我国上市公司CEO更替的理论与实证研究

发布时间：2018-01-09 18:25

本文关键词：我国上市公司CEO更替的理论与实证研究　出处：《山东大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：CEO更替是董事会做出的最重要决策之一,目前是公司治理机制与治理结构研究的核心课题。同时,更替问题也是约束CEO行为、保持企业健康发展的主要方式。就国内上市公司目前的情况看,自上世界90年代以来,国有企业进行大规模的公司制改革,逐步上市,成为产权结构、公司治理结构相对明晰的,具有一定竞争力的企业,CEO的更替在这一过程中发挥了较大的作用。CEO的管理经验或企业家才能往往能够决定一个企业成长的空间。一旦CEO更替事件发生,企业的股东、董事、客户、供应商、员工、公众等内外部利益相关方都会受到影响。本文研究主要基于东京大学Sato教授(Meg A. Sato,2008)的一个理论模型。论文论证了当CEO更替即将发生时,董事会做出两个重要的决定：监管强度与CEO继任来源的选择(也就是继任政策)。经过理论的推导可知,董事会不愿意进行CEO的更替是有内在理由的。董事会的成员主要包括：CEO,外部董事,内部董事。尽管两类董事对于成为下任CEO有各自不同的动机或诱因,当所有在职的董事共同决定谁将成为下任CEO时,他们都赞成最小化新任者的报酬,因为新任者的预期报酬越少,现任董事会成员的未来收益越多。理论模型推导过程,能够解释为何外部有更出色的候选者,董事会仍然将不是最有才能的内部董事任命为CEO。同时,也能够解释为何董事会倾向于弱化监管并且几乎不会雇佣新CEO。在理论模型推导之后,笔者依据现有的国泰安CSMAR数据库的数据,对理论模型的推导结论进行了实证检验。本文的主要从两个关键决策进行了推导与实证：董事会决定的继任政策与监管强度。在此之前,假定董事会决策的依据为预期报酬或损失。所以在第三章的第一节开始推导了损失的定义与模型的估计,并在节最后分析了损失模型的结果、探讨了模型的意义；随后将董事会的决策过程依据纳什谈判进行求解,得到了董事会各种角色的预期目标与报酬的表达式,分析了决策的制定过程,初步得到Sato教授的模型推导的结论。随后在第四章,对模型得到的定理与推论进行了探索性的验证,获得了这些结论在我国上市公司的实践过程中的实证结果,对比理论模型的定理与推论,分析了理论与实践的差异。本文主要采用了实证研究的方法,针对董事会继任来源选择、继任政策之内部提升倾向性的检验、监管强度的分析、董事会规模假设的验证等重要议题进行了实证检验,获得了目前我国上市公司CEO更替过程中的实际数据。针对理论模型的构建过程,指出模型应用时的不足,甚至可以为模型的改善提供一些实证依据。
[Abstract]:The replacement of CEO is one of the most important decisions made by the board of directors. At present, it is the core topic of the research on corporate governance mechanism and governance structure. At the same time, the replacement problem is also the behavior of restricting CEO. The main way to maintain the healthy development of enterprises. From the current situation of domestic listed companies, since 90s, state-owned enterprises have carried out large-scale corporate system reform, gradually listed, become the structure of property rights. Corporate governance structure is relatively clear, with a certain degree of competitiveness of enterprises. The replacement of CEO plays a great role in this process. The CEO's management experience or entrepreneur's ability can often determine the space of an enterprise's growth. Once the CEO replacement event occurs, the shareholders of the enterprise. Directors, customers, suppliers, employees, the public and other internal and external stakeholders will be affected. This paper is mainly based on a theoretical model developed by Sato Professor, University of Tokyo, China (2008). The paper demonstrates that when CEO turnover is about to take place. The board makes two important decisions: the intensity of regulation and the choice of CEO succession sources (that is, succession policy). There is an inherent reason why the board of directors is unwilling to replace the CEO. The main members of the board include: CEO, external director. Internal directors. Although the two categories of directors have different motivations or incentives to become the next CEO, when all serving directors jointly decide who will become the next CEO, they are in favour of minimizing the remuneration of the new entrants. Because the lower the expected remuneration of the new, the more the future benefits of the current board members. The theoretical modeling process can explain why there are better candidates from the outside. Boards still appoint not the most talented internal directors as CEOs. It can also explain why boards tend to weaken regulation and almost never hire new CEOs. After the theoretical model has been derived. Based on the existing data of Cathay Pacific CSMAR database, the author empirically tests the conclusion of the theoretical model. This paper mainly deduces and proves from two key decisions: succession policy and regulatory intensity decided by the board of directors. Assuming that the decision of the board is based on expected reward or loss, the definition of loss and the estimation of the model are derived in the first section of chapter 3, and the results of the loss model are analyzed at the end of the section. The significance of the model is discussed. Then, the decision-making process of the board of directors is solved according to Nash negotiation, and the expressions of the expected goals and rewards of the various roles of the board of directors are obtained, and the decision-making process is analyzed. The conclusion of the model derivation by Professor Sato is preliminarily obtained, and then in Chapter 4th, the theorems and corollaries obtained from the model are proved. The empirical results of these conclusions in the practice of listed companies in China are obtained, and the differences between theory and practice are analyzed by comparing the theorems and corollaries of theoretical models. This article mainly adopts the empirical research method, aiming at the board of directors succession source choice, the succession policy internal promotion tendency test, the supervision intensity analysis. Some important issues, such as the verification of board size hypothesis, are tested empirically, and the actual data of the CEO turnover process of listed companies in China are obtained, aiming at the construction process of the theoretical model. The deficiency of model application can even provide some empirical evidence for the improvement of the model.
【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F276.6;F832.51;F224

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