基于博弈论的建设工程费用索赔决策研究

发布时间：2018-03-18 08:15

本文选题：费用索赔　切入点：索赔战略决策　出处：《西南科技大学》2015年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：索赔是建设工程中正常的经济现象,是承发包双方维护自身合法权益的正当手段,但由于建设工程索赔在我国起步较晚,索赔管理仍然是工程项目管理中的一个薄弱环节,在索赔管理中,费用索赔又是其核心内容。而索赔决策做为工程索赔管理的关键,直接关系到索赔的成功与否,科学的决策能使索赔双方在实现利益最大化的情况下,就索赔结果协商一致,而不至于引发诉讼。因此,文章应用博弈论,研究了业主与承包商在费用索赔全过程中的一系列决策问题,并将建设工程费用索赔分为三个阶段:索赔决策前分析、索赔战略性决策以及索赔协商战术性决策阶段。在索赔决策前阶段,文章首先通过合同状态分析来引入索赔机会的概念,并分析总结了承包商在索赔决策前的必要准备工作,包括索赔机会识别、索赔事件分析、索赔依据搜集;在索赔战略性决策阶段,文章基于博弈论,建立了完全且完美信息条件下的索赔战略决策动态博弈模型,应用逆推归纳法,研究了业主与承包商关于索赔与不索赔、协商与不协商、接受协商与选择诉讼等战略性决策问题,并求出双方在不同得益情况下的均衡路径;在索赔协商战术性决策阶段,文章建立了业主与承包商索赔讨价还价战术决策的双边博弈模型,应用贝叶斯(Bayes)理论和Zeuthen谈判策略,研究了业主与承包商在进一步选择协商情况下的具体讨价还价协商过程,并求出了双边博弈的均衡解。最后,文章通过具体的案例应用,验证了讨价还价双边博弈的均衡解符合帕累托最优,说明文章建立的博弈模型可以为现实中的工程索赔提供一定的参考和借鉴作用。
[Abstract]:The claim for compensation is a normal economic phenomenon in the construction project and a proper means for both the contracting parties to safeguard their legitimate rights and interests. However, because the claim for construction project started relatively late in our country, claim management is still a weak link in the project management. In the claim management, the cost claim is the core content, and the claim decision, as the key of the engineering claim management, is directly related to the success of the claim. Therefore, the paper applies game theory to study a series of decision-making problems between the owner and the contractor in the whole process of claim for expenses. The claim for construction project cost is divided into three stages: the analysis before the claim decision, the strategic decision of the claim and the tactical decision of the claim negotiation. Firstly, this paper introduces the concept of claim opportunity through contract state analysis, and analyzes and summarizes the necessary preparation work of contractor before claim decision, including claim opportunity identification, claim event analysis and claim basis collection. In the strategic decision-making stage of claim, based on game theory, this paper establishes a dynamic game model of claim strategic decision under complete and perfect information, and applies the method of inverse induction to study the claims and non-claims of the employer and contractor. Consultation and non-negotiation, acceptance of strategic decision-making issues such as consultation and selection litigation, and finding out the balanced path of both parties in different situations of benefit; in the tactical decision-making stage of claim negotiation, In this paper, a two-sided game model of bargaining tactical decision between employer and contractor is established. By applying Bayesian Bayes theory and Zeuthen negotiation strategy, the concrete bargaining negotiation process between owner and contractor is studied under the condition of further selection and negotiation. Finally, the paper verifies that the equilibrium solution of bilateral bargaining game accords with Pareto optimal. It shows that the game model established in this paper can provide a certain reference and reference for engineering claims in reality.
【学位授予单位】：西南科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：TU723.3

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