基于不完全合约的企业高管激励与审计的互补性研究

发布时间：2018-01-06 07:15

本文关键词：基于不完全合约的企业高管激励与审计的互补性研究　出处：《成都理工大学》2010年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】： 本文采用规范研究与实证研究相结合的方法,首先从我国企业的委托-代理关系出发,阐明委托人给予代理人的激励合约即高管激励是有缺陷的(本文中所探讨的高管激励主要指对高管的显性激励),而弥补这种缺陷的措施之一就是引入了外部审计制度,这是本论文研究的背景所在。接着从合约的制度层面分别分析了作为委托-代理主要合约的激励合约和审计合约的不完全性,通过论证,证明了激励合约和审计合约具有互补性,即审计合约可以同激励合约进行效率改进,达到一种稳定的优化状态,进而改善委托-代理关系。这是本文理论研究的一个结论。接着本文基于不完全合约理论,构建了一个由董事会、高管和外部审计部门构成的三方不完全合约模型,并对模型进行了求解分析,主要得出以下结论:当董事会加大对高管和外部审计部门违规查处力度时,高管和外部审计部门的违规动机有所下降;若高管可以获得增大的激励收益时,他的违规动机是减弱的,但减弱程度同董事会的严查程度正相关;外部审计部门同高管合谋时获取的贿赂越多,外部审计部门越有动机配合高管的违规,但高管却会因为未得到相应的风险收益而使其违规动机得到抑制;当董事会获得更多的超额收益时,也就是董事会若不进行严查损失越大时,其严查的动机越大,但严查动机又同严查成本负相关,这使得董事会不得不在超额收益同严查成本之间寻找最佳平衡点。理论模型构建后,本文选取了京津地区的上市公司在2007年-2009年三年间稀释每股收益、经营费用率、财务杠杆,前三位高管报酬总和和聘用的外部会计事务所是否为“国内十大”等变量指标,构建实证模型进行Logistic回归分析,以此来验证由不完全合约理论推导的模型结论,通过实证分析,得出了当董事会加大对高管和外部审计部门严查的概率或者增强处罚力度时,严查机制产生作用,高管和外部审计部门的违规动机有所下降;当高管的违规收益增大时,高管的违规动机增强,此时处罚成本对高管违规行为的约束不明显;当高管的激励收益增大时,高管的违规动机减弱,但减弱程度同董事会的严查程度正相关;外部审计部门同高管合谋时获取的贿赂越多,外部审计部门越有动机配合高管的违规,但高管却会因为未得到相应的风险收益而使其违规动机得到抑制;当董事会获得更多的超额收益时,也就是董事会不进行严查损失越大时,其严查动机越大,但严查动机又同严查成本负相关。董事会不得不在超额收益同严查成本之间寻找最佳平衡点。最终理论模型的结论得以证实,同时激励合约同审计合约的互补性也进一步实证中得到了体现。
[Abstract]:This paper adopts the method of combining normative research with empirical research, starting from the principal-agent relationship of Chinese enterprises. It is clarified that the incentive contract given by the principal to the agent, that is, the executive incentive, is flawed (the executive incentive discussed in this paper mainly refers to the explicit incentive to the executive). One of the measures to remedy this defect is to introduce the external audit system. This is the background of this thesis. Then from the contract system level, the paper analyzes the incompleteness of incentive contract and audit contract as principal principal-agent contract, and proves the incompleteness of the incentive contract and audit contract. It is proved that the incentive contract and the audit contract are complementary, that is, the audit contract can improve the efficiency with the incentive contract, and achieve a stable state of optimization. And then improve the principal-agent relationship. This is a conclusion of the theoretical study in this paper. Then, based on incomplete contract theory, this paper constructs a board of directors. The three-party incomplete contract model composed by senior executives and external audit departments is solved and analyzed. The main conclusions are as follows: when the board of directors strengthens the investigation and punishment of executives and external audit departments. The motivation of executives and external audit departments to violate the regulations has decreased; If the executive can obtain increased incentive income, his motivation to violate the regulations is weakened, but the degree of abatement is positively related to the degree of scrutiny of the board; The more bribes the external audit department acquires with the senior executives, the more motivated the external audit departments have to cooperate with the executives' violations, but the executives will restrain their offending motives because they do not get the corresponding risk returns. When the board of directors obtains more excess returns, that is, if the board of directors does not carry out a serious inspection the greater the loss, the greater the motivation of strict inspection, but the more negative correlation between the motivation and the cost of strict inspection. This makes the board of directors have to find the best balance between excess income and cost. This paper selects Beijing-Tianjin listed companies in 2007 to 2009 to dilute earnings per share, operating expenses, financial leverage. The total compensation of the top three executives and whether the external accounting firm employed are variables such as "the top ten in China", an empirical model is constructed to carry out Logistic regression analysis. In order to verify the model conclusions derived from incomplete contract theory, through empirical analysis, it is concluded that when the board of directors increases the probability of strict investigation of executives and external audit departments or strengthen the punishment. The mechanism of strict inspection has had an effect, and the motivation of executives and external audit departments to violate the regulations has decreased; When the revenue of the executive is increased, the motivation of the executive is enhanced, and the penalty cost has no obvious constraint on the executive's violation. When the incentive income of the executive increases, the incentive of the executive weakens, but the degree of abatement is positively related to the degree of the board of directors' strict investigation. The more bribes the external audit department acquires with the senior executives, the more motivated the external audit departments have to cooperate with the executives' violations, but the executives will restrain their offending motives because they do not get the corresponding risk returns. When the board of directors obtains more excess returns, that is, if the board of directors does not conduct strict checks on the losses, the greater the motivation. However, the motive of strict inspection is negatively correlated with the cost of strict inspection. The board of directors has to find the best balance point between excess return and cost. The conclusion of the final theoretical model can be confirmed. At the same time, the complementarities between incentive contracts and audit contracts are further demonstrated.
【学位授予单位】：成都理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2010
【分类号】：F272;F239.4;F224

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