资本约束对我国上市商业银行经营的影响研究

发布时间：2018-05-18 05:32

本文选题：资本约束 + 银行经营　；参考：《西南财经大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：2010年国际巴塞尔委员会出台《巴塞尔协议Ⅲ》,继2004年《新巴塞尔协议》落地不过短短6年时间,随后我国为响应国际协议于2011年出台银行监管新规并于2012年正式实施,这一系列银行监管新框架的推出再一次将银行的资本约束与监管问题推向了热议的高峰。在我国资本市场并不完善的架构下,资本市场融资结构相当失衡,其中间接融资占整个融资结构的75%以上,而银行便成为如此大规模间接融资的承载主体,这使得银行大力开展贷款业务的同时不可避免的成为高风险的集聚主体,而鉴于银行强大的外部效应,对银行资本的监管问题就成为客观必然。本文认为,在我国特殊的政治经济和文化背景下,资本约束不论是作为一种监管机制要求还是作为一种管理手段对银行的经营稳健都带来了巨大的积极效应,但是由于银行主观和客观上的某些原因,使得资本约束下,银行的经营走入了一个循环往复的经营盲区,这在一定程度上对整个银行业和资本市场的健康可持续发展形成了瓶颈,如何避免和摆脱资本约束下银行的经营误区,加大加强资本约束机制的正面积极效应,这也正是本文所要着重探讨的问题。资本约束的本质就是将资本与风险之间建立某种联系,使得资本可以一定程度的覆盖风险资产。随着资本市场和金融环境的日益复杂,金融工具的层出不穷,对银行资本约束的要求也越来越细化和严格,《巴塞尔协议Ⅲ》和我国的银行监管新规中,对资本约束的内涵和外延都做出了进一步的更高层次的要求：从外延上,资本约束在加强资本充足率指标要求的同时,也提出了流动性指标和杠杆指标,这在一定程度上极大的将银行的资产规模和信贷规模控制在资本要求的范围内,减少了银行的风险经营,同时首次提出了计提逆周期资本的要求,这不仅保证了经济上行期银行经营的安全,同时也为经济下行期银行的经营稳健和安全构筑了一道防线;从内涵上,对资本、核心资本、一级核心资本的构成要素也做出了更细化和更为合理的定义,同时在数量指标上加大了资本充足率的要求,可以看到不论是从内涵上还是从外延上,对银行资本约束的要求已经越来越严格和完善,随着我国银行监管新规的出台并最后正式实施,我国的银行监管进入到了一个全新的更为严格和更为完善的监管新时代。在监管新时代下,作为更为细化和更为严格的资本约束要求机制,其对银行的稳健经营起到了巨大的不可替代的积极作用,在更为严格的资本约束机制下,我国的商业银行正在走向一个“更加稳健和安全的运作带动整个银行体系的运转,在充分的风险覆盖和风险化解准备机制下稳步向前,在实现盈利的同时积极的为经济调控、市场稳健做出贡献”的局面。我们可以看到,在资本约束要求下,商业银行正在逐步实现风险可控下的盈利增长。我们可以清晰的看到资本约束巨大的正面积极效应,然而随着资本约束监管要求的不断完善和严格,这枚硬币的反面效应也越来越凸显：在更为严格的资本约束要求下,银行的经营却陷入了一个“融资——放贷——融资”不可自拔的循环往复的经营怪圈。笔者通过对近几年我国16家上市银行在实施资本充足率要求前后的贷款规模、贷款增量、资产规模等财务指标的描述和分析对16家银行资本约束的实施情况和现状进行了探索和研究,得出目前阶段我国上市商业银行在执行资本约束要求下经营的三个特点：1.贷款脱离资本规模而高速扩张是导致商业银行资本充足率下降的最主要原因；2.大量外部融资行为是资本充足率补足与达标的最主要途径；3.信贷投放是拉动银行规模高速增长的核心力量,银行超速扩张局面难控。笔者认为,通过透析这三个特点,可以发现其背后折射出的一种银行经营的逻辑：强大的“规模偏好”和“速度情节”下,资本要求和资本管理并没有纳入银行正常的经营管理体系框架,对资本的一再忽视导致银行不断上演资本充足率倒逼的困境和尴尬,在此种经营模式下,对资本充足率执行的逻辑是一种倒逼式达标。而这种经营逻辑的外化表现就是银行进入了一轮又一轮的“融资——放贷——融资”循环往复的经营怪圈,这不仅使银行的成长陷入了一个不断增资不断倒逼的粗放型非可持续的不良增长模式,同时在银行不断的“膨胀”下,信贷风险如同泡沫越积越多,对整个资本市场和金融环境的稳健也埋下了隐患。为使银行尽快脱离经营怪圈、摒弃粗放和不可持续的增长模式,走入健康的可持续发展的经营正规,笔者对其陷入融资怪圈、步入不良发展的原因进行了深层次的剖析。具体的,笔者从银行经营怪圈的链条出发,找出了突破和断裂此怪圈链条的两个关键环节和节点所在：1.“资本充足率不足——融资补足资本充足率”环节：在资本充足率面临不足时,我国商业银行为什么一定要或热衷于选择资本市场融资的方式来提升资本充足率?2.“资本充足率回升——银行开展信贷业务——资本充足率下降”环节：银行为什么一定要将最能消耗资本的信贷业务作为主要经营业务?或者说银行为什么不将信贷业务扩展速度和风险程度限制在资本约束的范围内从而保持规模、风险、资本三者的均衡增长?笔者认为,以上两个问题的答案便是银行陷入融资怪圈的成因,换言之,如果突破或改善以上两个环节便可以期待打断整个怪圈的链条的衔接,银行即可突破融资怪圈。对此笔者通过系统性的深入探析发掘出银行深陷怪圈的几点原因：从宏观方面说,我国银行陷入融资怪圈有其相应的制度背景：由于相对于西方发达国家,我国资本市场的发展并不成熟和完善,由计划经济转轨市场经济也不过三十几年的时间,在整个资本市场的融资中,间接融资依然作为融资的主导,据相关统计,我国的融资结构基本是失衡和不合理的,在整体资本市场融资中,间接融资占据了75%以上的比例,而发行股票、债券等直接融资却不到15%。商业银行作为间接融资的主要承担者,其一方面将贷款作为核心业务也“顺理成章”,另一方面银行作为间接融资的主要承担者的同时就决定了其成为风险的承担者,这些都会不同程度的降低资本充足率,使得银行不断的面临资本充足率“踩线”的威迫,成为其陷入融资怪圈的间接杀手。另一方面,银行作为一种具有特殊作用和经济功能的市场主体,为保持国家每年一定比例的经济增长、扶持经济发展,大力开展贷款业务也就成为必然。从银行个体的微观方面说,笔者认为主要存在以下几点原因：1.我国上市商业银行并没有建立一个以资本管理为核心的有效资本规模约束业务扩张的健康可持续经营管理模式。2.我国上市商业银行的业务构成单一,中间业务、金融创新的新兴业务的发展完全还处于起步和探索阶段。3.我国商业银行在经营中并没有建立一个科学和先进的风险管理体系,风险管理水平普遍低下。4.我国商业银行普遍缺乏一个有效的资本补充机制,资本内生能力差,内源性融资明显不足。归根结底,笔者认为其最本质的原因源于银行的经营理念的偏差,银行应摒弃传统的“规模偏好”和“速度情节”,将银行安全问题落实到实实在在的经营流程中去。最后,文章针对以上银行存在的问题,对如何强化资本约束,构建可持续发展的银行体系提出了自己的几点思考和建议：1.转变银行经营理念,从价值观和本质上解读资本约束的要求；2.强化资本硬约束,大力构建以资本管理为核心的银行经营体系：3.树立和加强银行风险观,提高银行风险控制水平并加强对经济资本的管理；4.改变传统利差时代,逐步实现多元化业务转轨,提高资本使用效率；5.提升内生资本的培养和补足机制,从粗放型增长转轨到内涵式增长；6.拓宽外部融资渠道,减少融资与资本压力；7.逐步实现利率管制向利率市场化的转轨。在资本市场不断发展和完善的浪潮下,银行的经营正面临着一场质变的改革,银行很快会走出“短痛”局面,构建一个全新的科学的稳健的银行体系,在资本约束的有效实施下,稳步健康向前发展。
[Abstract]:In 2010, the international Basel committee introduced the Basel Agreement III, followed by the new Basel agreement in 2004, only 6 years, followed by the implementation of the new regulation of banking supervision in 2011 in response to the international agreement and the formal implementation in 2012. The new framework of this series of bank supervision and regulation once again put the capital constraints and supervision of the bank. Under the imperfect structure of China's capital market, the capital market financing structure is quite unbalanced, in which the indirect financing accounts for more than 75% of the whole financing structure, and the bank has become the main body of such large-scale indirect financing, which makes the bank develop the loan business and inevitably become a high wind. In view of the special political economy and cultural background of our country, the capital constraint has brought a huge product to the stable operation of the bank, whether it is a regulatory mechanism or as a management means. But because of the subjective and objective reasons of the bank, the bank's operation has entered a blind area under the constraints of capital, which has formed a bottleneck for the healthy and sustainable development of the whole banking and capital market to a certain extent, and how to avoid and get rid of the misunderstandings of the banks under capital constraints. The positive effect of strengthening the capital constraint mechanism is also what this article will focus on.
The essence of capital constraint is to establish a certain connection between capital and risk, so that the capital can cover the risk assets to a certain extent. With the increasing complexity of the capital market and the financial environment, the financial instruments emerge in an endless stream, and the requirements for the bank capital constraints are becoming more and more detailed and strict. < Basel III > and China's banking supervision. In the new regulation, the connotation and extension of capital constraints are further higher level: from the extension, capital constraints, while strengthening the requirements of the capital adequacy index, also put forward the liquidity index and leverage index, which, to a certain extent, controls the bank's asset scale and credit scale in capital requirements. Within the scope, the risk management of the bank is reduced. At the same time, the requirements of the counter cyclical capital are put forward for the first time. This not only ensures the safety of the bank operation in the economic uplink period, but also constructs a line of defense for the stable and safe operation of the bank in the economic downlink period, and the elements of capital, core capital and the first class core capital from the connotation. It has also made a more detailed and more reasonable definition. At the same time, the demand of capital adequacy ratio is increased on the quantity index. It can be seen that the demand for bank capital constraints is more and more strict and perfect in terms of connotation and extension. With the introduction of new regulation and the final implementation of China's banking regulation, China's banking supervision In the new era of supervision, as a more detailed and more strict demand mechanism for capital constraints, it has played a huge and irreplaceable role in the stable operation of the bank. Under the more stringent capital constraint mechanism, the commercial banks of our country are taking off under the new era of supervision. To a "more robust and safe operation to drive the operation of the whole banking system, steady progress under the full risk coverage and risk mitigation preparation mechanism, and make a positive contribution to economic control and market stability while realizing profit," we can see that commercial banks are progressively under the demand of capital constraints. Profit growth under risk control.
We can clearly see the positive positive effect of capital constraints. However, with the continuous improvement and strict requirements of capital restraint supervision, the reverse effect of this coin is becoming more and more obvious: under the stricter demand for capital constraints, the operation of the bank has fallen into a "financing - lending - financing". Through the description and analysis of the loan scale, loan increment, asset scale and other financial indexes of 16 listed banks before and after the requirement of capital adequacy ratio in recent years, the author explored and studied the implementation and present situation of the capital constraints of 16 banks, and reached the current stage of China's Listed Commercial banks. The three characteristics of the bank under the requirements of capital constraints: 1. the main reason for the decline of the capital adequacy ratio of commercial banks is the rapid expansion of the loan from the scale of capital; 2. a large number of external financing behavior is the most important way for the capital adequacy ratio to complement and reach the standard, and the 3. credit investment and release is the core of the rapid growth of the bank scale. The author believes that, through the three characteristics of dialysis, we can find that a kind of bank management logic behind it can be found: strong "scale preference" and "speed plot", capital requirements and capital management are not included in the normal management system framework of the bank, and the capital is repeated again and again. Ignoring the predicament and embarrassment that led to the banks' continuous performance of capital adequacy ratio, the logic of the implementation of capital adequacy is an upside down standard under such a mode of operation. Only the growth of the bank has fallen into an unsustainable and unsustainable growth model of continuous expansion of capital and constant "inflation". At the same time, under the constant "expansion" of the bank, the credit risk, like a bubble, has also buried a hidden danger to the stability of the whole capital market and the financial environment.
In order to make the bank break away from the business circle as soon as possible, abandon the extensive and unsustainable growth mode and enter the healthy and sustainable development management, the author deeply analyzes the reason why it falls into the strange circle of financing and enters the bad development. Two key links and nodes of the chain: 1. "insufficient capital adequacy ratio - financing sufficient capital adequacy ratio" link: when the capital adequacy ratio is insufficient, why should our commercial banks have to improve capital adequacy ratio in the way of choosing capital market financing? 2. "recovery of capital adequacy ratio - bank opening Credit spread business - a decline in capital adequacy ratio: why should banks have to use the most capital - consuming credit business as the main business? Or why banks do not limit the expansion and risk of credit business in the scope of capital constraints to maintain scale, risk and balanced growth of the three capital of capital? The answer is that the answer to the above two questions is the cause of banks falling into the financing circle. In other words, if the above two links are broken or improved, the link between the chain of the whole circle can be interrupted, and the bank can break through the financing circle.
The author finds out the reasons for the bank's deep trap through systematic analysis: from the macro point of view, the Bank of our country has its corresponding institutional background in the financial circle: compared with the developed countries in the west, the development of China's capital market is not mature and perfect, and the transition from planned economy to market economy is also thirty In the past few years, indirect financing is still the leading financing in the financing of the whole capital market. According to the relevant statistics, the financing structure of our country is basically unbalanced and unreasonable. In the overall capital market financing, indirect financing occupies more than 75% of the proportion, while the direct financing such as issuing shares and bonds is not the Commercial Bank of 15%.. The main undertaker of indirect financing, on the one hand, the loan as the core business is also "logical", on the other hand, as the main bearer of the indirect financing, the bank determines its risk bearer, which will reduce the capital adequacy ratio in varying degrees, so that the bank is constantly faced with the capital adequacy ratio "stepping on the line". On the other hand, as a market subject with special role and economic function, the bank is necessary to maintain a certain proportion of the country's economic growth every year, support the economic development and develop the loan business. The following reasons are as follows: 1. China's listed commercial banks have not established a healthy and sustainable management model with the capital management as the core of the effective capital scale constraint business expansion.2.. The business of the listed commercial banks in China is single, the intermediate business and the new business development of financial innovation are still in the start and exploration. Stage.3. China's commercial banks have not established a scientific and advanced risk management system in their operation, and the level of risk management is generally low..4. is generally lack of an effective capital replenishment mechanism, the inability of capital and the inadequacy of endogenous financing. The deviation of business philosophy is that banks should abandon traditional "scale preference" and "speed plot", and carry out the problem of bank security into real business process.
Finally, in view of the problems existing in the banks above, the paper puts forward some thoughts and suggestions on how to strengthen capital constraints and build a sustainable development bank system: 1. change the concept of bank management, interpret the requirements of capital constraints from values and essence; 2. strengthen the hard constraints of capital, and vigorously construct the core of capital management. Bank management system: 3. set up and strengthen the bank risk concept, improve the bank risk control level and strengthen the management of economic capital; 4. change the era of traditional spreads, gradually realize the transformation of diversified business, improve the efficiency of capital use; 5. enhance the cultivation of endogenous capital and complement the system, from extensive type of growth to connotation growth; 6 Broaden the external financing channels, reduce the pressure of financing and capital. 7., gradually transform the interest rate control to the marketization of interest rate.
In the tide of the continuous development and perfection of the capital market, the bank's operation is facing a qualitative change. The bank will soon get out of the "short pain" situation and build a new and scientific and stable banking system. Under the effective implementation of the capital constraint, the bank will develop steadily and healthily.
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.33

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