成本管理信息租金、内部冲突与控制绩效——基于施工项目的实验研究
发布时间：2019-01-13 09:16
【摘要】：本文采用实验研究的方法,针对施工项目的成本控制绩效问题展开研究,探讨了施工项目特点对经理人成本控制中信息租金的影响及对制定目标责任成本过程中委托代理双方冲突的影响,并在此基础上进一步分析信息租金、内部冲突单独和两者交互对施工项目责任成本控制绩效的影响。研究发现,由于施工项目关键成本因素难以被定量化,成本计算不具备重复可验证性,当施工项目成本节余空间较大时将导致项目部经理人的寻租行为,但信息租金会随着博弈次数的不断增加而减少。信息租金和博弈冲突均对项目部的全年成本绩效具有不利影响,但当外部环境为奖励机制时,冲突与信息租金的交互作用能够提升企业的成本控制绩效。依据实验结论,本文提供了相应的政策建议。
[Abstract]:In this paper, the method of experimental research is used to study the cost control performance of construction projects. This paper probes into the influence of construction project characteristics on information rent in manager's cost control and on the conflict between principal and agent in the process of formulating target responsibility cost, and further analyzes information rent on this basis. The influence of internal conflict on the performance of construction project responsibility cost control separately and interactively. It is found that because the key cost factors of construction project are difficult to be quantified and the cost calculation is not repeatable and verifiable, it will lead to the rent-seeking behavior of the project manager when the cost savings of the construction project are large. But the information rent will decrease with the increase of the number of games. Both information rent and game conflict have a negative impact on the annual cost performance of the project department, but when the external environment is a reward mechanism, the interaction between the conflict and the information rent can improve the cost control performance of the enterprise. According to the experimental conclusions, this paper provides the corresponding policy recommendations.
【作者单位】： 西南财经大学国际商学院;西南财经大学会计学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(70872093、71172228、71102181) 教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-09-0658) 教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(10YJC630253) 财政部全国会计领军(后备)人才培训项目资助
【分类号】：F426.92;F406.72;F224
本文编号：2408307
[Abstract]:In this paper, the method of experimental research is used to study the cost control performance of construction projects. This paper probes into the influence of construction project characteristics on information rent in manager's cost control and on the conflict between principal and agent in the process of formulating target responsibility cost, and further analyzes information rent on this basis. The influence of internal conflict on the performance of construction project responsibility cost control separately and interactively. It is found that because the key cost factors of construction project are difficult to be quantified and the cost calculation is not repeatable and verifiable, it will lead to the rent-seeking behavior of the project manager when the cost savings of the construction project are large. But the information rent will decrease with the increase of the number of games. Both information rent and game conflict have a negative impact on the annual cost performance of the project department, but when the external environment is a reward mechanism, the interaction between the conflict and the information rent can improve the cost control performance of the enterprise. According to the experimental conclusions, this paper provides the corresponding policy recommendations.
【作者单位】： 西南财经大学国际商学院;西南财经大学会计学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(70872093、71172228、71102181) 教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-09-0658) 教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(10YJC630253) 财政部全国会计领军(后备)人才培训项目资助
【分类号】：F426.92;F406.72;F224
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相关硕士学位论文 前2条
1 曾静;成本管理信息租金、内部冲突与控制绩效[D];西南财经大学;2011年
2 郑东华;工程项目内部冲突管理理论研究及其运用[D];湖南大学;2007年
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