基于激励理论的政府购买公共服务问题研究
发布时间：2019-03-26 11:25
【摘要】：政府购买公共服务是转变政府职能、减少财政负担、提高服务质量的一种创新供给模式。目前我国的政府购买公共服务尚处于起步阶段,形式单一、受众面窄,在实践中需要借鉴西方国家的先进经验。值得引起关注的是政府在购买公共服务过程中与承包商之间形成的委托-代理关系,由于二者之间的信息不对称必然导致逆向选择和道德风险问题,在实践中必将偏离政府最初的政策目标。本文从激励理论入手,分析了政府购买公共服务过程中的委托-代理问题和与之相关的选择、激励与监督机制,并结合博弈模型阐述了这些机制的设计思路和方法,从而最大限度地实现社会福利最大化目标。本文一方面构建了双信号、双目标的博弈模型,从理论模型的角度研究如何防范政府购买公共服务过程中的逆向选择和道德风险问题;另一方面从经验分析的角度比较了目前国内主要的政府购买公共服务模式所采用的选择机制、激励机制和监督机制。根据理论与实证两个方面的研究表明,政府购买公共服务必须提高供给过程的透明度,降低信息不对称的程度;必须支付检查成本,形成公益性激励预期;必须加强多方监管,满足社会对公共服务的期望。最后从我国政府购买公共服务的责任、实践环境的优化、机制的完善三个方面提出相应的政策建议。
[Abstract]:The purchase of public services by the government is an innovative mode of supply to change the functions of the government, reduce the financial burden, and improve the quality of services. At present, the government buys public service in our country is still in the initial stage, the form is single, the audience is narrow, we need to draw lessons from the advanced experience of western countries in practice. What is worthy of concern is the principal-agent relationship formed between the government and the contractor in the process of purchasing public services. Because of the asymmetric information between the two, the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard will inevitably be caused by the asymmetry of information between the two. In practice, it is bound to deviate from the government's original policy objectives. Starting with the incentive theory, this paper analyzes the principal-agent problem in the process of government purchasing public service and the related selection, incentive and supervision mechanism, and expounds the design ideas and methods of these mechanisms in combination with the game model. So as to maximize the goal of social welfare maximization. On the one hand, this paper constructs a two-signal and two-objective game model, and studies how to prevent adverse selection and moral hazard in the process of government purchasing public service from the perspective of theoretical model. On the other hand, this paper compares the selection mechanism, incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism used by the major domestic government purchasing public service mode from the perspective of empirical analysis. According to the theoretical and empirical research, the government must improve the transparency of the supply process, reduce the degree of information asymmetry, pay the inspection cost, and form the public welfare incentive expectation. Multi-party supervision must be strengthened to meet the expectations of the community for public services. Finally, the corresponding policy suggestions are put forward from three aspects: the responsibility of the government to purchase public services, the optimization of the practice environment, and the perfection of the mechanism.
【学位授予单位】：青岛大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D630
本文编号：2447494
[Abstract]:The purchase of public services by the government is an innovative mode of supply to change the functions of the government, reduce the financial burden, and improve the quality of services. At present, the government buys public service in our country is still in the initial stage, the form is single, the audience is narrow, we need to draw lessons from the advanced experience of western countries in practice. What is worthy of concern is the principal-agent relationship formed between the government and the contractor in the process of purchasing public services. Because of the asymmetric information between the two, the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard will inevitably be caused by the asymmetry of information between the two. In practice, it is bound to deviate from the government's original policy objectives. Starting with the incentive theory, this paper analyzes the principal-agent problem in the process of government purchasing public service and the related selection, incentive and supervision mechanism, and expounds the design ideas and methods of these mechanisms in combination with the game model. So as to maximize the goal of social welfare maximization. On the one hand, this paper constructs a two-signal and two-objective game model, and studies how to prevent adverse selection and moral hazard in the process of government purchasing public service from the perspective of theoretical model. On the other hand, this paper compares the selection mechanism, incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism used by the major domestic government purchasing public service mode from the perspective of empirical analysis. According to the theoretical and empirical research, the government must improve the transparency of the supply process, reduce the degree of information asymmetry, pay the inspection cost, and form the public welfare incentive expectation. Multi-party supervision must be strengthened to meet the expectations of the community for public services. Finally, the corresponding policy suggestions are put forward from three aspects: the responsibility of the government to purchase public services, the optimization of the practice environment, and the perfection of the mechanism.
【学位授予单位】：青岛大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D630
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