府际博弈、草根动员与“反邻避”效应——基于国内“高铁争夺战”分析

发布时间：2018-04-29 04:27

  本文选题：府际博弈 + 草根动员　； 参考：《北京社会科学》2017年07期

【摘要】：邻避效应是民众对项目负外部性的强烈排斥,而反邻避是民众对项目正外部性的积极争取。基于府际博弈和草根动员的两个维度解释反邻避效应发现:在府际博弈中,项目的正外部性驱动着地方官员的行为动机,权力关系网络决定着博弈双方争夺项目的话语权,博弈结果的非均衡性困境从外部增加了反邻避效应的风险;在草根动员中,地方政府的默许加剧了民众相对剥夺感和不公平感,进而以联名诉求的方式催生舆论施压,"一闹就给"的回应方式推动了效尤效应,引发决策失误,内部加剧了反邻避效应的矛盾。
[Abstract]:The neighbor-avoidance effect is the strong rejection of the negative externality of the project, while the anti-neighbor avoidance is the people's active struggle for the positive externality of the project. Based on the two dimensions of inter-government game and grassroots mobilization, it is found that in the inter-governmental game, the positive externality of the project drives the behavior motivation of the local officials, and the power relationship network determines the right to speak for the project between the two sides of the game. The disequilibrium dilemma of the game results increases the risk of anti-neighbor effect from the outside; in the grassroots mobilization, the acquiescence of the local government intensifies the sense of relative deprivation and unfairness of the people. Then, the pressure of public opinion was induced by the way of joint appeal, and the response way of "making a scene as soon as possible" promoted the effect of effect, caused the error of decision making, and intensified the contradiction of anti-neighbor effect inside.
【作者单位】： 南京农业大学公共管理学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金项目(14BGL150)
【分类号】：D630;F532
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本文编号：1818393