考虑搭便车行为的营销渠道选择策略研究

发布时间：2018-01-09 09:11

本文关键词：考虑搭便车行为的营销渠道选择策略研究　出处：《重庆交通大学》2015年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：随着电子商务的飞速发展,网络直销渠道与传统零售渠道并存的混合渠道模式已广泛存在于实际应用中。混合渠道结构下,供应链成员之间的搭便车行为不可避免,深刻影响着决策者的定价和渠道选择策略。在此背景下,本文考虑基于零售商服务的搭便车行为,探讨了制造商和零售商的渠道选择问题。本文主要内容如下:首先,综合考虑消费者渠道偏好、零售商服务水平以及搭便车行为等因素,分别建立传统单一零售模式、制造商双渠道模式、零售商双渠道模式和双重混合渠道模式的需求模型。采用Stackelberg动态博弈模型对分散决策时的最优定价进行求解。借助算例仿真,分析搭便车系数对定价和利润的影响;分别从制造商和零售商视角,探讨制造商优先建立网络渠道,以及零售商优先建立网络渠道这两种情形下,供应链成员均衡决策和收益的变化;研究分散决策时的渠道选择策略,并探析供应链成员中一方决策对另一方产生的影响。其次,从集中决策角度,分析制造商与零售商在上述四种供应链模式的定价和收益,并与分散决策时的相应收益进行对比;拓展基础模型,在考虑搭便车行为的同时设计基于零售商需求数量的转移支付合同,分析拟定转移支付合同后供应链成员的定价和收益。利用数值仿真,分析搭便车行为对协调定价、固定转移支付及收益的影响,进一步探究供应链得到协调之后的渠道选择策略。最后,借助演化博弈论,将制造商与零售商视为有限理性的参与者,用博弈方群体代替博弈方个人,用博弈方策略类型比例代替传统博弈的混合策略,建立制造商和零售商采取不同策略时的复制动态方程,通过博弈方决策群体比例变化图讨论不同情况下两个博弈方群体比例的复制动态关系,并归纳不同情形下供应链模式的演化结果,从而分析长期发展中,供应链系统的均衡结构。最后通过数值仿真,分析分散决策时搭便车系数和渠道偏好程度对渠道选择策略的影响,以及转移支付合同下的渠道选择策略。通过以上研究发现:一方面,分散决策时,搭便车系数和渠道偏好程度和对制造商与零售商策略演化路径的影响不同,但对供应链系统演化结果的影响类似:经过长期演化后双方都选择建立网络直销渠道;另一方面,转移支付合同下的渠道选择受到搭便车行为和固定转移支付的综合影响,制造商拟定转移支付合同可以间接干预零售商的渠道选择策略。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of electronic commerce, the mixed channel mode of network direct marketing channel and traditional retail channel has been widely used in the practical application, under the mixed channel structure. The free-rider behavior among supply chain members is inevitable, which has a profound impact on the pricing and channel selection strategy of decision makers. In this context, this paper considers the free-rider behavior based on retailer services. The main contents of this paper are as follows: firstly, considering the factors such as consumers' channel preference, retailers' service level and free-rider behavior. The traditional single retail mode and the manufacturer dual channel mode are established respectively. Stackelberg dynamic game model is used to solve the optimal pricing in decentralized decision-making. The influence of hitchhiking coefficient on pricing and profit is analyzed. From the perspective of manufacturer and retailer, this paper discusses the equilibrium decision and the change of profit of the member of supply chain under the condition of manufacturer giving priority to establishing network channel and retailer giving priority to establishing network channel. This paper studies the channel selection strategy in decentralized decision-making, and analyzes the influence of one decision on the other in the supply chain members. Secondly, from the perspective of centralized decision-making. This paper analyzes the pricing and profit of manufacturers and retailers in the above four supply chain models, and compares them with the corresponding returns in decentralized decision-making. This paper extends the basic model, designs the transfer payment contract based on the retailer demand quantity while considering the free-rider behavior, and analyzes the pricing and income of the supply chain members after the proposed transfer payment contract. This paper analyzes the influence of free-rider behavior on coordinated pricing, fixed transfer payment and income, and further explores the channel selection strategy after coordination of supply chain. Finally, with the help of evolutionary game theory. The manufacturer and retailer are regarded as the participants of limited rationality, the gambler group is used to replace the gambler individual, and the gambler strategy proportion is used to replace the traditional mixed game strategy. The replicative dynamic equations of manufacturers and retailers with different strategies are established, and the replicative dynamic relationship of the proportion of two gamblers is discussed by using the game party decision group proportion change graph. The results of the evolution of the supply chain model under different conditions are summarized, and the equilibrium structure of the supply chain system is analyzed in the long term. Finally, the numerical simulation is carried out. This paper analyzes the influence of free-rider coefficient and channel preference on channel selection strategy in decentralized decision-making, and the channel selection strategy under transfer payment contract. The hitchhiker coefficient, channel preference and its influence on the evolution of manufacturer and retailer strategy are different. However, the impact on the evolution of supply chain system is similar: after a long period of evolution, both sides choose to establish network direct marketing channels; On the other hand, the channel selection under the transfer payment contract is influenced by the free-rider behavior and the fixed transfer payment, so the manufacturer can indirectly interfere with the retailer's channel selection strategy by drawing up the transfer payment contract.
【学位授予单位】：重庆交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F274

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