电信运营商间合谋行为的机理及对企业绩效的影响

发布时间：2018-05-05 01:11

本文选题：电信运营商 + 合谋　；参考：《吉林大学》2012年博士论文

【摘要】：中国电信产业经过三十几年的发展，已经取得了长足的进步。但是在管制过程中，监管部门更多的强调人为创造和实现均衡的市场份额，而忽略了企业的策略性行为对产业市场结构的影响作用。企业选择什么样的策略性行为是企业战略决策的重要内容之一，它可以反应出该企业所秉持的管理思想与管理理念，也会对企业的经营效率产生直接而深刻的影响，进而影响产业的市场结构。合谋是企业策略性行为的重要组成部分。所谓合谋就是指企业之间旨在避免竞争而采取的彼此协调行动的一种行为，它极易出现在寡头垄断的市场结构中。电信产业是一个典型的寡头垄断产业，已经有足够的证据证明电信运营商之间确实存在合谋行为。电信运营商的合谋行为一方面会对企业自身的经营效率产生影响，另一方面也会影响电信产业的有效竞争和良性发展。本文应用产业组织理论、博弈论、合谋理论、企业绩效决定理论等对电信运营商之间合谋行为的机理以及合谋行为对电信运营商的企业绩效的影响进行了研究。主要解决了四方面的问题：1、电信运营商之间为什么会产生合谋？电信运营商之间的合谋有怎样的特征？电信运营商之间的合谋会产生怎样的结果？2、电信运营商之间的合谋会受哪些因素的影响？3、产品差异化下运营商之间的合谋行为会发生怎样的变化？4、合谋行为对电信运营商企业绩效会产生怎样的影响作用？证明电信运营商之间有合谋行为存在的市场事实主要有四项：电信运营商之间签署的具有合谋性质的“合作协议”；电信运营商收取高额的垄断价格，获得高额的垄断利润；移动通信中的漫游费问题；电信运营商的高管互换。这些事实一定程度上证明了电信运营商之间的确存在合谋行为。而合谋行为与运营商之间的价格战有密切的联系，合谋一旦破裂很容易转换为彼此之间的价格战；反过来为了避免运营商之间的恶性价格竞争，电信主管部门也积极提倡运营商之间进行“合作”。电信运营商之间之所以会出现合谋行为源于企业内部与管理部门两方面激励。一是两运营商合谋下的利润要高于竞争下的利润，出于利润最大化的目的，运营商有合谋的意愿。二是工信部（原信息产业部）以及各地电信管理局出于对国有资产保值、增值的考虑，不愿意看到同为国有企业的电信运营商之间进行低价竞争，因此倡导运营商之间签署合谋协议。电信运营商之间的合谋行为的根本特征是不稳定。首先，在两运营商彼此合谋下，如果有一方坚持合谋价格（产量），而另一方背叛合谋（降低价格或提高产量），则背叛方所获得的利润要高于其在合谋下的利润，而对于坚持合谋的一方，其所获得的利润要比在独立竞争时所获得的利润还要少。因此，运营商都有背叛合谋的激励，合谋本身是不稳定的。其次，根据“冷酷策略”，要使两个运营商都能长期维持合谋而不发生背叛行为，就要求两个运营商所确定的贴现因子大于0.5294，此为维持合谋稳定的条件。但是现实中运营商的贴现因子水平会随时间、环境变化而变化，也会出现更加重视短期利益的情况。维持合谋稳定的条件的严苛性也导致运营商的合谋行为不能长期、稳定持续。电信运营商之间的合谋与竞争的常态表现为合谋与价格竞争交替出现。“冷酷策略”所得到的结论是一种理想状态，在现实中很难实现。因此，电信运营商之间进行长期的、稳定的合谋是很难出现的。但是，出于自身利益的考虑，彼此又有进行合谋的意愿。因此，在现实中更容易出现的情况是：在一段时间内，运营商展开激烈的价格竞争；然后出于自身利益考虑，彼此又会积极寻求合作与合谋；经过了一段相对稳定的市场运行期后，价格竞争又会出现。现实中运营商之间的合谋行为都是短期的、小范围的和不稳定的。电信运营商的贴现因子水平低、成本和市场份额的不对称、产品的同质性竞争，以及合谋成本、监督成本的客观存在，对背叛合谋行为的惩罚威胁小都导致合谋很难长期存在。产品差异化可以分为垂直差异化和水平差异化。垂直差异是指所有消费者都认可的质量差异，即厂商在追求更好产品的过程中设计出的相同价格而不同质量水平的产品。水平差异是指不同特性的商品在制造过程中所需要的资源数量一样，但产品在设计中却存在明显差异，如品种、花色、样式等。垂直产品差异化对限制运营商的价格战和合谋都有作用。首先，在垂直产品差异化下，只有当两运营商的产品的垂直差异程度控制在一定范围内（运营商产品的替代系数b≥2.32288），合谋才有发生的可能性和意义。如果两运营商产品垂直差异程度过大，合谋下的利润反而比独立竞争下的利润更少，则合谋不会发生，故较大程度的垂直产品差异可以限制合谋发生。其次，如果两个运营商在垂直产品差异下发生合谋，则随着垂直产品差异化的程度不断增大（但始终满足b≥2.32288），两个运营商维持合谋稳定所需要的贴现因子的数值逐渐减小，说明一定程度的垂直产品差异化有助于合谋的稳定，从而减少运营商之间价格战的发生。当两个运营商合谋时，要使生产高质量产品的运营商维持合谋而不背叛，其所需要的临界贴现因子水平明显高于生产低质量产品的运营商维持合谋所需要的临界贴现因子水平。说明提供高质量产品的运营商在背叛合谋时所获得的利润更大，更容易背叛合谋而发动价格战。这一结论与现实中中国移动与中国联通的价格战情况相吻合。合谋行为会导致运营商产品差异化水平降低，无论是垂直差异化还是水平差异化。在垂直产品差异化下，要使合谋利润达到最大化，则生产高质量产品的运营商的质量水平要比彼此独立开展竞争时的质量水平降低，即两运营商的产品差异程度降低。在水平产品差异化下，彼此独立竞争下两运营商的产品只有在水平差异达到最大化时才会实现利润最大化。但是，在合谋下，要实现利润最大化则要求两运营商的产品差异程度是中等水平，即合谋降低了产品差异化程度。而一旦合谋破裂，，势必导致市场中产品同质竞争激烈。水平产品差异化不利于合谋的稳定，但此结论的适用性有限。因为这一结论的获得是在假设运营商保持所处地理位置不变时降低产品价格，这样背叛合谋的利润自然变大，维持合谋自然困难。但在现实中，运营商不仅会降低产品的价格，还可以改变其所处的地理位置。因此，现实中的背叛行为更加复杂，理论分析也更加困难。本文从企业的经济利润、成本效率、消费者满意度和创新活动四个方面分析了合谋行为对电信运营商企业绩效的影响作用。合谋行为虽然短期内可以提高电信运营商的企业利润，但是，从长期来看，合谋行为会大大降低企业的成本效率和消费者对企业服务的满意度，同时，合谋行为导致的垄断会严重影响电信运营商的创新动力，对运营商的技术创新产生严重的负面影响作用，甚至会打击运营商长期的竞争力。合谋也会导致运营商产品差异化水平降低，从而遏制运营商产品创新动力，降低企业的竞争优势。因此，从综合、全面的角度分析，合谋行为对电信运营商企业绩效有负面的影响作用，应该尽量去除。文章最后从电信运营商自身竞争行为、立法和法律监督、政府部门的规制政策等方面提出了去除合谋行为的策略。并基于可竞争市场理论提出了一个放松电信运营产业准入，引入多个竞争主体的假说。
[Abstract]:After more than thirty years of development, the China Telecom industry has made great progress. But in the process of regulation, the regulatory department emphasizes more people to create and realize a balanced market share, but neglects the influence of the strategic behavior of the enterprise on the industrial market structure. One of the important contents of the decision is that it can reflect the management ideas and management ideas held by the enterprise. It also has a direct and profound influence on the business efficiency of the enterprise, and then affects the market structure of the industry. Conspiracy is an important part of the strategic behavior of the enterprise. The so-called collusion means that the enterprise is designed to avoid competition. The behavior of the coordinated action of each other, which is very easy to appear in the oligopoly market structure. The telecom industry is a typical oligopoly industry, and there is enough evidence to prove that there is a conspiracy between the telecom operators. The conspiracy of the telecom operators will have an impact on the business efficiency of the enterprise itself. On the other hand, it will also affect the effective competition and benign development of the telecommunications industry.
This paper applies industrial organization theory, game theory, conspiracy theory and enterprise performance determination theory to study the mechanism of collusion between telecom operators and the effect of conspiracy behavior on the enterprise performance of telecom operators. The main problems are as follows: 1, why will the telecom operators conspire? Telecom operation between telecom operators and telecom operators? What are the characteristics of the collusion between business operators? What are the results of the collusion between telecom operators? 2, what factors will be affected by the conspiracy of telecom operators? 3, how will the conspiracy of operators change under the product differentiation? 4, how does the conspiracy effect on the performance of telecom operators Use?
There are four main market facts that show conspiracy between telecom operators: the conspiracy "cooperation agreement" signed by telecom operators; the telecom operators collect high monopoly prices, obtain high monopoly profits; the problem of roaming fees in mobile communications; and the exchange of executives of telecom operators. The facts prove to some extent that there is a conspiracy between the telecom operators, and the collusion is closely related to the price war between the operators, and the conspiracy is easily converted into a price war between each other; in turn, in order to avoid the vicious price competition between the operators, the telecommunications authorities also actively advocate transportation. "Cooperation" between the battalions.
The reason why the conspiracy between telecom operators is motivated by two aspects of enterprise and management. First, the profits of the two operators conspire higher than the profit under competition. The operators have conspiracy intention for the purpose of maximizing profit. Two is the Ministry of industry and information (Ministry of information industry) and the local telecommunication Administration for the country. With the consideration of asset preservation and value added, it is not willing to see the low price competition between the telecom operators with the state-owned enterprises and therefore the conspiracy agreement between the operators. The fundamental characteristic of the conspiracy between the telecom operators is unstable. First, if the two operators conspire with each other, if one adheres to the conspiracy price (production), While the other side betrays the conspiracy (reducing the price or increasing the output), the betrayal gains more profit than its conspiracy, and for the conspiracy, the profit is less than the profit gained in the independent competition. Therefore, the operator has a betrayal of the incentives, and the conspiracy itself is unstable. In order to keep the two operators conspire for a long time without betrayal, the discount factor determined by the two operators is more than 0.5294, which is the condition to maintain the conspiracy. However, in reality, the level of the discount factor of the operators will change with time and environment, and more attention will be paid. The conditions of short-term interests. The harsh conditions of maintaining the stability of the conspiracy also lead to the conspiracy of the operators. The conspiracy and competition between the operators of telecom operators appears to appear alternately between the conspiracy and the price competition. The conclusion of "cool strategy" is an ideal state and is difficult to realize in reality. It is hard to make a long-term, stable conspiracy among telecom operators. But, for the sake of their own interests, there is a willingness to conspire each other. So, in reality, it is easier for the operators to compete for a period of time; then, for their own interests, they will accumulate again. They seek cooperation and conspiracy; after a relatively stable period of market operation, price competition will emerge. In reality, the conspiracy between the operators is short, small and unstable. The low level of the discount factor of the telecom operators, the asymmetry of the cost and market share, the homogeneous competition of the products, and the conspiracy The objective existence of supervision costs and the threat of punishment for treason collusion are difficult to cause collusion.
Product differentiation can be divided into vertical differentiation and horizontal differentiation. Vertical difference refers to the quality differences recognized by all consumers, that is, the same price and different quality products designed by the manufacturer in the process of pursuing better products. The level difference refers to the amount of resources required by different characteristics in the manufacturing process. However, there are obvious differences in product design, such as variety, color, style, etc.. Vertical product differentiation plays a role in limiting the price war and conspiracy of the operators. First, under the vertical product differentiation, only when the vertical difference degree of the two operators is controlled within a certain range (the substitution coefficient of operator products b > 2.32) 288), conspiracy has the possibility and significance. If the vertical difference between the two operators is too large and the profit of the conspiracy is less than that of the independent competition, the conspiracy will not happen, so the larger vertical product difference can limit the conspiracy. Secondly, if the two operators conspire under the vertical product difference. As the degree of vertical product differentiation increases (but always meets b > 2.32288), the number of discount factors that the two operators need to maintain conspiracy is gradually reduced, indicating that a certain degree of vertical product differentiation contributes to the stability of collusion, thus reducing the price war between the operators. When two operators conspire In order to make the operators of high quality products conspire rather than betrayal, the critical discount factor is significantly higher than the critical discount factor required by operators producing low quality products to maintain conspiracy. It shows that the operators providing high quality products are more profitable and easier to betray when they are betraying the conspiracy. Conspiracy to launch price war. This conclusion is consistent with the reality of the price war between China Mobile and China Unicom.
Conspiracy behavior will lead to lower level of operator product differentiation, whether vertical differentiation or level difference. Under vertical product differentiation, to maximize the conspiracy profit, the quality level of the operators producing high quality products is lower than that of each other when they compete independently, that is, the poor product of the two operators. Under the horizontal product differentiation, the two operators' products will maximize the profit maximization only when the level difference is maximized. However, under the conspiracy, to maximize the profit, the product difference degree of the two operators is moderate, that is, conspiring to reduce the degree of product differentiation. Once the conspiracy is broken, it is bound to lead to a fierce competition in the market. The difference in horizontal products is not conducive to the stability of the conspiracy, but the applicability of the conclusion is limited, because the conclusion is obtained by reducing the price of the product when the operator maintains its geographical position, so that the conspiracy of profit will become larger, and the conspiracy to conspire is maintained. But in reality, the operator can not only reduce the price of the product, but also change its location. Therefore, the betrayal in the reality is more complex and the theoretical analysis is more difficult.
This paper analyzes the effect of conspiracy on the enterprise performance of telecom operators from four aspects: economic profit, cost efficiency, consumer satisfaction and innovation activities. The conspiracy behavior can improve the profit of the telecom operators in the short term, but in the long run, the conspiracy will greatly reduce the cost efficiency of the enterprise. And the satisfaction of consumers to business services, and the monopoly caused by collusion will seriously affect the innovation power of the telecom operators, have a serious negative impact on the technological innovation of the operators and even combat the long-term competitiveness of the operators. The conspiracy will also lead to the reduction of the level of the operators' difference in the operation of the operators, thus preventing the operation of the operators. Therefore, from a comprehensive and comprehensive perspective, the conspiracy behavior has a negative impact on the performance of the telecom operators from a comprehensive and comprehensive perspective. The article finally puts forward the removal of the competitive behavior of the telecom operators themselves, the legislative and legal supervision, the government regulation and other aspects. Based on the theory of contestable markets, a hypothesis of loosening the access of telecom operators and introducing multiple competitive entities is proposed.

【学位授予单位】：吉林大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F626

【引证文献】