国有控股、政府干预与高管薪酬激励

发布时间：2018-03-07 12:16

本文选题：高管薪酬　切入点：激励过度　出处：《重庆工商大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：企业高管是重要而又稀缺的人力资源。在现代公司制企业中，企业高管作为委托代理关系中的代理方，往往与委托方发生利益冲突，如何进行有效的激励与监督并使其充分发挥经营管理职能，一直以来都是理论界研究的重点。高管激励理论起源于西方，并获得了一定的实证支持。然而，这些理论并不一定适合于正处在经济转轨特殊时期的中国，在我国特殊的社会主义市场经济体制下，企业所处的制度环境可能会对企业高管激励产生重大影响。本文分别从“薪酬总量”和“薪酬差距”两个层面对高管薪酬激励进行了分析，希望为企业进行高管薪酬激励设计提供必要的证据支持。本文以我国上市公司为背景，通过对委托代理理论、锦标赛理论、行为理论等相关理论的归纳和概括以及对以往国内外相关研究进行分析总结，在利用上市公司经验数据得出单纯依靠“增加薪酬总量”或“扩大薪酬差距”无法实现薪酬激励预期效果的结论后，分别结合“国有控股”、“政府干预”两个具有中国特色的因素进行深入研究，将高管薪酬激励的扭曲分为激励过度与激励不足，并对薪酬差距进行分层设计，分析发现：（1）在高管薪酬激励不足的企业中，非国有控股企业的股权制衡度与高管薪酬激励不足呈显著负相关关系，而国有控股企业却并非如此。（2）在高管薪酬激励过度的企业中，，国有企业和非国有控股企业的股权制衡度均与高管薪酬激励过度呈负相关关系，只是国有控股企业的显著性更强。（3）在内部薪酬差距不大的公司，适当扩大薪酬差距，有利于提高企业绩效，政府不需进行薪酬干预；在内部薪酬差距较大的公司，继续扩大薪酬差距会对企业绩效的提升起反作用，政府应该对该类企业进行充分适度的干预。本文的特色主要在于把“国有控股”、“政府干预”等中国制度背景纳入了企业高管薪酬激励及其效果的研究，并得到了有一定价值的结论。高效的高管薪酬激励体系的建立并不是一个简单的静态过程，企业内部治理机制、外部宏观环境、国家政策法规以及高管人力资本特征等都是不容忽视的影响因素，需要结合企业内外部实际情况来制定，真正做到具体问题具体分析。本文的研究结果为上市公司和政府等相关管理部门进行薪酬制度改革、构建激励机制和提高企业绩效提供了一定的参考依据。
[Abstract]:Corporate executives are important and scarce human resources. In modern corporate enterprises, as agents in the principal-agent relationship, corporate executives often conflict with their clients' interests. How to carry out effective incentive and supervision and give full play to the function of management and management has always been the focus of theoretical research. The theory of executive incentive originated in the West and has received some empirical support. These theories are not necessarily suitable for China, which is in a special period of economic transition, under the special socialist market economy system of our country. The institutional environment of the enterprise may have a significant impact on the executive incentive. This paper analyzes the executive compensation incentive from the two aspects of "total compensation" and "pay gap". We hope to provide the necessary evidence for the executive compensation incentive design. Based on the background of listed companies in China, this paper summarizes the related theories, such as principal-agent theory, tournament theory, behavior theory and so on, and analyzes and summarizes the related researches at home and abroad. Based on the empirical data of listed companies, it is concluded that it is impossible to achieve the expected effect of salary incentive simply by "increasing the total salary" or "widening the pay gap". Combined with "state-owned holding" and "government intervention", two factors with Chinese characteristics are studied. The distortion of executive compensation incentive is divided into excessive incentive and insufficient incentive, and the pay gap is designed in different layers. It is found that in the enterprises with inadequate executive compensation incentive, the equity balance degree of non-state-owned holding enterprises is negatively correlated with the lack of executive compensation incentive, while the state-owned holding enterprises are not. 2) in the enterprises with excessive executive compensation incentives, there is a significant negative correlation between the equity checks and balances of non-state-owned holding enterprises and the lack of executive compensation incentives. The equity checks and balances of state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned holding enterprises are both negatively related to executive compensation incentive, but the state-owned holding enterprises have stronger significance. 3) in the companies with small internal pay gap, the pay gap should be widened appropriately. In order to improve the performance of enterprises, the government does not need to pay intervention; in the internal pay gap companies, continue to expand the pay gap will be counterproductive to the improvement of corporate performance, the government should take adequate and appropriate intervention to this kind of enterprises. The main features of this paper are that the background of "state-owned holding", "government intervention" and other Chinese institutions are included in the study of executive compensation incentive and its effect. The establishment of efficient executive compensation incentive system is not a simple static process, enterprise internal governance mechanism, external macro environment, National policies and regulations, as well as the characteristics of senior executives' human capital, are all factors that can not be ignored. They need to be formulated in combination with the internal and external actual conditions of the enterprise. The research results of this paper provide a certain reference for listed companies and government and other relevant management departments to carry out salary system reform, to build incentive mechanism and to improve enterprise performance.
【学位授予单位】：重庆工商大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F276.6;F832.51;F224

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