企业和整体均较难达到帕累托均衡,亟须提出新的应对决策以最大化成员企业的效益。 本文的研究考虑存在战略顾客跨期购买行为的条件下,基于渠道优势地位由制造商向零售商转移的动态过程,通过比较制造商主导、权力对等、零售商主导的博弈均衡以分析战略顾客的延迟购买行为对供应链成员企业最优决策以及供应链绩效的影响。本论文研究结论表明：供应链成员企业若正视战略顾客存在,制定合理的决策,能达到互利共赢的局面。不同权力结构供应链绩效的优劣情况取决于顾客战略行为程度的大小,当顾客战略行为程度小于临界值时,零售商主导下供应链占优,反之,制造商主导下供应链占优,且高比例的战略顾客会持续恶化零售商主导的供应链绩效。顾客会倾向于零售商主导的市场结构,因为该权力结构的销售价格最低,消费者更能享受到低价带来的好处。本论文所得结论为存在战略顾客的行业提供理论基础与方法指导。
[Abstract]:With the retailers in the scale, access to information and close to the consumer market advantage status constantly prominent, coupled with the rapid development of information technology and the changing market environment, the supply chain related economic forces have been greatly changed. As a result, the market's competitive advantage shifted from manufacturers to retailers. The transfer of market power to downstream is mainly reflected in the emergence of three different power structure supply chains: manufacturer-led, power-equal and retailer-led. And the frequent discount promotion activities in retail industry make the training of customers more rational and strategic, increase the counterweight of retailers facing consumers directly, and aggravate the conflicts of interests between retailers and manufacturers and the competition for channels. It is difficult to achieve Pareto equilibrium for supply chain member enterprises and the whole, so it is urgent to put forward new countermeasures to maximize the benefits of member enterprises. In this paper, considering the existence of strategic customers' intertemporal purchasing behavior, based on the dynamic process of channel dominance transferring from manufacturer to retailer, the author compares manufacturers' dominance and power equivalence. The game equilibrium led by retailers is used to analyze the influence of strategic customers' delayed purchase behavior on the optimal decision and supply chain performance of supply chain member enterprises. The conclusion of this paper shows that if supply chain member enterprises face up to the existence of strategic customers and make reasonable decisions, they can achieve the situation of mutual benefit and win-win situation. The performance of supply chain with different power structure depends on the degree of customer strategic behavior. When the level of customer strategic behavior is less than the critical value, the retailer dominates the supply chain, whereas the manufacturer dominates the supply chain. And a high proportion of strategic customers will continue to deteriorate the retailer-led supply chain performance. Customers tend to prefer a retailer-dominated market structure because the power structure has the lowest sales price and consumers are more likely to enjoy the benefits of low prices. The conclusions of this paper provide theoretical basis and method guidance for industries with strategic customers.
【学位授予单位】：厦门大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F274
[Abstract]:With the retailers in the scale, access to information and close to the consumer market advantage status constantly prominent, coupled with the rapid development of information technology and the changing market environment, the supply chain related economic forces have been greatly changed. As a result, the market's competitive advantage shifted from manufacturers to retailers. The transfer of market power to downstream is mainly reflected in the emergence of three different power structure supply chains: manufacturer-led, power-equal and retailer-led. And the frequent discount promotion activities in retail industry make the training of customers more rational and strategic, increase the counterweight of retailers facing consumers directly, and aggravate the conflicts of interests between retailers and manufacturers and the competition for channels. It is difficult to achieve Pareto equilibrium for supply chain member enterprises and the whole, so it is urgent to put forward new countermeasures to maximize the benefits of member enterprises. In this paper, considering the existence of strategic customers' intertemporal purchasing behavior, based on the dynamic process of channel dominance transferring from manufacturer to retailer, the author compares manufacturers' dominance and power equivalence. The game equilibrium led by retailers is used to analyze the influence of strategic customers' delayed purchase behavior on the optimal decision and supply chain performance of supply chain member enterprises. The conclusion of this paper shows that if supply chain member enterprises face up to the existence of strategic customers and make reasonable decisions, they can achieve the situation of mutual benefit and win-win situation. The performance of supply chain with different power structure depends on the degree of customer strategic behavior. When the level of customer strategic behavior is less than the critical value, the retailer dominates the supply chain, whereas the manufacturer dominates the supply chain. And a high proportion of strategic customers will continue to deteriorate the retailer-led supply chain performance. Customers tend to prefer a retailer-dominated market structure because the power structure has the lowest sales price and consumers are more likely to enjoy the benefits of low prices. The conclusions of this paper provide theoretical basis and method guidance for industries with strategic customers.
【学位授予单位】：厦门大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F274
【参考文献】
相关期刊论文 前10条
1 张贵磊;刘志学;;主导型供应链的Stackelberg利润分配博弈[J];系统工程;2006年11期
2 王强,王U，
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