审计师声誉与银行信贷资源配置——基于银行信用借款决策的经验证据

发布时间：2018-01-06 07:42

本文关键词：审计师声誉与银行信贷资源配置——基于银行信用借款决策的经验证据　出处：《审计研究》2011年05期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：本文以2001至2006年沪深A股上市公司为样本,从银行信用借款决策的视角,研究了审计师声誉对银行信贷资源配置的影响。研究发现,聘请高声誉审计师的上市公司更可能获得银行信用借款(即存在"门槛效应")且信用借款的比例更高(即存在"约束效应");在区分产权性质后发现,国有控股公司中审计师声誉机制主要体现为"约束效应",其原因在于"政治关系"是一种更可靠的替代机制;非国有控股公司中仅存在审计师声誉机制的"门槛效应",主要归因于我国司法体系不健全,银行将寻求其他更可靠的替代机制。研究结果表明审计师声誉是一种有效的资源配置机制,但其有效性受制度环境的制约。
[Abstract]:This paper takes Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as samples from 2001 to 2006 to study the impact of auditor reputation on the allocation of bank credit resources from the perspective of bank credit loan decision. Listed companies with high reputation auditors are more likely to obtain bank credit loans (i.e. "threshold effect") and the proportion of credit loans is higher (that is, there is "constraint effect"); After distinguishing the nature of property right, it is found that the reputation mechanism of auditors in state-owned holding companies is mainly reflected as "constraint effect", the reason is that "political relationship" is a more reliable alternative mechanism; There is only the threshold effect of auditor reputation mechanism in non-state-owned holding companies, which is mainly attributed to the unsound judicial system in our country. Banks will seek more reliable alternatives. The results show that auditor reputation is an effective resource allocation mechanism, but its effectiveness is limited by the institutional environment.
【作者单位】：南京审计学院;厦门大学管理学院;
【基金】：江苏省教育厅人文社科一般项目(2010SJB630041)的资助
【分类号】：F239.4;F832.4;F224
【正文快照】： 一、引言在转轨经济时期,我国企业的外部融资渠道相对单一,银行借款已成为企业融资的首选,2001至2008年《中国人民银行货币执行报告》的数据显示非金融机构通过借款融资的比例始终保持在80%左右。与担保借款相比,银行信用借款没有担保物保证贷款的相对安全,也没有向第三方保

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