中国的集权与分权:“风险论”与历史证据

发布时间：2018-06-08 10:58

本文选题：中央集权 + 地方分权　；参考：《社会》2017年03期

【摘要】：在中国历史上,中央集权与地方分权的关系经历了一系列重大演变。这些演变给我们提出如下三类问题:第一,在地方政治体制上,为什么一部分王朝在开国初期采用了分封制,而当王朝稳定下来之后,却又谋求削藩?第二,在边疆和西南少数民族地区,为什么元代和明代采用"土司制",清代却推行"改土归流"?第三,在省级政区和省级政府的设置上,为什么汉人政权表现出兴废不定和周期性循环,而游牧民族建立的中原王朝却不存在这种循环?此外,清代之后建立的汉人政权为什么又打破了这种周期循环,建立起稳定的省级政区和统一的省级政府?本文论证了上述问题可以用"风险论"——即中央政府追求"统治风险最小化"的行为及其面临的约束条件——来解释,还同时比较了"风险论"与"帝国的治理逻辑"和"行政发包制模型"在解释能力上的差别。
[Abstract]:In Chinese history, the relationship between centralization and decentralization has undergone a series of important changes. These evolution give us the following three questions: first, in the local political system, why some dynasties in the early days of the founding of the country, but when the dynasty stabilized, but also seek to cut the vassal? Second, why did the Yuan and Ming dynasties adopt the "Tusi system" in the border areas and the southwest minority areas, while the Qing Dynasty carried out "changing the land and returning to flow"? Third, in the setting up of provincial government and provincial government, why did the Han government show the cycle of prosperity and abolition, but the central Plains dynasty established by nomadic people did not exist such a cycle? In addition, why did the Han regime established after the Qing Dynasty break this cycle and set up stable provincial governments and unified provincial governments? This paper argues that the above problems can be explained by the "risk theory", that is, the behavior of the central government in pursuit of "ruling risk minimization" and the constraints it faces. At the same time, the paper compares the differences between the theory of risk and the logic of imperial governance and the model of administrative contract system.
【作者单位】：浙江大学社会学系;浙江大学地方政府与社会治理研究中心;
【基金】：包兆龙包玉刚留学生基金会的资助
【分类号】：D630

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