电子废弃物回收处理的双链竞争博弈模型研究

发布时间：2019-06-10 00:05

【摘要】：电子废弃物数量的快速增长给社会的资源与环境带来了巨大压力，欧美等发达国家较早开展了电子废弃物回收处理的相关立法和实践工作，凭借着较为完善的回收处理体系，电子废弃物得到了科学有效的回收处理。我国政府也高度重视电子废弃物的回收处理工作，在借鉴发达国家成功经验的基础上，通过规范立法、积极开展回收试点以期找到一条符合我国自身国情的电子废弃物回收处理路径。但由于受到我国经济、文化、技术等特殊国情的制约，电子废弃物的回收处理进展缓慢。为此，需要对我国电子废弃物回收处理的各环节进行深入研究，为我国的政府、电子废弃物回收商和处理商提供辅助决策支持。因此，本文在汲取前人研究成果的基础上，针对识别出的关键问题建立了相应的数学模型。首先，建立了电子废弃物处理商间的双寡头垄断博弈模型。通过引入技术创新因素，由静态博弈到动态博弈，分析了处理商获取竞争优势地位的过程，并通过数值仿真讨论了技术溢出率、回收竞争系数等参数对处理商定价决策的影响。结果表明，实施技术创新可以提高电子废弃物的回收价和回收量，处理商通过技术创新是否可以取得竞争优势取决于技术溢出率的大小。技术溢出率越高，回收价和回收量越大，从而可以实现更高的社会效益，但这会遭到创新实践者的抵制。其次，将处理商间的双寡头垄断博弈模型扩展到双链竞争情形，构建了电子废弃物处理商决策模式选择的双链竞争博弈模型。讨论了逆向供应链间Stackelberg博弈下的四种决策结构：分散分散（DD）模式、分散集中（DC）模式、集中分散（CD）模式、集中集中（CC）模式。研究结果表明，不管追随者逆向供应链如何决策，集中决策是领导者逆向供应链的占优策略；而对于追随者逆向供应链来说，采取何种决策模式，不仅取决于领导者逆向供应链的选择，还受到回收竞争系数及领导者和追随者逆向供应链的成本收益的影响。最后，在上述分析基础上，讨论了链间信息不对称对两条逆向供应链各自决策模式选择的影响。通过数值仿真分析，所得结果表明，当链间竞争强度较低时，，集中集中（CC）模式是链间博弈的均衡策略；当链间竞争较为激烈时，链间博弈均衡策略取决于领导者逆向供应链对追随者逆向供应链的成本预测情况以及回收竞争系数的大小。
[Abstract]:The rapid growth of the quantity of electronic waste has brought great pressure to the resources and environment of the society. Europe, the United States and other developed countries have carried out the relevant legislation and practice of e-waste recovery and treatment earlier, relying on a relatively perfect recovery and treatment system. Electronic waste has been recovered scientifically and effectively. Our government also attaches great importance to the recovery and treatment of electronic waste, and on the basis of drawing lessons from the successful experience of developed countries, it has adopted standardized legislation. Actively carry out recycling pilot in order to find a path of e-waste recovery and treatment in line with China's own national conditions. However, due to the restriction of China's economy, culture, technology and other special national conditions, the recovery and treatment of electronic waste is slow. Therefore, it is necessary to study the links of e-waste recovery and treatment in China in order to provide auxiliary decision support for the government, e-waste recyclers and processors in China. Therefore, on the basis of drawing on the previous research results, this paper establishes the corresponding mathematical model for the identified key problems. First of all, the duopoly game model among electronic waste processors is established. By introducing technological innovation factors, from static game to dynamic game, this paper analyzes the process of obtaining competitive advantage position by processors, and discusses the influence of parameters such as technology overflow rate and recovery competition coefficient on the pricing decision of processors through numerical simulation. The results show that the recovery price and quantity of electronic waste can be increased by implementing technological innovation, and whether the processor can obtain competitive advantage through technological innovation depends on the technological overflow rate. The higher the technology overflow rate, the greater the recovery price and recovery quantity, so that higher social benefits can be achieved, but this will be resisted by innovation practitioners. Secondly, the duopoly game model between processors is extended to the case of double-chain competition, and the double-chain competition game model for the decision mode selection of e-waste processors is constructed. This paper discusses four decision structures under Stackelberg game between reverse supply chains: decentralized (DD) model, decentralized centralized (DC) model, centralized decentralized (CD) model and centralized (CC) model. The results show that no matter how followers make decisions in reverse supply chains, centralized decision-making is the dominant strategy of leaders in reverse supply chains. For the follower reverse supply chain, the decision mode depends not only on the choice of the leader reverse supply chain, but also on the recovery competition coefficient and the cost and benefit of the leader and follower reverse supply chain. Finally, on the basis of the above analysis, the influence of information asymmetry between chains on the choice of decision modes of two reverse supply chains is discussed. Through numerical simulation analysis, the results show that when the competition intensity between chains is low, the centralized (CC) model is the equilibrium strategy of inter-chain game. When the inter-chain competition is fierce, the inter-chain game equilibrium strategy depends on the cost prediction of the leader's reverse supply chain to the follower reverse supply chain and the size of the recovery competition coefficient.
【学位授予单位】：杭州电子科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F224;F713.2;F426.63

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