中央银行独立性测度体系及对我国的适配性研究

发布时间：2018-04-21 02:21

  本文选题：中央银行 + 相对独立性　； 参考：《天津财经大学》2012年博士论文

【摘要】：中央银行独立性是有效制定和实施货币政策的前提条件,对于一个国家和地区金融的健康运行至关重要,而独立性测度指标体系是中央银行独立性研究的基础。论文借助已有的测度指标体系,建立了适合我国的中央银行独立性测度指标,从不同角度对我国中央银行独立性进行测度,并对独立性与通货膨胀的关系、独立性作用的适度区间进行了实证分析。论文通过我国中央银行独立性适配性分析,结合我国中央银行的现状,提出适度增强我国中央银行独立性的若干建议。 目前已有的独立性测度指标体系存在一些局限性,如实际操作与立法具有差异性、独立性指标设置过于简单、测度指标在选择上主观性强等。为了更准确地反映现阶段所有影响独立性水平的因素,迫切需要构建适合我国的中央银行独立性测度指标体系,不仅能够为探索独立性与宏观经济之间的内在联系提供理论依据,而且有助于探索独立性最优路径的选择和控制手段的实施。基于这一现状,论文把中央银行的制度结构作为独立性测度的核心,将已有的几种测度指标体系进行了整合,克服了以往指标设置的局限性,提炼出适合我国的中央银行独立性测度指标。具体操作方法为：按照我国具体的经济发展情况,选取更详细的衡量标准并设置相应的条目,赋予每个条目0-1的数值,用中国人民银行发展各阶段的大事件与论文的综合测度条款相对应,从而给出每个条目的得分值,继而得到我国中央银行独立性的指数。这样得到的指数可以从不同角度反映出我国中央银行的独立性程度及其变化。 中央银行独立性指数数值应当科学地界定在具体什么范围?论文通过多元回归嵌套模型的建立和运用给出了答案。论文基于1978-2008年的经验数据,引入收入不平等、固定资产投资等宏观经济变量,对我国中央银行独立性的适度性进行综合分析。实证检验结果发现：中央银行独立性存在一个作用的适度区间,即14.28至20.65之间。论文还对我国中央银行独立性与通货膨胀的关系进行了实证检验,检验结果表明：中央银行独立性与通货膨胀不仅呈负相关关系,并且是通过与基尼系数和固定资产投资增长率的交互作用实现的,具体表现为中央银行独立性指数每增加一个单位,通货膨胀率大约降低3.54个百分点。基于此,论文提出三点政策建议,即：我国应当在一定程度上增强中央银行独立性,这样有助于抑制通货膨胀；应抑制基尼系数的增大,同时转变经济增长方式、以抑制由固定资产投资增加所带来的通货膨胀：在14.28至20.65的区间内适度增加中央银行的独立性,有助于我国经济平稳健康地发展。 中央银行独立性测度指标的内核是其适配性,是与其相关的多重因素相适应的中央银行独立性指标的总和,中央银行独立性测度指标的适配性具有动态性、多维性、异质性和可变性的特征。论文结合我国中央银行现状从中央银行的经济独立性和货币政策决策的独立性两大方面进行了深入分析并提出了相关建议,以进一步说明我国适度增强中央银行独立性的必要性和可能性。
[Abstract]:The independence of the central bank is the prerequisite for the effective formulation and implementation of monetary policy, which is very important for the healthy operation of a country and region, and the index system of independence measure is the basis for the study of the independence of the central bank. The paper measures the independence of China's central bank from different angles, and makes an empirical analysis on the relationship between independence and inflation and the moderate interval of independence. Through the analysis of the suitability of the independence of China's central bank and the current situation of the Central Bank of China, this paper puts forward some appropriate measures to enhance the independence of the Central Bank of China. Suggestion.
There are some limitations in the existing independent measurement index system, such as the difference between the actual operation and the legislation, the simplistic setting of the independence index and the strong subjectivity of the measure index. In order to reflect all the factors that affect the independent level at the present stage, it is urgent to establish the independence of the central bank suitable for our country. The index system of sex measurement can not only provide theoretical basis for exploring the internal relations between independence and macro-economy, but also help to explore the choice of the optimal path of independence and the implementation of control means. Based on this situation, the paper takes the institutional structure of the central bank as the core of the independence measure, and puts forward several measure indexes. The system has been integrated to overcome the limitations of previous index setting and to extract the index of independence measure suitable for China's central bank. The specific operation method is to select more detailed criteria and set corresponding items according to the specific economic development of our country, give 0-1 value of each item, and develop with the people's Bank of China. The large events in each stage correspond to the comprehensive measure clause of the paper, thus giving the score of each item, and then getting the index of the independence of the Central Bank of China, so that the index can reflect the degree and change of the independence of the Central Bank of China from different angles.
What scope should the central bank's independence index value be scientifically defined? The paper gives the answer through the establishment and application of the multiple regression nesting model. Based on 1978-2008 years' empirical data, the paper introduces macroeconomic variables such as income inequality and fixed asset investment, and makes a comprehensive analysis of the moderation of the independence of the Central Bank of China. The results of the empirical test found that there is a moderate interval between the independence of the central bank, that is, between 14.28 and 20.65. The paper also empirically tests the relationship between the independence of the central bank and inflation in China. The results show that the independence of the central bank is not only negatively related to the inflation, but also is passed through the test. Based on the interaction between the Gini coefficient and the growth rate of fixed assets investment, the specific performance of the central bank independence index is an increase of about 3.54 percentage points per unit. Based on this, the paper puts forward three policy suggestions, that is, China should enhance the independence of the central bank to a certain extent, so that it will be helpful. In order to restrain inflation, we should restrain the increase of Gini coefficient and change the way of economic growth in order to restrain the inflation caused by the increase of investment in fixed assets: the moderate increase of the independence of the central bank in the range of 14.28 to 20.65 will help our economy develop smoothly and healthily.
The core of the measure of independence of central bank is its suitability. It is the sum of the independent indexes of the central bank which is related to the multiple factors related to it. The suitability of the independence measure of the central bank is dynamic, multidimensional, heterogeneous and changeable. The thesis is based on the current situation of Central Bank of China from the central bank's economy. The independence and the independence of the monetary policy decision are analyzed in two aspects and the relevant suggestions are put forward to further illustrate the necessity and possibility of China's moderate enhancement of the independence of the central bank.

【学位授予单位】：天津财经大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.31;F224

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