有限理性监管、初步询价和IPO定价效率

发布时间：2018-05-30 14:09

本文选题：有限理性监管 + 初步询价　；参考：《经济管理》2010年05期

【摘要】：在询价机制中加入初步询价阶段是我国累计投标询价机制区别于国际通行做法的主要特征。作为定价源头,初步询价为定价提供了最重要信息。本文从询价规则本身合理性出发,研究了初步询价在定价程序中的关键作用。研究发现,监管者的有限理性导致询价规则本身存在缺陷;由初步询价得到的初始价格区间主要受到询价家数、筹资额和市场整体回报影响,研究结果不同于成熟市场的结论;由于询价规则存在歧视性分配机制缺失、发行价受到控制和初步询价报价无有效约束等缺陷,初步询价没有改善定价效率。
[Abstract]:Adding the initial inquiry stage to the inquiry mechanism is the main characteristic of the accumulative bidding inquiry mechanism in China which is different from the international common practice. As the source of pricing, preliminary inquiry provides the most important information for pricing. Based on the reasonableness of inquiry rules, this paper studies the key role of preliminary inquiry in pricing procedure. It is found that the limited rationality of the regulator leads to the defects of the inquiry rule itself, and the initial price range obtained from the initial inquiry is mainly affected by the number of inquiries, the amount of funds raised and the overall return of the market. The results of the study are different from the conclusions of the mature market. Due to the absence of discriminatory distribution mechanism in the inquiry rules, the control of the issuing price and the lack of effective constraints on the initial inquiry quotation, the initial inquiry has not improved the pricing efficiency.
【作者单位】：上海财经大学金融学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目“基金治理与投资者利益保护研究”(70803027) 上海市哲学社会科学规划项目“证券投资基金投资者利益保护研究”(2008BJB004) 上海市教委曙光计划项目“基金治理问题根源与金融财富的不和谐分配”(08SG34) 上海财经大学研究生科研创新基金项目“非理性监管、利益博弈和IPO异常询价”(CXJJ-2009-329)
【分类号】：F832.51

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