投资机会、可操控性应计利润与审计质量的相关性研究

发布时间：2018-09-07 17:10

【摘要】：审计作为企业的一种监督监管手段和制度安排，它不仅可以有效解决企业内部的代理问题，而且还可以约束企业经营管理人员的机会主义行为。同时，企业投资机会的研究也是长期以来公司治理中学者们最为关注的领域之一。因此，本文主要通过将审计质量与企业投资机会这一新兴概念相联系，通过实证检验二者之间的关系。本文选取我国在上海和深圳上市的A股企业2006年至2010年的财务数据作为研究样本，通过剔除金融保险行业和数据不完整样本，得出了5698个样本数据，构造了两个回归模型分别检验了审计质量与企业投资机会之间的相关性，，和在引入可操控性应计利润后的内在关系。通过实证检验发现，拥有高投资机会的企业为监督其管理人员更倾向于选择高质量的审计，且随着企业投资机会的增加，高质量的审计需求也会随之上升，即二者存在着显著的正相关关系。为了进一步探讨内在原因，本文又引入了可操控性应计利润这一盈余管理的变量，进一步研究发现，拥有高投资机会的企业相对于低投资机会企业普遍存在更为严重的盈余管理问题，在经高质量审计时，可操控性应计利润水平会相对较低，即高审计质量可以在一定程度上有效抑制高投资机会企业的盈余管理程度，所以进一步解释了高投资机会企业更倾向于追求高质量审计。文章的主要内容和结构如下：第一部分主要介绍了文章的研究背景和意义，国内外研究现状和文献综述，研究方法和研究框架以及本文的创新。第二部分将审计质量，企业投资机会和可操控性应计利润等相关概念和理论基础作具体阐述，并在此基础上分析其关系。第三部分在已有的理论基础上设计实证回归模型，包括研究假设，样本数据规模和来源，变量设计和回归模型设计。第四部分分析研究变量之间的实证结果。第五部分，针对实证结论提出对策及相关建议。第六部分，总结全文的结论和指出本文研究的局限及不足。
[Abstract]:As a means of supervision and institutional arrangement, audit can not only effectively solve the agency problem within the enterprise, but also restrain the opportunistic behavior of the enterprise management personnel. At the same time, the research of enterprise investment opportunities is one of the most concerned areas in corporate governance. Therefore, this article mainly through the audit quality and the enterprise investment opportunity this new concept is related, through the empirical examination between the two relations. This paper selects the financial data of A-share companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen as the research samples from 2006 to 2010, and obtains 5698 sample data by excluding the incomplete samples of financial insurance industry and data. Two regression models are constructed to examine the correlation between audit quality and investment opportunities, and the internal relationship after the introduction of controllability accrual profit. Through the empirical test, it is found that enterprises with high investment opportunities tend to choose high-quality audit in order to supervise their managers, and with the increase of investment opportunities, the demand for high-quality audit will also rise. That is, there is a significant positive correlation between the two. In order to further explore the internal reasons, this paper introduces the controllable accrual profit as a variable of earnings management, and finds that, Enterprises with high investment opportunities generally have more serious earnings management problems than those with low investment opportunities. After high quality audit, accrual profit levels of maneuverability are relatively low. That is, high audit quality can effectively restrain the earnings management degree of high investment opportunity enterprises to a certain extent, so it further explains that high investment opportunity enterprises are more inclined to pursue high quality audit. The main contents and structure of the paper are as follows: the first part mainly introduces the research background and significance of the article, the domestic and foreign research status and literature review, research methods and research framework, as well as the innovation of this paper. In the second part, the related concepts and theoretical basis, such as audit quality, investment opportunity and controllable accrual profit, are elaborated in detail, and the relationship between them is analyzed. In the third part, empirical regression models are designed on the basis of existing theories, including research hypothesis, sample data size and source, variable design and regression model design. The fourth part analyzes the empirical results between variables. The fifth part, according to the empirical conclusions, put forward the countermeasures and related recommendations. The sixth part summarizes the conclusions and points out the limitations and shortcomings of this paper.
【学位授予单位】：首都经济贸易大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F239.4;F275;F224

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