公私合作制中政府监管机制研究
发布时间:2018-04-30 02:28
本文选题:公私合作制 + 政府监管 ; 参考:《华东政法大学》2015年硕士论文
【摘要】:公私合作制,即PPP模式,是公共部门和私营部门共同供给公共产品的一种合作模式,其核心是以“合作”的方式将私营部门引入至公共产品领域,从而缓解政府的财政压力,提高公共产品供给的效率和质量。在通过公私合作制引入私营部门的过程中,政府承担者监管者、规则制定者和项目参与者的三重角色,其中,政府监管者的身份要求政府必须对整个项目进行谨慎的监管。综合现有的文献资料,针对公私合作制项目的讨论一般侧重于项目整体的风险管理,对政府监管的讨论则存在空缺。本文即旨在基于现有的国内外成功及失败案例,以及国内外PPP政府监管实践经验,对公私合作制中政府监管的问题作深入探讨,以期获得完善我国未来公私合作制中政府监管机制的启示。本文共有四章,其主要内容和逻辑结构如下:第一章从政府对供给公共产品之社会性、经济性职能展开讨论,第一节分析了政府对调控市场经济并维护社会公益的诉求,重点讨论了当前政府重视公共产品的供给正是为了矫正政府原本对经济建设的决策偏好,以及市场失灵的客观存在要求政府通过有形的手加以调控,从而取得政府依其职能供给公共产品的正当性。第二节从现实情况出发,讨论政府财政、管理能力与社会对公共产品之需求的矛盾,以及公共产品市场对于适度竞争的需求,从而得出社会资本参与公共产品供给的比较性;再从制度的角度和法经济学的视角分析社会资本进入公共领域的可行性,并通过外部性内在化、有机会选择等理论,探讨如何在具有公益性的社会产品领域有机包容社会资本的逐利性。第三节基于上述两节之基础,提出公私合作制实质是政府职能与社会资本的契合,在此制度下社会公众和私营部门的利益诉求得到了有机的结合。第二章主要探讨公司合作制中政府监管的正当性。第一节首先从公私合作制中政府监管之必要性开始展开,分别就政府监管对公私部门之间目标冲突的矫正、弥补在公私合作制的框架下公共利益的话语权丧失所导致的制度缺陷进行探讨。第二节则主要从公私合作制中政府监管的法律和合同依据进行研究。其中法律依据的梳理分为早期政策文件、十八届三中全会以后的相关规定两个阶段;合同依据主要从公私合作制合同的定性、行政性合同的“行政性”、“契约性”的双重属性的方面进行探讨。第三节顺着上文的思路,对公私合作制中政府监管的主要内容进行分析,从监管手段加以区分,分别讨论了准入监管和绩效监管在政府监管中的具体实施。其中,绩效监管中又区分了价格监管和质量监管两个较为重要的监管类别。第三章围绕公私合作制中政府监管失灵展开。以“监管无效果但有效率”、“监管无效果且无效率”作为分类,第一节讨论政府监管失灵的外部表现:信息披露不透明,即政府因采用间接监管而无法直接去的监管信息,监管因而可能被滞后;价格监管存在误区,即在决定监管标准时,政府容易错误地以价格高低作为唯一的衡量标准;质量监管存在监管缺位,即政府运用自由裁量权不当、监管标准制定不清等情况会导致政府在监管时存在放权即等同于不监管的错误认识。第二节则通过对上述问题进行剖析后归纳出政府监管失灵的内在原因,从政府内部看,监管失灵主要由于政府多头监管所导致的协调性差、相互口径不一、政府多重角色(监管者、参与者、规则制定者)之间存在角色冲突、政府缺乏自我监管的内控体系等问题,而从政府外部看,政府因采用间接监管的方式而必须承担其监管滞后的效果,同时公共产品市场的公益性和公私合作的较长周期的特点会造成“二次垄断”的非竞争效果。上述因素共同作用导致了政府监管的失灵。第四章意图为公私合作制中政府监管制度提出完善建议。第一节从政府监管的基本理念的讨论展开,首先提出了“柔性监管”的理念,即在公私合作制的合作框架下,政府监管应当摈弃强制性、行政性的监管手段,转而以协商性、市场性的方式进行监管;其次提出了“激励性监管”的理念,即在柔性监管的理论基础之上,通过“激励相容”的手段,鼓励私营部门自主自发地提高项目运行效率。第二节讨论了确认政府监管机构独立地位的重要性。第三节为加强政府监管提出了两项具体措施,包括信息披露体系的构建和第三方争议解决机制作为辅助手段的实施。
[Abstract]:The public and private cooperative system, the PPP model, is a cooperative model for the common supply of public goods by the public and the private sector. The core is to introduce the private sector into the public product field in a "cooperative" way, thus alleviating the government's financial pressure, improving the efficiency and quality of the supply of public goods. In the process of the Department, the government is responsible for the three roles of the supervisor, the rule maker and the project participants. Among them, the government supervisor's identity requires the government to supervise the whole project carefully. On the basis of the existing domestic and foreign success and failure cases, and the practical experience of PPP government supervision both at home and abroad, this paper makes an in-depth discussion on the government supervision in the public and private cooperative system, in order to obtain the inspiration for improving the government supervision and management mechanism in the future public and private cooperative system in China. There are four chapters in this paper. In the first chapter, the government has discussed the social and economic functions of the supply of public goods. The first section analyzes the government's demands for the regulation of the market economy and the maintenance of social public welfare. The emphasis is on the government's importance of the supply of public products to correct the government's original decision preference for economic construction. And the objective existence of market failure requires the government to regulate and control through the tangible hand, thus obtaining the legitimacy of the government to supply the public products according to its functions. In the second section, we discuss the contradiction between the government finance, the management ability and the social demand for public products, and the demand for moderate competition in the public product market from the reality. From the angle of system and the perspective of law and economics, the feasibility of social capital into the public domain is analyzed from the angle of system and the perspective of law and economics. And through the internalization of the externality and the choice of opportunity, this paper discusses how to contain the profit of social capital in the field of social products with public welfare. Third section. Based on the above two sections, it is proposed that the public and private cooperative system is essentially a combination of government functions and social capital. Under this system, the interests of the public and the private sector are organically combined. The second chapter mainly discusses the legitimacy of the government supervision in the company's cooperative system. In the second section, the second section mainly studies the law and the conformity basis of the government supervision in the public and private cooperative system. The legal basis is combed. It is divided into two stages: the early policy documents and the relevant provisions after the third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee; the contract basis is mainly discussed in the aspects of the quality of the contract of public and private cooperative system, the "administrative" of the administrative contract and the dual attribute of the contract. The third section is the main content of the government supervision in the public and private cooperative system. Through the analysis, the specific implementation of supervision and performance supervision in government supervision is discussed from the supervision means. In the performance supervision, two more important regulatory categories are classified in the performance supervision. The third chapter focuses on the malfunction of the government and the government in the public and private cooperative system. The first section discusses the external performance of government regulatory failure: information disclosure is not transparent, that is, the government is unable to direct supervision information because of the use of indirect supervision. Supervision may be lagged behind; there is a misunderstanding of price regulation, that is, when the regulatory standards are determined, the government is prone to erroneous prices. The quality supervision is the only standard of measurement; there is a lack of supervision in the supervision of the quality supervision, that is, the government's improper use of discretion, the unclear supervision standards will lead to the government's wrong understanding of the government's decentralization in supervision. The second section, through the analysis of the above problems, concludes the internal control failure of the government. The reason, from the government inside, is that the regulatory failure is mainly due to the poor coordination caused by the government's multiple supervision, the different mutual caliber, the role conflict between the multiple roles of the government (supervisors, the participants, the rulers), the lack of the internal control system of the government, and the external supervision of the government from the outside of the government. And we must bear the effect of the lag of supervision. At the same time, the public goods market's public welfare and the long cycle of public and private cooperation will result in the non competitive effect of "two monopolies". The joint effect of the above factors leads to the failure of government supervision. The fourth chapter is intended to put forward a perfect proposal for the government supervision system in the public and private cooperative system. From the discussion of the basic concept of government supervision, the concept of "flexible supervision" is first put forward, that is, under the cooperation framework of public and private cooperation, government supervision should abandon compulsory and administrative supervision means, and transfer the supervision in a negotiable and marketable way, and it puts forward the idea of "incentive supervision", that is, in flexible supervision. The second section discusses the importance of identifying the independent status of the government regulators. The third section puts forward two specific measures for strengthening government supervision, including the construction of information disclosure system and the settlement of the third party disputes. The mechanism is implemented as an auxiliary means.
【学位授予单位】:华东政法大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2015
【分类号】:D630.9
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相关期刊论文 前2条
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2 武俊山;;论行政合同的法律救济[J];内江师范学院学报;2012年09期
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