房地产市场博弈中银行行为对宏观调控的影响及对策

发布时间：2018-06-16 13:42

本文选题：房地产市场博弈 + 银行行为　；参考：《国家行政学院学报》2010年05期

【摘要】：近年来,房价持续上涨,房地产市场参与主体的利益博弈格局和博弈程度日趋激烈,市场发展趋势扑朔迷离,我国房地产市场发展正处于一个关键时期。以银行为主体的金融机构既是国家通过货币政策实施宏观经济调控的重要执行者和政策传导者,作为市场中的经济利益主体,又是参与市场利益分配的经济人,银行在与政府、开发商和购房者的博弈中,其经济行为关系着自己作为独立经济利益市场主体的可持续发展也影响着宏观政策的调控实施效果预期。本文运用博弈论和理性预期理论对银行与房地产市场参与主体之间的利益博弈和银行业务模式行为对宏观调控政策的影响进行了分析并提出了政策建议。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the rising of house prices, the interest game pattern and game degree of the participants in the real estate market are becoming more and more intense, and the development trend of the market is uncertain. The development of the real estate market in China is in a critical period. The financial institutions with banks as the main body are not only the important executors and policy transmitters of the national macro-economic regulation and control through monetary policy, but also the economic interest subjects in the market, and the economic people who participate in the distribution of market interests. The banks are working with the government. In the game between developers and buyers, their economic behavior is related to their sustainable development as the main body of independent economic interest market, and it also affects the expectation of the effect of macro-policy regulation and implementation. In this paper, the game theory and rational expectation theory are used to analyze the benefit game between the banks and the real estate market participants, and the influence of the bank business model behavior on the macro-control policy, and some policy suggestions are put forward.
【作者单位】：中国科学技术大学;中央财经大学;
【分类号】：F293.3;F832.4;F123.16

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