审计失败的股票市场反应与长期经济后果

发布时间：2018-01-03 07:07

本文关键词：审计失败的股票市场反应与长期经济后果　出处：《南京大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：本文研究了中国证券市场对审计失败的反应,并且从审计费用和审计质量两个角度研究了审计失败导致的审计师声誉损失产生的长期经济后果。文中收集了2004年-2008年期间所有审计师因其上市公司客户财务舞弊受到证监会行政处罚的案例,并将此处罚视为监管机构对其审计失败的认定。剔除了会计师事务所被处罚时已被合并或不存在的案例,共得到12个审计师受到处罚的案例作为研究对象。一方面,针对每一个案例采用了事件研究的方法,考察在证监会对审计师行政处罚进行公告的一系列事件窗口内,被处罚审计师的其他上市公司客户的累积异常报酬率是否显著为负。结果发现在多数案例中,审计师被处罚公告日前后的窗口内,股票市场上其他客户的CAR值(累积异常报酬率)显著为负,市场对该事件产生了负面反应。在其中一些案例中,CAR值显著为负表现在审计师受到证监会处罚公告前后,而另一些案例中,由于市场对审计师被处罚信息的提前察觉和提前反应,CAR值显著为负表现在事件发生前30天范围内。另一方面,以每一个审计失败案例前两年、当年和后两年的数据作为样本,检验审计师受到处罚前和受到处罚后审计收费是否有显著降低,以及审计质量是否有显著提高来考察审计失败的长期经济后果。结果发现审计师受到处罚后审计收费并没有下降,审计师受到处罚的当年审计收费有下降的趋势,但从处罚后第一年开始反而有上升的趋势；并且发现与处罚前相比,处罚后审计师上市公司的操控性应计利润下降,审计师的审计质量提高,尤其是在被处罚的当年,审计质量的提高是显著的,但是持续的时间并不长久,处罚后的第一年审计质量的提高就开始不显著了。通过上述研究,本文从理论上对审计师声誉机制在我国市场上的有效性,以及我国审计需求是否存在逆向选择两方面提供了更为完善的依据。同时在实践方面,考察了市场作为一种隐性的手段是否能够对审计失败起到惩戒的作用。
[Abstract]:This paper studies the response of Chinese securities market to audit failure. The long-term economic consequences of auditor reputation loss caused by audit failure are studied from two angles of audit cost and audit quality. In this paper, all auditors are collected from 2004 to 2008 because of their listing. Corporate customer financial fraud by the CSRC administrative punishment cases. The punishment is regarded as the recognition of the audit failure of the regulator, and 12 cases of auditors being punished are taken as the object of study by excluding the cases in which the accounting firm has been merged or does not exist when the accounting firm was penalized. On the one hand, for each case, the method of event study is used to investigate a series of events window in which the CSRC announces the auditor's administrative punishment. Whether the accumulated abnormal rate of return of the other listed company customers is significantly negative. The results show that in most cases, the auditor was punished before and after the announcement of the window. The CAR value (cumulative abnormal rate of return) of other clients in the stock market was significantly negative and the market reacted negatively to the event. In some of these cases. The CAR value was significantly negative before and after the auditor was punished by the CSRC notice, while in other cases, due to the early detection and early response of the market to the auditor punishment information. CAR was significantly negative within 30 days before the event. On the other hand, the data of the first two years, the current year and the last two years of each audit failure case were used as samples to test whether the audit fees before and after the auditor's punishment had significantly decreased. And whether there is a significant improvement in audit quality to examine the long-term economic consequences of audit failure. The audit fees of auditors in the year of punishment have a downward trend, but from the first year after the punishment there is an upward trend; And found that compared with the punishment before, the auditor listed companies after the punishment of the operating accrual profits decreased, auditor audit quality improved, especially in the year of punishment, the audit quality improvement is significant. But the duration is not long, the first year after the penalty audit quality improvement began to be insignificant. Through the above research, this paper theoretically analyzes the effectiveness of auditor reputation mechanism in Chinese market. And whether there are two aspects of adverse selection in audit demand in China provides a more perfect basis. At the same time, in practice, it examines whether the market as a recessive means can play a disciplinary role in audit failure.
【学位授予单位】：南京大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F239.4;F832.51;F224

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