制造商和零售商基于品牌的冲突与合作

发布时间：2018-01-20 05:51

本文关键词： 制造商零售商品牌冲突合作广告服务　出处：《暨南大学》2008年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】： 20世纪80年代以来,零售商通过扩大的市场势力改变了原有制造商和零售商之间的力量对比。零售商基于短期利益(利润)考虑,通过降价促销或降低售后服务水平等一系列纵向控制措施,来损害制造商的长期利益(品牌)。不仅如此,许多大型的零售商通过建立自有品牌商品与制造商商品抢夺市场,使得二者的冲突更加激化。本文认为制造商和零售商关于品牌的冲突就是零售商实施纵向控制的新表现,其原因在于二者还持有传统的对立观念——通过损害他人利益来使自己获利。在制造商和零售商品牌冲突的情况下,制造商应该积极主动寻求与零售商的合作,激励零售商参与制造商品牌的建设才是长久之计。现代生产和分销体制下,广告和服务成为品牌的核心要素。因此,本文从这两个要素出发,来说明制造商应该如何与零售商进行合作。制造商和零售商针对同一产品所作的广告虽不同但存在互补功能,所以制造商应该承担地方性广告的部分费用以达到对零售商的激励。本文讨论了制造商和零售商的简单合作广告博弈模型和多阶段博弈模型得出,制造商积极进行品牌建设,并使零售商获得较高的边际利润,同时和零售商建立长期合作关系,可以提高二者的合作广告效率。现实中,制造商无法观测零售商对其产品提供的服务,这样就导致了二者基于服务的委托—代理关系。本文建立一个服务水平的委托—代理模型,通过对信息对称和不对称情况的比较发现信息不对称降低了零售商的努力程度、增加了销售增量的奖励。所以制造商应该激励零售商进行信息共享,减少二者之间信息不对称的现象。
[Abstract]:Since 1980s, the retailer has changed the balance of power between the manufacturer and the retailer by expanding the market power of retailers. Based on short-term interests (profits), through price promotions or reduce customer service service level and a series of vertical control measures, damage the long-term interests of manufacturers (brand). Moreover, many large retailers through the establishment of its own brand merchandise and merchandise manufacturers grab the market, making the two conflict intensified.
The performance of the new manufacturers and retailers on the conflict between brands is the implementation of vertical retailers control, the reason is that the two also holds the traditional concept of opposites -- through their own profit to damage the interests of others to make. In the manufacturer and the retailer brand conflict situation, manufacturers should actively seek cooperation with retailers, manufacturers of brand retailers to participate in the construction of incentive is a permanent solution. Modern production and distribution system, advertising and services become the core elements of the brand. Therefore, this article from the two elements of that manufacturer should be how to cooperate with retailers.
The manufacturer and the retailer in the same product ads are different but complementary, so manufacturers should share the expenses of local advertising to retailers. This paper discusses the incentive game model of cooperative advertising game model of manufacturer and retailer and manufacturer of active stage, brand building, and marginal profit the retailer was higher, and establish long-term cooperation relationship with retailers, the two cooperation can improve the efficiency of advertising.
In reality, manufacturers can not observe retailers servicing their products, resulting in the two principal-agent relationship service based on principal-agent model. This paper establishes a service level, by comparison of symmetric and asymmetric information asymmetry information reduces the effort of retailers, increased incremental sales reward. So manufacturers should encourage retailers to share information, reduce the information asymmetry between the two phenomena.

【学位授予单位】：暨南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2008
【分类号】：F273.2;F406;F717;F224

【引证文献】