中国政府绩效考核制度视角下的中央与地方利益关系

发布时间：2018-09-12 11:46

【摘要】：政府绩效考核制度是当代中国最重要的政治制度之一。政府通过绩效考核的方式将干部晋升与实现经济发展目标捆绑在一起。考核制度是中国能够实行行政下放,同时保持政治集权制度,克服所有官僚体系面对的委托-代理问题的关键因素。本文对关于考核制度的两种模型进行评估,即重视中央管控地方政府的"传动皮带"模型,以及重视各级政府之间的商量的"谈判"模型。现行干部考核制度被一般学者认为是统一制度。但是本文通过研究证明,中国各级政府中存在着各种不同的目标责任制度。而且,一个责任制本身包括较多来自不同单位的评估者。尽管晋升的激励会让地方官员考虑到他们在体制内长期的仕途发展,以及中央的要求,但是地方政府提供的财政和"荣誉"激励会让官员重视短期的收获以及直接上级的要求。因此,政绩考核制度就有横向的和纵向的碎片化。本文还指出,地方政府能够通过地方考核办法的措辞调整和解释中央目标;有时地方政府能够将自己的利益纳入考核内容中,甚至因而违反中央利益的目标。由此可见,政绩考核制度不完全是将中央目标翻译成地方行动的自上而下体制。制度的碎片化,加上地方政府为了调整和改变中央目标而能够采取的各种手段,都意味着"谈判"模型比较适合考核制度的具体运作。
[Abstract]:Government performance appraisal system is one of the most important political systems in contemporary China. The government binds the promotion of cadres to the achievement of economic development goals through performance appraisal. The appraisal system is the key factor for China to carry out administrative decentralization, maintain political centralization and overcome the principal-agent problem faced by all bureaucrats. In this paper, two models of assessment system are evaluated, that is, the "transmission belt" model of central control local government and the "negotiation" model of negotiation between governments at all levels. The current cadre appraisal system is regarded by the general scholar as a unified system. However, this paper proves that there are different systems of target responsibility in Chinese governments at all levels. Moreover, a responsibility system itself includes more evaluators from different units. While promotion incentives allow local officials to take into account their long-term career development within the system and central demands, financial and "honour" incentives from local governments value short-term gains as well as those of immediate superiors. Therefore, the performance appraisal system has horizontal and vertical fragmentation. This paper also points out that the local government can adjust and explain the central goal through the wording of the local assessment method, and sometimes the local government can bring its own interests into the assessment content, thus even violating the goal of the central government interest. This shows that the performance appraisal system is not entirely a top-down system that translates central targets into local actions. The fragmentation of the system, together with the various means that local governments can adopt to adjust and change the central objectives, means that the "negotiation" model is more suitable for the concrete operation of the appraisal system.
【学位授予单位】：南京大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D630

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