公司高管变更的市场反应——来自中国A股市场的经验证据

发布时间：2018-01-20 21:09

本文关键词： 高管变更信息含量事件研究　出处：《北京工商大学学报(社会科学版)》2013年05期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：选取2001—2010年中国沪深A股上市公司的数据为样本,以61天为窗口期,运用事件研究法,对上市公司高管变更事件的市场反应进行了实证检验。结果表明,高管变更事件具有信息含量;高管变更事件既可能被市场解读为好消息,也可能被市场理解为坏消息,具体取决于市场对高管聘任的态度;变更公告发布前累积超常收益率呈上升态势,随着变更公告的发布,累积超常收益率表现为明显的下降态势;国有企业高管变更累积超常收益率为正,非国有企业高管变更累积超常收益率为负;自愿高管变更累积超常收益率为正,强制高管变更累积超常收益率为负;非常规高管变更累积超常收益率高于常规高管变更累积超常收益率。上述发现对完善企业高管聘任机制、推进现代企业制度建设具有重要意义。
[Abstract]:The data of China's Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2001 to 2010 are selected as samples and 61 days as window period, using the method of event research. An empirical test is made on the market reaction of executive change events in listed companies. The results show that executive change events have information content. The change of executives may be interpreted as good news or bad news by the market, depending on the attitude of the market to the appointment of senior executives; Before the announcement of the change announcement, the cumulative abnormal rate of return is on the rise, and with the release of the notice of change, the cumulative extraordinary rate of return is obviously decreasing; The cumulative abnormal rate of return on the change of senior executives in state-owned enterprises is positive, while that of non-state-owned enterprises is negative. The cumulative abnormal rate of return is positive for voluntary change of senior executives, and negative for mandatory change of cumulative abnormal rate of return of senior executives; The above findings are of great significance to improve the mechanism of senior management appointment and promote the construction of modern enterprise system.
【作者单位】：安徽工业大学管理学院;北京工商大学;河南省财经学校;
【基金】：北京市属高等学校人才强教计划“高层次人才资助计划”项目“会计与投资者保护”(PHR20100512) 国家社会科学基金项目“内部资本市场对企业集团成长的作用机制研究”(11BGL022)
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F224
【正文快照】： 一、文献回顾在理性的金融市场上,一个事件(如高层更换、合并、收购、收益公告、再融资行为等)的影响会迅速反映到股票价格中,事件研究法通过衡量股票价格的短期变化,探讨事件的发生对股票价格或企业价值带来的冲击。就高层更换事件而言,运用事件研究法通常就是要研究企业高层

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