实际控制人性质对高管薪酬契约有效性的影响研究

发布时间：2018-01-02 02:27

本文关键词：实际控制人性质对高管薪酬契约有效性的影响研究　出处：《西南财经大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：近年来,随着我国资本市场的发展,上市公司数量迅速增多,高管薪酬快速增长,伴随出现的一些公司高管薪酬与公司绩效不挂钩的现象也越来越引起人们的关注,引发了人们对高管薪酬契约有效性的怀疑。因此,高管薪酬契约究竟能否提升公司业绩这一课题,再一次地摆在了人们的面前。以往对高管薪酬契约的研究大多局限于货币薪酬、持股激励等显性薪酬方式,但是却忽略了重要的一点：显性薪酬并非高管薪酬的全部,以在职消费为主要形式的隐性薪酬同样是高管薪酬的重要组成部分。高管薪酬契约制定的初衷和最终目的是促进公司业绩的提升,但是制定之后,公司内在或外在的各种因素都会影响其激励效果的发挥,这其中既有提高其有效性的正面影响,又有降低其有效性的负面影响。以往的研究先后考察过公司规模、公司成长性、行业、地区等很多方面的因素,但是在公司实际控制人性质对高管薪酬契约有效性的影响方面,涉及的较少。本文正是希望从这一角度入手,为高管薪酬领域的研究增添一个新的视角。本文主要对下面几个问题进行研究：第一,探讨高管薪酬契约(包括显性薪酬契约和隐性薪酬契约)能否有效地激励管理者提升公司业绩,即高管薪酬契约是否是有效的。特别是隐性薪酬契约,我国目前的研究较少,仅有的文献研究大多认为隐性薪酬契约与公司业绩负相关,事实果真如此吗?第二,考察实际控制人性质对高管薪酬契约有效性的影响,即：政府作为公司的实际控制人是否会影响高管的薪酬水平与薪酬契约的激励有效性；中央政府与地方政府分别控制的公司,其高管的薪酬水平与薪酬契约有效性有何不同。为了解决以上问题,本文的写作(除第一章引言外)主要包括以下几个部分：第二章：文献综述。主要是回顾相关领域的国内外研究,主要包括高管薪酬与公司绩效关系的研究、高管薪酬激励机制的影响因素研究、实际控制人性质对公司治理的影响研究。第三章：理论基础与制度背景。理论基础部分主要包括委托代理理论、激励理论、人力资本理论等。制度背景部分主要包括我国的国企改革与薪酬管制、我国的财政分权制度与国有资产分级管理体制。第四章：高管薪酬激励现状的分析,主要是根据统计资料,观察近几年我国非国有企业、地方国有企业、中央企业在高管货币性薪酬、持股情况、在职消费、企业业绩方面存在的差异。第五章：研究设计。主要包括在前文理论分析与文献回顾的基础上提出研究假设、进行样本选择与变量定义、构建相应的检验模型,共构建了四个模型,分别对薪酬与业绩的相关性、实际控制人性质对高管显性薪酬契约有效性的影响、实际控制人性质对高管隐性薪酬契约有效性的影响进行检验。第六章：实证研究。包括描述性统计、模型回归分析结果和对模型的检验。第七章：研究结论与建议。包括对研究结论的总结、研究启示、本文的创新点与不足。通过理论分析与实证检验,本文得出了以下结论：首先,在对高管显性薪酬契约有效性进行的检验中,高管货币薪酬契约有效得到了实证支持,但是高管持股激励有效性并未得到实证支持。为此,本文把全体样本分为两部分：政府控制公司与非政府控制公司,对高管持股激励有效性重新进行检验,结果发现非政府控制公司高管持股激励契约具有有效性,政府控制公司高管持股激励作用不明显。本文认为,政府控制公司的高管持股比例偏低,只有1%左右,过低的持股比例致使激励作用难以有效发挥,虽然非政府控制公司的持股激励有效性通过了显著性检验,但是受到政府控制公司较低的持股比例和较大的样本量的影响,全样本检验才没有支持“高管持股具有激励有效性”这一结论。其次,对高管隐性薪酬契约有效性的检验结果显示：高管隐性薪酬契约具有激励有效性,即高管隐性薪酬契约能够提升公司业绩,这与以往的研究结论不同。本文认为,信息不对称导致所有者与经营者签订完全契约成为不可能,隐性薪酬契约作为显性薪酬契约的有效补充,能够有效提升高管人员效用水平,起到良好的激励效果。此外,公司允许高管人员享用的在职消费大多是规定了具体用途的(如办公费、业务招待费等),这些规定的用途与公司利益的实现基本是一致的。再次,本文考察了政府作为实际控制人对高管薪酬契约有效性的影响,研究表明：对于高管显性薪酬契约,非政府控制的公司有效性好于政府控制的公司;而对于隐性薪酬契约,非政府控制的公司有效性差于政府控制的公司。这表明政府作为公司实际控制人对公司施加的直接干预,削弱了高管显性薪酬契约的有效性。最后,本文考察了中央和地方政府作为实际控制人对高管薪酬契约有效性的影响,研究结果显示：中央政府控制公司的高管货币薪酬契约有效性显著好于地方政府控制公司,隐性薪酬契约有效性差于地方政府控制公司,持股激励在两类公司中不存在显著差异,激励效果都不显著。本文的研究贡献主要在于：首先,本文在研究中采用了广义高管薪酬的概念,即把高管薪酬界定为包含货币薪酬、高管持股与在职消费的薪酬体系,拓宽了以往研究中把高管薪酬局限于货币性年薪的研究思路,不仅考察了高管显性薪酬契约的有效性,而且考察了高管隐性薪酬契约的有效性,并得出“高管隐性薪酬契约具有激励有效性”的结论,这有助于改变人们对于在职消费的消极印象,只要能够提供适当的监督与引导,在职消费等隐性薪酬契约能够对提升公司业绩产生积极效果。其次,本文考察了政府控制与否对高管薪酬契约有效性的影响,证明了政府干预影响了公司高管薪酬机制的激励效率,并进一步考察了公司实际控制人的政府层级对高管薪酬契约有效性的影响,证明了控制人所属政府层级不同也会影响公司高管薪酬机制的激励效率。这为我国高管薪酬激励机制的研究提供了一个新的视角,并能在一定程度上帮助提高对我国政府经济职能的认识。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the development of China's capital market, the rapid increase in the number of listed companies, executives of rapid growth, with the emergence of some company executive compensation and corporate performance is not linked to the phenomenon is more and more concerned by people, has sparked the effectiveness of suspicion of executive compensation contract. Therefore, whether the executive compensation contract to enhance the performance of the company this issue, once again placed in front of people. Previous research on executive compensation contracts are mostly limited to the monetary compensation, stock incentive and other dominant compensation, but it ignores an important point: the explicit compensation of executive compensation is not full, with implicit compensation on-the-job consumption as the main form of the same is an important part of executive compensation.
Executive compensation contract purpose and ultimate purpose is to promote the company to enhance performance, but after the development, all kinds of factors inside and outside the company will affect the incentive effect, both of which enhance its positive impact on the effectiveness, and reduce the negative influence of effectiveness. Previous research has examined the the size of the company, the company's growth, industry, region and other factors in many aspects, but in the actual controller of the company's properties impact on executive compensation contract validity, involving less. It is hoped that from this point into the hand, adding a new perspective for the study of executive compensation field.
This paper mainly focuses on the following questions: first, to investigate the executive compensation contract (explicit compensation contract and implicit compensation contract) can effectively motivate managers to enhance the performance of the company, namely the executive compensation contract is effective. Especially the implicit compensation contract, our country's present research literature research less, only most of that negative implicit compensation and the performance of the company, really? Second, examine the nature of the actual controller to influence the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts, namely: the government as the actual control of the company's incentive effectiveness not only affects the level of executive compensation and compensation contract; the central government and the local government respectively control the company, its executives the compensation level and compensation contracts of difference.
In order to solve the above problems, the writing of this article (except the first chapter) mainly includes the following parts:
The second chapter: literature review. It mainly reviews the domestic and foreign research in related fields, including the research on the relationship between executive compensation and company performance, the influencing factors of executive compensation incentive mechanism, and the influence of the nature of actual controller on corporate governance.
The third chapter: the theoretical basis and system background. The theoretical basis includes the principal-agent theory, incentive theory, human capital theory and so on. The system mainly includes the background of the reform of state-owned enterprises and compensation control in our country, China's fiscal decentralization system and the classification of state-owned assets management system.
The fourth chapter: the analysis of executive compensation incentive status, mainly based on statistical data, to observe the differences in executive monetary compensation, shareholding, on-the-job consumption and business performance in recent years in China's non state owned enterprises, local state-owned enterprises and central enterprises.
The fifth chapter mainly includes: research design. Put forward the research hypothesis based on the previous theoretical analysis and literature review, sample selection and variable definition, construct the corresponding model test, a total of four models were constructed, respectively. The correlation of pay and performance, influence the nature of the actual controller on the effectiveness of executive compensation contract explicit, inspection influence of the nature of the actual controller on the validity of the implicit salary contract.
The sixth chapter: empirical research, including descriptive statistics, model regression analysis and test of the model.
The seventh chapter: the conclusions and suggestions of the research, including the conclusion of the research, the inspiration of the research, the innovation and the deficiency of this article.
Through theoretical analysis and empirical test, the following conclusions are drawn.
First of all, in the test on the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts in the dominant currency, executive compensation contracts are effective empirical support, but the executive stock ownership incentive effectiveness has not been empirically supported. Therefore, the whole sample is divided into two parts: the government controlled companies and non government controlled companies, the executive stock ownership incentive effectiveness again test results found with the effectiveness of non government controlled companies executive stock ownership incentive contract, government control company executive stock ownership incentive effect is not obvious. This paper argues that the government control of the company's executives shareholding ratio is low, only about 1% of the shareholding ratio is too low that incentives can not effectively play the role, although the stock incentive effectiveness of non government controlled companies through a significant test, but influenced by the ownership of government controlled companies is low and large quantity of samples, the whole sample test before There is a conclusion that "executive stock ownership has incentive effectiveness".
Secondly, the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts implicit test results showed that: implicit salary incentive contract has validity, namely the implicit salary contract can improve the performance of the company, which is different from the previous research result. This paper argues that the information asymmetry in the owners and operators signed a complete contract has become impossible, the implicit compensation contract as an effective complement for the dominant the salary contract, can effectively enhance the level of utility executives, play a good incentive effect. In addition, the company allowed executives to enjoy on-the-job consumption is mostly provided with Applications (such as office expenses, hospitality business, etc.) to achieve these provisions and the purpose of the interests of the company is basically the same.
Again, this paper examines the impact of the government as the actual control, executive compensation in the effectiveness of the research showed: for the executive compensation contract explicit, non government controlled company effectiveness better than the government controlled companies; for the implicit compensation contract, non government controlled company effectiveness for the control of the government. This shows that the company the direct intervention of the government as the actual control of the company to the company applied, weakened the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts dominant.
Finally, this paper examines the central and local governments as the actual control effect of executive compensation in the effectiveness of the research results show that: the central government control effectiveness of the company's executives monetary compensation contract is better than the local government control companies, the effectiveness of compensation contracts for implicit local government control companies, shareholding motivation has no significant difference between the two the company, the incentive effect is not significant.
The main contributions of this study are as follows:
First, this paper uses the concept of generalized executive compensation in the study, namely the executive compensation should include monetary compensation, managerial ownership and on-the-job consumption the salary system, broaden the previous research in the research of executive compensation is limited to monetary salary, not only examines the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts and the dominant effects of the effective. Of implicit salary contract, and the contract is implicit salary incentive effectiveness "conclusion, it is helpful to change people for on-the-job consumption negative impression, as long as they can provide appropriate guidance and supervision, serving consumer implicit compensation contract can have a positive effect to improve the performance of the company.
Secondly, this paper examines the government control and not to influence the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts, that government intervention affects the incentive efficiency of executive compensation mechanism, and further investigated the impact of the company's actual control of the government level of executive compensation in the effectiveness of the controller is proved that the incentive efficiency will also affect the government level the company executive compensation mechanism. Provide a new perspective for the incentive mechanism of executive compensation research in China, and can help to improve the understanding of the economic function of Chinese government in a certain extent.

【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F224;F272.92;F832.51

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