我国家族控股上市公司控制权与现金流权分离对投资效率的影响研究

发布时间：2018-01-05 13:07

本文关键词：我国家族控股上市公司控制权与现金流权分离对投资效率的影响研究　出处：《西南财经大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：自改革开放以来,我国资本市场规模逐步壮大,私营资本发展迅速。随着深市中小板块的发展及2009年创业板在深市推出,我国家族控股上市公司发展迅猛,已成为国民经济的重要组成部分。针对家族控股上市公司,学术界对其在控制权与现金流权分离状况下的公司治理问题进行了一些研究,诸如两权分离对公司价值的影响、对投资行为的影响等,并得出了控制权与现金流权分离会对公司价值、投资行为等产生影响的结论。作为家族控股上市公司终极控制人的自然人或由自然人组成的家族性群体基于经济人假设,他们会利用自己手中掌握的控制权为家族谋取最大利益。当控制权与现金流权的分离度出现变化时,家族控制人基于对风险和利益的考量,他们对上市公司的投资行为施加的影响可能发生改变,由此带来的投资效率也可能发生改变。而投资作为上市公司的一项重要活动,是公司发展的主要动力和未来现金流量增长的重要基础,投资是否有效率将直接影响公司的业绩和发展前景。投资效率高则说明公司未来发展前景较好,能够吸引市场投资者的投资热情。因此,研究家族控股上市公司控制权与现金流权分离对投资效率的影响,对于在控制权与现金流权分离的基础上判断家族控股上市公司发展前景、如何有效提振投资者信心具有积极的作用。在检索国内有关研究文献时,发现国内学者在研究家族控股上市公司控制权与现金流权分离时,多是研究两权分离对公司价值、公司绩效的影响,而忽视了对影响公司价值或绩效的传导机制——投资效率的研究。因此,研究家族控股上市公司控制权与现金流权分离对公司投资效率的影响可能会更清晰地揭示由于两权分离而影响公司价值或绩效的黑匣子。本文共分六章,各章主要内容如下：第一章.绪论本章首先介绍了本文的研究背景和研究意义,其次对研究思路和研究框架进行了阐述。在研究背景中加入了两个在本文实证部分收集到的具有明显对比特征的样本公司,它们的控制权与现金流权分离度的变化以及随之而来的投资效率的变化对本文的写作意图有一个很形象的诠释。在研究意义部分,简要介绍了本文所要研究的课题的理论意义和现实意义。为了使本文的研究思路有一个更为直观的感受,在绪论部分对研究思路进行了框架式处理。第二章.研究现状由于本文搜集到的相关文献较为有限,因此,将上市公司控制权与现金流权分离对投资效率影响方面的研究现状进行了一个梳理。有学者基于大股东与中小股东的代理理论,研究得出控制权与现金流权的分离会引起公司的非效率投资。有的学者针对非效率投资的两个主要表现形式——投资不足和投资过度进行了研究,一些学者得出两权分离度越大越容易引起公司投资不足的结论,但也有学者在对样本公司区分产权后的研究中得出两权分离度与公司投资过度呈现出显著正相关关系的结论。第三章.理论分析本章首先对在本文中涉及到的诸如家族企业、终极控制人、控制权、现金流权以及投资效率进行了概念界定。在概念界定部分的写作模式主要是先列举两三个现有的对该概念的界定并对该界定有何特点进行了简单述评,然后给出本文的界定并指出其特点或意义。其次,对本文研究中涉及到的理论基础进行了简要介绍。在本文中所涉及到的理论基础主要有委托代理理论、不完全契约理论以及控制权理论。在对理论基础进行了简要介绍后,本文还对相关理论与本文的关系进行了阐述,以表明该理论对本文有何指导意义。再次,对控制权与现金流权分离及其实现方式进行了简要介绍。在本文中,由于控制权与现金流权分离是一个很重要的概念,因此对什么是控制权与现金流权分离进行了界定。然后对产生控制权与现金流权分离的股权结构类型,如直接控制式、金字塔式和交叉持股式进行了阐述。最后,对控制权与现金流权分离和投资效率之间的关系进行了较为深刻的解析。此处是本文写作思路的逻辑所在,通过本节分析可以得出控制权与现金流权的分离会对家族控股上市公司的投资效率产生影响,分离度越大,投资非效率程度越严重。而基于利益协同效应,较高的现金流权在两权分离时对投资效率的负面影响具有一定的抑制作用。第四章.实证研究设计本章首先在控制权与现金流权分离对投资效率的影响的分析基础上提出了本文的两个研究假设。其次,对本文中用到的变量进行了定义并列出了各个变量的计量方法。再次,对本文应用的模型和样本进行了阐释。本文运用了两个模型,一个是衡量公司投资是过度还是不足以及多大程度上的过度或不足的Richardson模型,这是一个在国内外应用得较多的成熟的模型,另一个是以控制权与现金流权的分离度为关键解释变量、投资过度或投资不足程度为被解释变量的多元回归模型。本文的样本公司范围限定在家族控股上市公司,并根据样本在样本选定期间是否被ST处理以及关键数据是否完整等条件进行了进一步的筛选。第五章.实证检验本章首先基于Richardson模型对家族控股上市公司的投资效率进行了实证研究,得到本文所选样本的投资效率数据。其次,利用得到的投资效率数据并将它们分为投资过度和投资不足两组,然后运用模型二分别验证家族控股上市公司终极控制人控制权与现金流权分离对投资过度和投资不足的影响,研究发现：控制权与现金流权分离度与家族控股上市公司投资不足显著正相关。再次,基于利益协同效应,将投资过度样本组与投资不足样本组按照各组现金流权中位数为线再分为高现金流权组和低现金流权组以检验在不同现金流权水平下家族控股上市公司终极控制人控制权与现金流权分离对投资过度和投资不足的影响。研究发现：控制性家族持有现金流权较低时,两权分离度越大越易导致公司投资不足。最后,由于Richardson模型应用条件的限制和模型二中所用变量不同的计量方式可能对实证结果带来影响,本文在此对前节的实证结果进行了稳健性检验,发现前节的检验结果并没有受到模型应用条件和变量不同计量方式的影响,可以确认实证结果是稳健的。在本章中,运用了描述性统计、相关性分析以及多元线性回归等计量方法。第六章.研究结论、对策与本文的局限本章首先在前文的理论分析和实证检验的基础上得出了本文的研究结论,即：①我国家族控股上市公司普遍存在着投资非效率现象；②控制权与现金流权的分离会影响家族控股上市公司的投资效率,分离度越大,投资不足越严重；③控制性家族持有现金流权较低时两权分离度越大越易导致公司投资不足。其次,基于研究结论提出了针对性的对策建议。即：①压缩控制链的层级,以缓解普遍存在着的非效率投资行为问题；②限制家族控股上市公司控制权与现金流权的分离度以抑制投资不足；③提高家族控制人的现金流权以限制其非效率投资行为。最后,对本文写作中的一些局限性作了简单的阐述。本文的主要贡献是：首先,拓展了家族控股上市公司控制权与现金流权分离引起的公司治理问题的研究视角。目前国内学者基于家族控股上市公司控制权与现金流权分离的研究多集中于对公司价值影响方面,且大多都得出两权分离度对公司价值具有负面影响的结论,而对于影响公司价值传导机制之一的投资鲜有讨论。本文则是从投资效率这一角度着力,研究在家族控股上市公司范围内,终极控制人控制权与现金流权的分离对投资效率的影响,以期验证两权分离度的不同是否对公司投资效率产生不同的影响结果。其次,填补文献研究空白。在本文能够搜集到的文献中,大多是研究控制权与现金流权分离所产生的一系列代理问题,而并未对家族控股上市公司这一特殊公司群体在控制权与现金流权分离下的投资效率进行探讨。因此,本文试图对此进行有益的尝试并试图填补在这一研究方面的文献空白。本文需进一步研究的方向： (1)本文将主要精力用于解决控制权与现金流权的分离对家族上市公司投资的影响,且主要是负面影响,而未对两权分离是否对公司的投资有正向影响进行分析和探讨。因此,未来在两权分离度方面的研究可以对此进行探讨。 (2)由于目前很难获得终极控制人对不同投资项目的偏好,无法研究终极控制人在两权分离的情况下对不同投资项目的代理问题。若在未来能够获得这些数据则可以对此进行研究。 (3)已有学者研究得出,有侵占公司资源动机的控股股东更倾向于让上市公司持有更多的现金流。因此,可以研究家族控股上市公司持有的现金流量是否对公司的投资效率产生了影响,是何种影响。但在进行研究时要注意因解释变量与被解释变量的相互影响作用而导致的模型内生性问题。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, the scale of China's capital market is gradually growing, private capital has developed rapidly. With the development of the gem and small plates of Shenzhen in 2009 in Shenzhen, China's family holding listed company is developing rapidly, has become an important part of the national economy. The family holding listed companies, the academic circles have carried out some research on the control rights and cash flow rights separation under the condition of corporate governance, such as the separation of two rights on the value of the company, the impact on investment behavior, and get the control rights and cash flow rights separation will affect the value of the company, investment behavior and other conclusions. As the ultimate controller of listed family controlled natural person the company consists of natural person or family groups based on the hypothesis of economic man, they will use their power in the hands of the maximum benefit for the family. When the control right and now Separation of gold Liuquan changes when the family control of risk and benefits based on considerations, they exert influence on the investment behavior of listed companies may be changed, the investment efficiency of the resulting changes may also occur. Investment as an important activity of the listed company, the company is the main motive force of development and future cash flow the growth of an important basis, investment efficiency will directly affect the company's performance and prospects. The efficiency of investment is the company's future development prospects, the market can attract investors. Because of this, the study of family holding flow rights separation effect on the efficiency of investment control right and cash flow of listed companies, for the basic right of separation in the judgment of control rights and cash holdings family prospects of listed companies, how to effectively boost investor confidence has a positive effect.
In the domestic related research literature retrieval, found that the domestic scholars in the study of family holding listed company control rights and cash flow rights separation, is much research on the separation of two rights on the company value, affect the company's performance, while ignoring the conduction mechanism to affect the company's value or performance -- A Study on the efficiency of investment. Therefore, the study of family holdings the listed company control rights and cash flow rights separation effect on investment efficiency may reveal more clearly the separation of the two powers affect the value of the company or performance of the black box.
This article is divided into six chapters, the main contents of each chapter are as follows:
Chapter 1. Introduction
This chapter first introduces the background and significance of the research, then describes the research ideas and research framework. Adding two collected in the empirical part of this article has obvious contrast characteristics of Sample Firms in the background of the change of control rights and cash flow rights of their separation and subsequent changes in the efficiency of investment the intention of writing this article is a very vivid interpretation. In the part of the research significance, briefly introduces the theoretical significance of this paper is to study the topic and practical significance. In order to make the research ideas of this paper have a more intuitive feel, in the introduction part, research ideas are framed.
The second chapter. The present situation of the study
Because of the relevant literature to the relatively limited, therefore, the listed company control rights and cash flow rights separation effect on investment efficiency the research progress of a sort. Some scholars agency theory of majority shareholders and minority shareholders based on the separation of control rights and cash Liuquan will cause non efficiency investment company some scholars. According to the two main forms of non efficiency investment, under investment and over investment are studied, some scholars concluded the separation of two rights more easily lead to inadequate investment results, but there are also scholars in the study of different property rights after the Sample Firms that the separation of two rights and corporate over investment show a significant positive correlation between the results.
The third chapter. Theoretical analysis
This chapter firstly in this paper including family enterprise, ultimate controller, control right, cash flow right and investment efficiency. The definition in the definition of the definition part of the writing mode is to enumerate the two or three existing on the definition of the concept and the definition of what the characteristics of the simple review, then this paper gives the definition and points out its characteristics and significance.
Secondly, on the theoretical basis of this study involved are briefly introduced. The theoretical basis involved in this paper include principal-agent theory, incomplete contract theory and control theory. The theoretical basis is briefly introduced, the relationship between the related theory and the described in what is the theory shows that the significance of this paper.
Again, the control rights and cash flow rights separation and its realization are introduced. In this paper, the control rights and cash flow rights separation is a very important concept, so what is the control rights and cash flow rights separation was defined. Then the control rights and cash flow rights separation the ownership structure types, such as direct control type, pyramid and cross ownership type are discussed.
Finally, the relationship between control rights and cash flow rights and the separation between investment efficiency are analyzed deeply. It is this paper's writing logic, through this section can be obtained by the analysis of control rights and cash flow rights and the separation of the family holding listed companies investment efficiency impact, the greater the degree of separation. The more serious inefficient investment. And based on the interests of synergies, the higher the cash flow right in the separation of two rights the negative impact on the investment efficiency have a certain effect.
The fourth chapter. Empirical research design
This chapter first analysis based on control rights and cash flow rights separation effect on the investment efficiency of the proposed two hypotheses of this paper. Secondly, the variables of this paper lists the definition of the measurement of each variable. Thirdly, the application of the model and the interpretation of in this paper. Use two models, one is a measure of corporate investment is excessive or lack of Richardson model and to what extent the excessive or insufficient, this is a more applied in the domestic and foreign mature model, another is to separate the control rights and cash flow rights is the key explanatory variables, investment excessive or inadequate investment degree for the multiple regression model explanatory variables. The Sample Firms limited range of Listed Companies in the family holding, and according to the sample period in the sample is selected by the ST processing and the key data is finished The whole condition was further screened.
The fifth chapter. Empirical test
In this chapter, based on the Richardson model, the investment efficiency of the family holding companies is empirically studied, and the investment efficiency data of the selected samples are obtained.
Secondly, using the investment efficiency data and divide them into excessive investment and insufficient investment in two groups, and then use the model to verify each two family holding listed companies ultimate control rights and cash flow rights separation effect, excessive and insufficient investment on investment research found: the control rights and cash flow rights and the degree of separation of the family holding listed inadequate investment are significantly correlated.
Again, based on the interests of synergies, the excessive investment and insufficient investment in the sample group sample group according to the median value of cash flow right are divided into high cash flow right group and low cash flow rights group to test in different level of cash flow right under the ultimate control of family owned listed company control rights and cash flow rights separation effect and excessive investment the lack of investment. It is found that the control of the family holding cash flow rights is low, separation of two rights more easily lead to underinvestment.
Finally, because the measurement of variables used to limit the application conditions of Richardson model and model 2 different effects on the empirical results, based on the empirical results of section of the robustness test, test results found in the preceding section was not affected by model application conditions and variables of different measurement methods, the empirical results can be confirmed robust.
In this chapter, descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and multivariate linear regression are used.
The sixth chapter, the conclusion, the countermeasures and the limitations of this article
In this chapter, based on theoretical analysis and empirical test of the above obtained on the conclusion of this article, namely, the Chinese family controlled listed companies generally have the phenomenon of non efficiency of investment; the separation of control rights and cash flow rights will affect the family holding listed companies investment efficiency, the greater separation of investment. The more serious the shortage; the controlling family holding cash flow right lower degree of separation of the two rights is more easily lead to underinvestment.
Secondly, based on the research conclusion put forward the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions: 1. The compression control chain level, non efficiency investment behavior problems to alleviate widespread; the limitation of family controlling rights and cash flow rights separation degree of control of listed companies to curb investment shortage; the increase of cash flow right to family controller the limit behavior of non efficiency investment.
Finally, some limitations in this paper are briefly described.
The main contributions of this article are:
First, expand the research perspective of corporate governance of family holding rights and cash flow rights separation caused by the control of listed companies. At present, the domestic scholars study of family owned listed company control rights and cash flow rights separation based on the influence to the company value, and most of them are the separation of two rights has a negative impact on firm value the conclusion, for one of the value of the transmission mechanism affect the company's investment few discussions. This article is from the perspective of investment efficiency to research in family holding listed companies within the scope of the ultimate control rights and cash flow rights separation effect on the efficiency of investment, in order to verify whether the different separation of two rights of the company the efficiency of investment have different effects.
Secondly, to fill the blank in this paper. The literature research to collect literature, mostly a series of agency problems of control rights and cash flow rights separation produced, not for family holding listed companies of this special group in the company control right and cash flow right under the separation of investment efficiency are discussed. Therefore, this paper trying to try and try to fill in the blank of research literature.
The direction of this paper is to be further studied.
(1) this article will mainly focus on issues affecting the separation of control rights and cash flow rights of family investment in listed companies, and is a major negative impact, but not for the separation of two rights are analyzed and discussed the positive impact on the company's investment in the future. Therefore, the separation of the two powers of the might to explore.
(2) because it is difficult to get the preference of the ultimate controller to different investment projects at present, it is impossible to study the agency problem of the ultimate controller in different investment projects under the separation of the two powers. If we can get these data in the future, we can do this research.
(3) of some scholars that had occupied the company's resources motivation of controlling shareholders tend to allow listed companies to hold more cash flow. Therefore, the cash flow can be of family holding listed companies held by whether the impact on investment efficiency, what kind of impact. But the study should pay attention to a problem due to interaction of explanatory variables and explained variables of the model.

【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F224

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