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考虑市场结构的产品—服务供应链渠道选择模型

发布时间:2019-07-02 10:11
【摘要】:随着经济的发展和电子商务的普及,产品流通的渠道呈现出多样化的趋势。与以往不同的是,制造商既可以通过网络和线下门店,直接面向客户销售产品,又可以与服务商进行捆绑销售。不同的渠道策略直接关系到制造商的市场覆盖范围和消费者需求,并最终影响制造商的盈利能力。所以,渠道选择已经成为制造商和服务商市场策略中至关重要的一环。同时,现有研究仍然较少涉及产品-服务供应链,企业能够参考的依据极少。为了给企业提供可靠的管理建议,本文将建立完整的数学模型,研究不同的市场结构下产品-服务供应链(PSSC)中各个主体(制造商和服务商)如何选择渠道策略,其中不同的市场结构主要体现在供应链参与主体的市场力量和成本结构两个维度。结合市场力量和成本结构,本文考虑四种模型,包括制造商与服务商均衡模型、制造商主导-服务商均衡模型、制造商主导-高效服务商Stackelberg模型、制造商主导-低效服务商Stackelberg模型。同时,在四种不同的模型条件下,利用博弈论的工具和方法,求解四种不同渠道策略的最优价格并且进行利润比较,最后分析结论得到最优的策略选择。本文研究不仅为制造商和服务商论证了不同情况下的最优渠道策略,还为政府反垄断提出了新的调控手段。从供应链总体来看,四种模型中供应链可能选择双渠道捆绑也可能选择捆绑高效服务商,判断条件为供应链成本结构,同时制造商和服务商的市场力量决定了两种渠道策略的临界点;从服务商角度来看,与制造商进行捆绑是服务商的占优策略,同时可以通过调节服务商之间的竞争强度来实现利润最优;从制造商角度来看,制造商可以通过扶持低效服务商来制衡高效服务商,从而维持自身的市场领导地位。从政府角度来看,政府可以通过控制制造商的渠道策略,来实现服务商之间市场力量的平衡,从而达到反垄断的目的。
[Abstract]:With the development of economy and the popularization of e-commerce, the channel of product circulation presents a variety of trends. Different from the past, the manufacturer can sell the product directly to the customer through the network and the offline store, and can be bundled and sold with the service provider. Different channel strategies are directly related to the manufacturer's market coverage and consumer demand, and ultimately affect the manufacturer's profitability. Therefore, channel selection has become an important part in the market strategy of manufacturers and service providers. At the same time, the existing research is still less involved in the product-service supply chain, and the basis for which the enterprise can reference is minimal. In order to provide a reliable management suggestion for the enterprise, this paper will establish a complete mathematical model to study how to select the channel strategy for each main body (manufacturer and service provider) in the product-service supply chain (PSSC) under different market structure. The different market structure is mainly embodied in the market force and cost structure of the main body of the supply chain. In combination with the market force and cost structure, this paper takes into account four models, including the equilibrium model of the manufacturer and the service provider, the manufacturer-led-service provider equilibrium model, the maker-led-high-efficiency service provider Stackelberg model, the manufacturer-led-low-efficiency service provider Stackelberg model. At the same time, under the four different model conditions, the optimal price of four different channel strategies is solved and the profit comparison is carried out by using the tool and the method of the game theory, and the final analysis conclusion is the optimal policy choice. The research not only proves the optimal channel strategy under different circumstances for the manufacturer and the service provider, but also put forward the new regulation means for the government's anti-monopoly. In the overall view of the supply chain, the supply chain in the four models may choose a two-channel bundle or a bundle of high-efficiency service providers, the judgment condition is the supply chain cost structure, and the market forces of the manufacturers and the service providers determine the critical point of the two channel strategies; and from the service provider perspective, Bundling with the manufacturer is the dominant strategy of the service provider, and the profit is optimal by adjusting the competition strength between the service providers; and from the manufacturer's point of view, the manufacturer can check and balance the high-efficiency service provider by supporting the low-efficiency service provider, thereby maintaining the market leadership position of the service provider. From the government point of view, the government can realize the balance of the market forces among the service providers by controlling the manufacturer's channel strategy, so as to achieve the purpose of anti-monopoly.
【学位授予单位】:电子科技大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F274

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