预算约束下广义第二价格关键字拍卖均衡分析

发布时间：2018-05-13 03:07

本文选题：拍卖理论 + 关键字拍卖　；参考：《运筹与管理》2014年04期

【摘要】：在关键字拍卖中,广告主预算约束是影响投标策略均衡的重要因素。针对广泛应用的广义第二价格机制,分析了预算约束下的关键字拍卖均衡性质。按照广告主的点击估价和预算分布情况,将广告主划分为天然完全赢家、天然部分赢家和天然输家这三种类型,提出了广告主投标临界值与关键值的概念,基于关键字拍卖不断重复进行的特点,分别从长期视角与短期视角建立了静态模型与动态模型,研究结果表明:静态环境下拍卖存在唯一的纯策略纳什均衡;动态环境下当广告主采用最优反应投标策略时拍卖将收敛至唯一的纳什均衡点,并且动态环境下拍卖商收入不低于静态环境下的拍卖收入。数值算例的结果表明在动态环境下不同的初始报价会导致拍卖收敛至不同的均衡点。研究结果为拍卖商提供了拍卖收入预测和拍卖机制优化的决策依据。
[Abstract]:In keyword auction, the budget constraint of advertisers is an important factor affecting the equilibrium of bidding strategy. Aiming at the generalized second price mechanism, the properties of keyword auction equilibrium under budget constraints are analyzed. According to the click evaluation and budget distribution of advertisers, the advertisers are divided into three types: natural total winners, natural partial winners and natural losers. The concept of critical value and critical value for advertisers' bidding is put forward. Based on the characteristics of repeated keyword auctions, static and dynamic models are established from the long-term and short-term perspectives, respectively. The results show that there is a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the static environment. The auction will converge to the unique Nash equilibrium when the advertiser adopts the optimal response bidding strategy and the auction income under the dynamic environment is not lower than the auction income under the static environment. The results of numerical examples show that different initial quotations in dynamic environment will result in the auction converging to different equilibrium points. The results provide a basis for auction revenue prediction and auction mechanism optimization.
【作者单位】：大连理工大学系统工程研究所;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金重大资助项目(70890080,70890083) 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70902033)
【分类号】：F49;F713.8;F724.59

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