财政分权背景下地方政府竞争对地区经济增长的影响研究

发布时间：2017-12-27 07:12

本文关键词：财政分权背景下地方政府竞争对地区经济增长的影响研究　出处：《南京师范大学》2016年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：财政分权体制改革以后,中央权力逐步下放,在缓解中央巨大财政压力的同时,也给予地方政府支配财政收入和投资的决策权,地方政府成为其管辖区内公有经济的真正剩余索取者和控制者。经济分权的同时伴随着政治的集权,也即地方官员的政治升迁仍然是由中央政府来考核的,并且与地区经济增长相挂钩,再加上社会资源总量的约束性,地方政府之间必然会产生激烈的竞争,以争夺更多有利于本地区经济增长的要素。这种地方政府竞争,实际上指的是地方政府之间的策略互动行为,也即某一地方政府的行为不仅影响本地区的经济增长,也会对其它地区的经济状况产生影响。我国以财政改革为起始和主要内容的分权化的发展,奠定了地方政府之间竞争的基本格局。地方政府竞争的目的是为了吸引更多的生产要素流入,并通过资源合理配置使地方获得更多的利益,从而提高辖区居民的生活水平。那么地方政府间的这些策略互动行为对经济增长的影响机制如何?地方政府竞争一定会给地区经济带来正向效应吗?本文正是基于这一思路来研究地方政府竞争对地区经济增长的影响。文章主要目的是在财政分权这一背景下探讨地方政府竞争对经济增长的影响,首先从财政分权理论、寡头竞争模型两个方面来探讨地方政府竞争对地区经济增长的理论基础,进而厘清地方政府竞争对经济增长的影响机理,包括财政分权背景下地方政府竞争的形成,以及地方政府竞争对经济增长的影响机制分析。其次,分析我国地方政府竞争的历史演变过程、特征及现状。再次,本文以我国30个省份2006-2012年的数据为样本,建立面板模型,选取税收竞争、支出竞争数据来测度地方政府的竞争行为策略,并用地区经济增长率来测度竞争的结果,运用空间计量经济学方法来实证检验竞争与增长二者之间的关系。实证研究结果发现,地区宏观税负水平明显与经济增长呈反向关系,而税收竞争却可以促进经济增长。另外,地方政府支出竞争对经济增长的影响并不显著,地方财政分权程度却明显有利于经济增长。最后,本文认为研究地方政府竞争与经济增长的关系是为了更加规范地方政府间的竞争行为,以促进经济的长效增长,因此笔者根据实证结果提出了如下政策建议,主要是进一步合理利用地方政府间的税收竞争,以吸引更多资本、劳动及技术等要素的流入；合理安排地方政府支出结构,避免结构性偏向,加大科教文卫领域的财政支出；在一定程度上改革现有的绩效考核机制,不再以GDP论英雄,而是将民生、生态、社会进步等纳入到综合考核体制中。
[Abstract]:After the reform of fiscal decentralization system, the central authority has been gradually devolved, while relieving the huge financial pressure of the central government, it also gives the local governments the right to decide the fiscal revenue and investment. The local government has become the real residual claimant and controller of the public economy in its jurisdiction. The economic decentralization is accompanied by political centralization, namely the political promotion of local officials is still by the central government assessment, and regional economic growth is linked together with constraints on the total amount of social resources, the local government will be generated between the fierce competition, in order to attract more elements conducive to economic growth in the region the. Such local government competition actually refers to the strategic interaction between local governments, that is, the behavior of a local government not only affects the economic growth of the local area, but also has an impact on the economic situation of other regions. With the development of fiscal reform as the beginning and the decentralization of the main content, the basic pattern of competition between local governments is laid. The purpose of local government competition is to attract more factors of production inflow, and to achieve more benefits through reasonable allocation of resources, so as to improve the living standard of residents in the district. Then, how does the interaction mechanism between local governments affect economic growth? Will local government competition bring positive effects to regional economy? This article is based on this idea to study the impact of local government competition on regional economic growth. The main purpose is in the background of fiscal decentralization and local government competition's impact on economic growth, first from two aspects of fiscal decentralization theory, oligopoly competition model to explore the local government competition on the theoretical basis of regional economic growth, and then clarify the local government competition mechanism of impact on economic growth, including the formation of local government finance Decentralization under the background of competition, and the competition of local government influence economic growth analysis. Secondly, it analyzes the historical evolution, characteristics and present situation of local government competition in China. Again, the 30 provinces of China in 2006-2012 data as the sample, establishing a panel model of competition strategy selection of tax competition and the expenditure competition data to measure the local government, and with regional economic growth rate to measure the results of the competition, the relationship between the use of spatial econometric methods to empirically test the competition and growth of the two. The results of the empirical study show that the regional macro tax burden has a negative relationship with economic growth, and the tax competition can promote economic growth. In addition, the effect of local government expenditure competition on economic growth is not significant, but the degree of decentralization of local finance is obviously beneficial to economic growth. Finally, this paper argues that the relationship of the local government competition and economic growth is to standardize the competition behavior of local government, to promote long-term economic growth, so according to the empirical results put forward the following policy recommendations, mainly to further the rational use of tax competition among local governments, in order to attract more capital inflows, and labor elements technology; reasonable arrangements for local government expenditure structure, to avoid structural bias, increase science and education in the field of finance expenditure; to reform the existing performance appraisal system to a certain extent, no longer GDP heroes, but the people's livelihood, ecological and social progress into the comprehensive assessment system.
【学位授予单位】：南京师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：D630;F127

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