政府监管与矿山治污博弈模型研究

发布时间：2018-03-09 01:15

本文选题：政府监管　切入点：矿山治污　出处：《南华大学》2015年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：政府监管与矿山治污之间的博弈是博弈论在采矿行业中的一种具体应用,本文对此进行了研究。文中,把政府的罚款方式分为累积罚款和单次罚款,同时把矿山的污染类型分为累积污染和单次污染。结果表明:在没有外力监督的前提下,所有矿山都治污并不是一个稳定的均衡,而所有矿山都不治污则能达成稳定的均衡;无论在什么情况下,政府采用累积罚款的方案均不可取;在政府或多或少会监管的前提下,矿山会治理好累积污染;当政府采用单次罚款的方案,同时矿山产生的污染属于单次污染时,情况变得比较复杂。根据建立的博弈模型可以看出,政府监管概率和矿山治污概率会达成均衡。但是,在现实中会产生以下几个问题:第一,政府有追求自身利益最大化的策略。即稳定地以略小于纳什均衡的概率进行监管,每次都能得到罚金;第二,政府倾向于管大放小。由于政府的监管资源是有限的,同样的监管资源投入到大矿山的收益比小矿山的收益高的多;第三,矿山可以通过寻租来削减成本。事实上,政府以略小于纳什均衡概率进行监管和矿山选择不治污不是双方最佳的博弈均衡,因为矿山可以通过寻租活动从而让政府停止监管。以上三个问题的解决方案如下:第一,解决政府追求自身利益最大化的问题,关键在于把治污矿山的数量多少作为考核其政绩的一个标准。若治污矿山的数量少于合格标准,则扣罚相关政府人员的工资甚至将其撤职。若治污矿山的数量高于优秀标准,则奖励相关政府人员甚至让其升迁。另外,政府得来的罚金只能用于监管花费,不能挪用。如此双管齐下,政府将不会以追求罚金为目的去选择监管策略,取而代之的是尽量督促矿山治污。第二,政府之所以管大放小,根本原因是监管资源的稀缺。而降低监管成本,如采用先进的检测技术等,可以丰富监管资源,让政府去监管小矿山有了现实的可能性。另外,将小矿山合并或者集中管理既能减少排污,又能方便政府监管。第三,矿山寻租行为有其内在的经济利益驱动,所以全社会要对相关监管部门进行监督。矿山有没有治污,当地群众是最清楚的。如果矿山通过寻租免去了治污的责任,群众可以揭发,而到时国家要追究矿山和相关监管部门的责任。最后,对于全社会来说,保持舆论监督的压力,形成自发保护环境的风气,加上政府极少量的监管能够实现社会总体福利最大化。
[Abstract]:The game between government supervision and mine pollution control is a concrete application of game theory in mining industry. At the same time, the types of mine pollution are divided into accumulative pollution and single pollution. The results show that, without external force supervision, all mines are not a stable equilibrium, and all mines can achieve a stable balance without pollution control; No matter what the circumstances, the Government's adoption of a cumulative penalty scheme is not desirable; if the Government is more or less able to monitor the situation, the mine will control the accumulated pollution. When the Government adopts a single fine scheme, At the same time, the situation becomes more complicated when the pollution produced by mines is single pollution. According to the established game model, we can see that the probability of government supervision and mine pollution control will be balanced. However, In reality, the following problems arise: first, the government has a strategy to maximize its own interests, that is, to regulate steadily with a probability slightly less than Nash's equilibrium and to be fined every time; second, Because the government's regulatory resources are limited, the same regulatory resources invest much more revenue in large mines than in small ones; third, mines can cut costs by rent-seeking. It is not the best game equilibrium for the government to supervise and the mine choose not to deal with pollution at a probability slightly less than Nash equilibrium, because mines can stop government supervision through rent-seeking activities. The solutions to the above three problems are as follows: first, The key to solving the problem that the government pursues the maximization of its own interests lies in how many mines are treated as a criterion for assessing its performance. If the number of mines for pollution control is less than the qualified standard, If the number of pollution mines is higher than the standard of excellence, then the relevant government personnel are rewarded or even promoted. In addition, the fines received by the government can only be used for regulatory expenses. It cannot be misappropriated. With this two-pronged approach, the government will not choose a regulatory strategy for the purpose of pursuing fines. Instead, it will try to urge the mines to deal with pollution. The root cause is the scarcity of regulatory resources. Reducing regulatory costs, such as the adoption of advanced detection techniques, can enrich regulatory resources and make it possible for the government to regulate small mines. In addition, Merging or centralized management of small mines can not only reduce sewage discharge, but also facilitate government supervision. Third, the rent-seeking behavior of mines has its inherent economic benefits, so the whole society should supervise the relevant regulatory authorities. Does the mine have pollution control or not? The local people are the most clear. If the mine is exempted from pollution control responsibility through rent-seeking, the masses can expose it, and the state will then have to investigate the responsibility of the mines and the relevant regulatory authorities. Finally, for the whole society, it is necessary to maintain the pressure of public opinion supervision. A climate of spontaneous environmental protection, coupled with minimal government regulation, maximizes the overall welfare of society.
【学位授予单位】：南华大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D630;F426.1

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