上市公司独立董事数量:大股东间的博弈均衡点

发布时间：2018-05-23 20:00

本文选题：独立董事 + 大股东　；参考：《中南财经政法大学学报》2010年01期

【摘要】：既定数量的独立董事是大股东之间以法规要求作为约束条件博弈的结果,加上独立董事提名平均分配机制的存在,导致了独立董事数量的超额或不足。以2005年和2008年沪深证券交易所的A股上市公司为总样本的经验研究发现:独立董事超额的公司均衡点临近股东持股比例差的均值显著小于独立董事不足的公司。在考虑了其他相关控制变量后,logistic回归结果表明,独立董事均衡点临近股东持股比例差显著影响独立董事数量。此外,控股股东性质和公司规模也对独立董事数量产生影响。
[Abstract]:The fixed number of independent directors is the result of the game between the major shareholders with the requirement of regulations as the constraint condition, and the existence of the mechanism of equal distribution of the nomination of independent directors leads to the excess or deficiency of the number of independent directors. The empirical study of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2005 and 2008 shows that the average value of the equilibrium point near shareholders' shareholding difference of the excess independent directors is significantly lower than that of the companies with insufficient independent directors. After taking into account other relevant control variables, the logistic regression results show that the proportion of independent directors is significantly affected by the difference in the proportion of independent directors. In addition, the nature of controlling shareholders and the size of the company also have an impact on the number of independent directors.
【作者单位】：中央财经大学会计学院;新疆财经大学会计学院;
【分类号】：F276.6;F832.51;F224.32

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