中国上市银行公司治理机制对信息披露质量影响的实证研究

发布时间：2018-01-07 02:10

本文关键词：中国上市银行公司治理机制对信息披露质量影响的实证研究　出处：《重庆大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：公司治理问题和信息披露问题是现代企业研究的重点，也在学术界引起了广泛关注。国内外对于公司治理和信息披露问题的研究都比较多，但是把二者结合起来，就二者的相互影响关系进行的研究比较少。就研究领域而言，多数研究更倾向于关注于一般企业，这使得相关研究结论是否适用金融行业，特别是商业银行值得商榷。商业银行作为一类特殊的公司，既有一般公司的普遍性，也有其特殊性，而银行市场又是一个典型的信息不对称的市场，因此信息披露问题对商业银行的影响相比对其他行业而言就显得更为重要。特别是我国商业银行发展历程较短，且配套制度和相关法规尚未完善，其信息披露质量存在着许多不足，加之2007年后9家商业银行相继成功上市A股，将来也会有越来越多的商业银行上市，，这就更加引发了人们对商业银行特别是上市银行信息披露质量的关注。由于公司治理机制与信息披露制度都是基于委托代理理论产生的，作为现代企业制度的两种核心制度安排，两者之间是相互影响、相互制约的。其中公司治理机制对信息披露质量的影响在于：通过在委托代理关系中建立一系列的制度安排，即有效的公司治理机制，为高质量的信息披露提供制度保证。国内外众多学者也通过理论分析和实证分析的方法得出了公司治理机制对信息披露质量有着重要影响的结论。具体到上市银行，从完善公司治理机制的角度来探讨如何提高上市银行信息披露质量的问题，是可行且有现实意义的。本文通过收集我国上市的国有大型股份制商业银行及其他已上市银行的数据，实证分析了银行公司治理机制与信息披露质量之间的关系。实证研究表明，一般公司治理的研究结论不适用于银行业。中国上市银行内部控制机制对会计信息披露质量的影响较小，仅发现两职分离的领导权结构以及分散的股权结构能够提高会计信息披露质量，没有发现董事会、债权人以及经理人激励合约等治理机制对会计信息披露质量的影响。在产品市场的强烈竞争对公司治理控制机制形成约束之后的统计结果显示，对于内部治理结构不完善的中国上市银行，产品市场的强烈竞争会进一步降低内部控制机制对会计信息披露质量的提高。最后根据已有研究成果和本文实证研究，文章从完善银行业公司治理机制和促进银行业信息披露质量两个方面提出建议。鼓励国有股减持，优化银行业股权结构，真正做到银行董事长和总经理两职分任，建立和完善审计委员会制度，加强外部监控力量，健全市场立法机制，促进信息中介行业的发展。同时，鼓励银行业上市公司进行自愿性信息披露，规范公司报告流程，培育产品市场竞争体系。
[Abstract]:Corporate governance and information disclosure issues are the focus of modern enterprise research, but also aroused widespread concern in the academic community. Domestic and foreign research on corporate governance and information disclosure issues are more. However, the combination of the two on the relationship between the two little research. In terms of research, most of the research tend to focus on the general enterprise. This makes the relevant research conclusions applicable to the financial industry, especially commercial banks. As a special kind of companies, commercial banks have not only the universality of general companies, but also their particularity. And the banking market is a typical asymmetric information market, so the impact of information disclosure on commercial banks is more important than on other industries, especially in China's commercial banks have a short history of development. And the supporting system and related laws and regulations are not perfect, its information disclosure quality has many deficiencies, coupled with the 9 commercial banks have successfully listed A shares since 2007, there will be more and more commercial banks listed in the future. This has aroused people's concern about the quality of information disclosure of commercial banks, especially listed banks. As corporate governance mechanism and information disclosure system are based on the principal-agent theory, as two core institutional arrangements of modern enterprise system, the two systems affect each other. The influence of corporate governance mechanism on the quality of information disclosure lies in the establishment of a series of institutional arrangements in the principal-agent relationship, that is, effective corporate governance mechanism. Many scholars at home and abroad have also reached the conclusion that the corporate governance mechanism has an important impact on the quality of information disclosure through theoretical analysis and empirical analysis. Yes. It is feasible and meaningful to discuss how to improve the information disclosure quality of listed banks from the angle of perfecting the corporate governance mechanism. By collecting the data of large state-owned joint-stock commercial banks and other listed banks in China, this paper empirically analyzes the relationship between the corporate governance mechanism and the quality of information disclosure. The conclusion of general corporate governance is not applicable to the banking industry. The internal control mechanism of listed banks in China has little effect on the quality of accounting information disclosure. Only two separate leadership structure and decentralized equity structure can improve the quality of accounting information disclosure, not the board of directors. The impact of governance mechanisms such as creditor and manager incentive contract on the quality of accounting information disclosure. The statistical results show that the strong competition in the product market restricts the corporate governance control mechanism. For the Chinese listed banks with imperfect internal governance structure, the strong competition in the product market will further reduce the internal control mechanism to improve the quality of accounting information disclosure. Finally, according to the existing research results and empirical research in this paper, the article from the improvement of the banking corporate governance mechanism and promote the quality of banking information disclosure two aspects of the recommendations to encourage the reduction of state-owned shares. Optimize the banking equity structure, truly achieve the bank chairman and general manager, establish and improve the audit committee system, strengthen the external monitoring force, improve the market legislative mechanism. At the same time, we should encourage banking listed companies to make voluntary disclosure of information, standardize the reporting process of companies, and foster a competitive system in the product market.
【学位授予单位】：重庆大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.3;F832.51;F224

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