代理人困境与国家治理:兼评“风险论”

发布时间：2018-02-14 16:07

本文关键词： 集权分权郡县制代理人风险　出处：《社会》2017年03期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：向下分权是治理幅员辽阔之国家的必然选择。在中央集权体制下,统治者采取向下分权的时候也会面临治理风险,即如果地方政府取得足够的资源和权力,它们可能对最高统治者构成威胁。曹正汉在考察中国古代统治体制演变时,提出郡县制是帝王减少代理人风险的制度安排,因为郡县制具有避免让单一地方政府强大到可以挑战帝王权威的作用。本文探讨向下分权对于集权体制政治稳定的影响。分权在为最高统治者减少代理人风险的同时,也为统治者创造了规避责难的空间。但向下分权在减少代理人风险的同时,也给统治者造成了多重代理人问题。具体而言,代理人如果没有受到有效约束,他们不但会削弱国家能力,还可能损害政权的合法性,引发社会风险。如何约束代理人始终是最高统治者面临的难题。
[Abstract]:Decentralization is an inevitable choice for governing a country with a vast territory. In a centralized system, rulers also face the risk of governance when they take a downward decentralization, that is, if local governments acquire sufficient resources and power, They may pose a threat to the supreme ruler. When Cao Zhenghan examined the evolution of the ancient Chinese ruling system, he proposed that the system of prefectures and counties was the institutional arrangement for emperors to reduce the risk of their agents. This paper discusses the influence of decentralization on the political stability of totalitarian system. Decentralization reduces the risk of proxy for the supreme ruler. It also creates a space for rulers to avoid censure. But decentralization reduces the risk of agents and creates multiple proxies for rulers. Specifically, agents are not effectively constrained, They not only weaken the ability of the state, but also damage the legitimacy of the regime and lead to social risk. How to restrain the agent is always the problem faced by the supreme ruler.
【作者单位】：香港科技大学社会科学部;
【分类号】：D630

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