双重股权结构下的中小投资者利益保护——基于Facebook收购WhatsApp的案例研究

发布时间：2018-04-05 15:08

本文选题：双重股权结构　切入点：创始人控制权　出处：《中国工业经济》2017年01期

【摘要】：企业股权安排的核心是寻求"控制权"和"现金流权"的有效匹配和均衡,基于股东同质性假定的"一股一票"投票权设计,因其与股东异质性现实的偏离,并不一定是唯一以及最优的匹配方式。以股东异质性客观事实为基础进行投票权制度创新,或许能提供新的洞见。本文以Facebook收购WhatsA pp为研究案例,从股东异质性视角,采用案例研究方法探讨双重股权结构对创始人控制权保持和中小投资者利益保护的治理机理,及其产生中小投资者利益保护效应的作用路径。研究表明:创始人与外部股东在投资目的、资源基础,以及风险承担方面存在明显的差异,此时双重股权结构作为适应股东异质性现实的制度创新,能通过制度化控制权来源保持创始人控制权,并通过维持和保护独特的企业文化、贯彻企业长期战略、提升管理层抗压能力、提高管理层决策效率路径产生中小投资者利益保护效应。并且,这种中小投资者利益保护效应的产生依赖于基于心理所有权和资产专用性投入的创始人自我约束机制控制以及激烈的产品市场竞争约束。本文从股东异质性视角深化了对双重股权结构治理机理的理解,也为化解当前企业发展过程中的"融资与创始人控制权保持"矛盾提供了必要的实践启示。
[Abstract]:The core of the enterprise equity arrangement is to seek the effective matching and equilibrium of "control right" and "cash flow right". The "one share, one vote" voting right design based on the assumption of shareholder homogeneity is based on the deviation from the reality of shareholder heterogeneity.It is not necessarily the only and best way to match.The innovation of voting rights system based on the objective facts of shareholder heterogeneity may provide new insights.This paper takes Facebook acquisition of WhatsA pp as a case study, from the perspective of shareholder heterogeneity, using the case study method to explore the governance mechanism of dual ownership structure on the maintenance of founder control rights and the protection of the interests of small and medium-sized investors.And how to protect the interests of small and medium investors.The research shows that there are obvious differences between the founder and the external shareholders in investment purpose, resource base, and risk taking. At this time, the dual equity structure is the institutional innovation adapted to the shareholder heterogeneity reality.Be able to maintain founder control through institutionalized sources of control, and to maintain and protect unique corporate culture, carry out long-term strategies, and enhance management's ability to resist stress,Improving the efficiency of management decision-making has the effect of protecting the interests of small and medium investors.Moreover, the benefit protection effect of small and medium-sized investors depends on the control of the founder's self-restraint mechanism based on psychological ownership and asset specific input and the fierce competition constraints in the product market.From the perspective of shareholder heterogeneity, this paper deepens the understanding of the governance mechanism of dual equity structure, and also provides necessary practical enlightenment for resolving the contradiction between financing and the maintenance of founder's right of control in the process of enterprise development.
【作者单位】：天津财经大学商学院;四川大学商学院;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学基金青年项目“制度环境、公司层面股东权利配置与中小投资者利益保护”(批准号13YJC630074) 国家自然科学基金面上项目“终极控制人、资本市场环境与企业风险承担”(批准号71472096)
【分类号】：F271;F49

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