电子商务环境下的最优双渠道设计及协调
本文关键词:电子商务环境下的最优双渠道设计及协调 出处:《青岛大学》2017年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文
更多相关文章: 消费者选择理论 Stackalberg博弈理论 委托代理理论 渠道选择及协调 契约设计
【摘要】:互联网及物流产业的迅速升温,不断的改变着社会的经营管理模式,大量的传统型企业开始紧跟时代的步伐,探索开辟网络直销渠道,而这一渠道的开辟,一方面拓宽了消费者范围,另一方面也给传统渠道带来了极大的冲击。机遇与挑战并存,如何抓住机遇,在竞争激烈的社会环境中存活,获得自身乃至整个供应链收益的最大化,成为了现实企业与学术界共同关注的热点。本文概括了国内外学者关于以下三个方面的研究现状:渠道选择及定价,渠道冲突及协调,信息不对称下的突变,从而分析了在Stackalberg博弈模式下,主导型制造商与零售商在不同情况下的渠道选择策略,并针对其中的零售商双渠道模式设计了相应的收益共享契约,以实现供应链收益最大化;同时,针对主导型零售商与小型制造商在合作过程中经常出现的,生产成本突变的情况,设计出最优双渠道销售价格及需求量契约,从而激励制造商更好的配合自身活动,获得更高收益。具体的研究内容及结论列示如下:(1)针对四种不同的渠道模式:传统零售单渠道模式、制造商双渠道模式、零售商双渠道一致定价与单独定价模式,建立了博弈模型,通过对所建模型的分析,比较了各参与主体及整个供应链的收益,给出了制造商与零售商开辟网络直销渠道的条件。同时,针对其中的零售商双渠道模式,研究了制造商与零售商的均衡策略,并设计了收益共享合同,即制造商以较低的批发价格给零售商提供商品,而作为补偿,零售商将自身收益按一定比例分享给制造商。研究表明,该收益共享合同能够充分的协调各分销渠道,从而使供应链上的各参与方收益增加。(2)针对由单一制造商与单一零售商组成的大型零售商为主导的零售商双渠道模式,利用委托代理模型,分别研究了无生产成本变动、制造商生产成本变动且信息对称与信息不对称三种情况下的最优渠道策略,从而分析了生产成本信息对于整个供应链绩效的价值。研究结果表明,零售商制定的渠道策略具有鲁棒性,只有当生产成本变动幅度较大的情况下,才会引起零售商渠道策略的变化;同时制造商的生产成本信息私有,一定会导致零售商收益的降低,但是未必会引起整个供应链系统收益的变化。
[Abstract]:The rapid warming of the Internet and logistics industry, constantly changing the social management model, a large number of traditional enterprises began to follow the pace of the times, explore the development of network direct marketing channels, and the opening of this channel. On the one hand, it widens the scope of consumers, on the other hand, it brings great impact to the traditional channels. Opportunities and challenges coexist, how to seize the opportunities and survive in the competitive social environment. To maximize the profit of the supply chain itself and the whole supply chain has become a common concern of real enterprises and academia. This paper summarizes the domestic and foreign scholars on the following three aspects of research: Channel selection and pricing. The channel conflict and coordination, the abrupt change under the information asymmetry, thus analyzed under the Stackalberg game pattern, the dominant manufacturer and the retailer in the different situation channel choice strategy. In order to maximize the profit of the supply chain, the corresponding revenue sharing contract is designed for the retailers' dual-channel mode. At the same time, aiming at the situation that the leading retailer and the small manufacturer often appear in the process of cooperation, and the production cost changes, we design the optimal double-channel sales price and demand contract. In order to encourage manufacturers to better cooperate with their own activities to achieve higher returns. Specific research content and conclusions are listed below: 1) aiming at four different channels: the traditional retail single channel model. Based on the model of manufacturer double channel, retailer double channel consistent pricing and individual pricing, the game model is established. Through the analysis of the established model, the profit of each participant and the whole supply chain is compared. At the same time, the equilibrium strategy between manufacturer and retailer is studied, and the profit sharing contract is designed. In other words, the manufacturer supplies the goods to the retailer at a lower wholesale price, and as a compensation, the retailer shares their income to the manufacturer in a certain proportion. The revenue-sharing contract can fully coordinate the distribution channels. In order to increase the income of each participant in the supply chain, we use the principal-agent model to solve the double-channel model of retailers, which is dominated by a large retailer composed of a single manufacturer and a single retailer. The optimal channel strategy is studied under the condition of no change of production cost, change of manufacturer's production cost and information symmetry and information asymmetry. The results show that the channel strategy made by retailers is robust only if the range of production costs is large. Only then will the retailer channel strategy change; At the same time, the private production cost information of the manufacturer will definitely lead to the decrease of the retailer's income, but it will not necessarily lead to the change of the whole supply chain system.
【学位授予单位】:青岛大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F274;F721
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