中国地方领导任期与政府行为模式:官员任期的政治经济学

发布时间：2018-03-05 00:09

  本文选题：官员任期　切入点：地方政府　出处：《经济学(季刊)》2016年03期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：本文基于政治经济周期理论,通过地方领导的基建投入,考察任期制度如何塑造官员的行为激励。作者利用全国省级、地市与江苏县级数据,逐一检测官员任期影响政府行为的多项假说。发现由于缺乏明确任期,职务随时可能调整,地方领导十分类似"试用期"任职。也因此,官员甫任新职,便不断加码拼搏。由于缺乏任期保障,上级得以充分激励下级,中央也能有效调动地方,官员政绩压力发挥得淋漓尽致,中国经济增长因而不断拔高。
[Abstract]:Based on the theory of political and economic cycle, this paper examines how tenure system can shape the behavior incentive of officials through the investment of local leaders in capital construction. The author makes use of the data of provincial, prefectural and Jiangsu county-level. Examining several hypotheses that the term of office of an official affects government behavior one by one. It is found that due to the lack of a clear term of office, posts may be adjusted at any time, and local leaders are very similar to "probationary" posts. As a result, officials are appointed to new posts. Due to the lack of security of tenure, superiors can fully motivate their subordinates, the central authorities can effectively mobilize local governments, and official performance pressures are brought into full play. As a result, China's economic growth continues to rise.
【作者单位】： 华南理工大学公共管理学院;上海大学社会学院;上海财经大学公共经济与管理学院;美国得克萨斯大学奥斯汀分校;
【分类号】：D630.3
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本文编号：1567897