并购融资风险视角下的掏空与支持行为研究

发布时间：2018-01-07 22:16

本文关键词：并购融资风险视角下的掏空与支持行为研究　出处：《西南财经大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：国内外涉及并购融资的理论文献,主要是从公司治理的角度出发,研究并购融资方式的的选择和融资风险的产生。此类研究大部分以代理问题为核心,却很少涉及大股东和小股东之间的利益关系。而并购交易很可能是大股东实现掏空上市公司的途径。大股东也可能在上市公司陷入困境时施以援手,这种支持行为又使公司所有股东受益。国外一些文献探讨了掏空行为存在的法律环境和实施途径,另一些研究则通过分析大量数据资料,在发现掏空行为规律的同时也找到了大股东支持行为的证据。国内对掏空行为的研究则主要围绕大股东圈钱、关联交易和操纵股价等方面展开,对支持行为的研究则集中于对上市公司进行资产注入、债务担保等“保全”上市公司的行为。总之,国内外文献将并购融资和掏空、支持行为分割开来,形成两个不同的研究方向。即使同时涉及并购和掏空的文献,也只是将并购作为掏空的一种形式来研究,或者将掏空作为并购的一个目的来加以说明。本文则试图从并购融资风险的视角,研究控股股东对上市公司的掏空与支持行为,从而将并购融资和掏空与支持行为的研究融为一体。上市公司并购融资本身是为并购交易的一部分,并购融资和并购交易却又都涉及掏空和支持行为。我国的上市公司并购融资的方式主要有债务融资、信托融资和定向增发融资。这些融资方式会产生相应的融资风险。融资风险恰好是并购价值天然的指示器,它们可以显示并购交易背后的掏空和支持行为对企业价值变动的影响。正是看到了上市公司并购融资所表现出来的这些融资风险,才引发探究这些融资风险背后“元凶”——掏空和支持行为的兴趣。因此本文的研究思路是按照企业并购融资的金融风险、发行风险、财务风险,揭示风险背后的掏空与支持行为。通过对比国内掏空、支持行为与西方发达国家的不同,得出国内掏空、支持行为还处于原始阶段的结论。股价的信号作用,能迅速对并购融资做出不同的反应。一般而言,债务融资使得股价上扬,股权融资引致股价下跌。然而若是并购本是涉及内幕交易等掏空上市公司的行为时,增发融资导致股价下跌越是明显。通过分析我国上市公司并购定向增发的例子却发现,普遍存在新增股份发行时的价格较增发价格有明显的上扬,这种“公告效应”容易让人产生困惑。在对定向增发的股价效应进行实证分析后发现,增发价格实际上较首次公告前股价明显下跌了很多,此效应与“公告效应”相悖,故称作定向增发的“逆公告效应”。国内2008-2010年上市公司为并购定向增发的90个案例中83%存在“逆公告效应”,从而证实了关联交易等掏空行为可以被股价下跌所反映。企业为并购发行证券,必须考虑市场的接受度。证券价格、利率水平、融资规模和市场环境都是影响发行的因素。投资者抵制、市场容量有限、监管严苛等则可能导致并购融资发行失败。然而发行风险的决定性因素还在于企业本身。并购融资的发行风险决定于并购交易的性质和价值。如果并购交易是掏空上市公司,或者侵占中小股东利益,那么并购融资就会遭到投资者的抵制。结果不仅是增发的证券无人认购,现有股东也会选择“用脚投票”,以至于股价大跌。监管当局对并购融资的从严审批也会导致发行风险。无论是出于稳定市场的考虑,还是为保护中小投资者利益,监管严苛可能是遏制掏空行为最有效的方式。并购融资可能使企业因资金紧张而积聚财务风险。因此并购融资使得上市公司陷入一场“保级”之战。控股股东是上市公司“保级”的最大受益者,也最有动力对上市公司提供支持。无论是提供贷款担保,还是内部贷款,都能够解决上市公司的资金链紧张的问题。陷入财务危机中的上市公司犹如“惊弓之鸟”,稍有风吹草动都能将危机效应放大,所以这在很大程度上限制了大股东继续掏空上市公司,转而在适当的时机对上市公司施以援手,如提供流动性支持和重新注入优质资产。掏空和支持行为不仅存在于国内证券市场,在西方发达国家也广泛存在。但由于法律原则和法律框架的不一致,造成掏空行为的表现形式各不相同。普通法系国家以维护市场公平为基点,建立以“公平原则”为核心的判例法律体系,使得上市公司的实际控制人负有“勤勉义务”和“忠实义务”,而一旦没有履行义务,就被视同“违约”,其后果是巨额的罚款、甚至牢狱之灾。严刑峻法为维护证券市场公平保驾护航,专门的投资者利益保护机制也增强了投资者的维权力量。所以,普通法系国家的掏空行为在表面上至少需要具备合理的商业目的,且符合“公平原则”。相比而言,国内的掏空行为显得比较“原始”,既有赤裸裸的关联交易,也有直接低价向大股东增发新股转移利益的行为。由于没有相应的法律条款加以惩罚和禁止,许多掏空行为都披上了“合法的外衣”,这与普通法系国家就有了很大的不同。成文法强调法的可预测性,却不能最大限度的保证“公平”；加之国内对于掏空行为的处罚又不能落到实处,使得监管的效用大打折扣。此外,投资者的维权意识薄弱,且缺乏相应的投资者保护机制,使得掏空等侵占中小股东利益的行为肆意横行。本文的主要贡献：首先,在国内外研究的基础上,从并购融资的风险角度,研究上市公司的掏空与支持行为,可以弥补这一块理论的空缺。其次,针对我国上市公司普遍存在关联交易现象和定向增发偏好,分析上市公司并购交易背后的真实动机,从而揭露控股股东掏空上市公司的本质。再次,并购融资风险和掏空、支持行为可以有机统一,通过分析外部表现揭示内在原因,通过假设内部行为推断外部反应,这是本文的一大创新。最后,从西方发达国家治理掏空行为的经验中,得出对遏制国内证券市场掏空行为的一些政策建议。本文的不足在于实证数据样本容量还不够大、案例还不够丰富,因此其佐证作用有限；由于学识有限,政策建议还不够完善。
[Abstract]:The domestic and foreign literature relates to the theory of financing, mainly starting from the perspective of corporate governance, research on financing ways and the choice of financing risk. Most of such studies to the agency problem as the core, but seldom between large shareholders and small shareholders. The deal is probably the way emptied of listed companies large shareholders. Large shareholders may also help in the listed companies in trouble, this kind of behavior and support to the benefit of all shareholders of the company. Some foreign literature discusses the legal environment of the tunneling behavior exist and the implementation approach, other research is through the analysis of a large number of data, found in the tunneling behavior rules also found the propping behavior evidence. Domestic research on tunneling behavior is mainly around the large shareholders quanqian, related transactions and stock price manipulation and other aspects of support for. The research is focused on the listed company asset injection, debt guarantees and other "security" of the listed companies. In short, the domestic and foreign literature will be financing and tunneling, support is divided into two different research directions. Even at the same time involved in mergers and acquisitions and tunneling literature, will be the only merger as a kind of the form of hollowed out to study, or will be emptied as a mergers and acquisitions to illustrate this. This article attempts from the financing risk from the perspective of research on controlling shareholders of listed companies of tunneling and supporting behavior, which will integrate financing and mergers and acquisitions of propping and tunneling behavior.
The mergers and acquisitions of listed companies financing itself is a part of mergers and acquisitions, mergers and acquisitions financing but are involved in tunneling and propping behavior. China's listed companies merger financing of the main mode of debt financing, trust financing and private placement financing. The financing will have corresponding financing risk financing risk is just the value of the acquisition. The influence of natural indicator, they can display deals behind the tunneling and propping behavior of enterprise value. It is to see the mergers and acquisitions of listed companies financing has shown the financing risk, to explore the reasons behind these financing risk causing culprit - the interest of tunneling and propping behavior. Therefore this study is in accordance with the enterprise the financing of financial risk, financial risk, risk issue, reveal the tunneling and propping behavior behind the risk. Through comparing the tunneling, support The behavior is different from the western developed countries, and the conclusion is that the behavior of domestic hollowing is still in the original stage.
The price signal, can quickly respond differently to financing. In general, the price of debt financing, equity financing. However, if the stock fell caused by mergers and acquisitions is involved in insider trading and tunneling behavior of listed companies, resulting in additional financing of stock prices fall more obvious. Through the analysis of the listed company mergers and acquisitions orientation additional examples have found widespread issue of new shares when the price is the issuance price was rising, this "announcement effect" makes people confused. By empirical analysis on stock price effect on private placement after the discovery, the issuance price is actually for the first time before the announcement of stock price was down a lot, and contrary to this effect the "announcement effect", so called "inverse placement announcement effect. The existence of" inverse 90 case studies of domestic listed companies in 2008-2010 for the acquisition of private placement in 83% The announcement effect, which confirms that the hollowing of related transactions can be reflected by the fall of the stock price.
Enterprise merger issue securities, must consider the acceptance of the market. The price of securities, interest rates, financing scale and market environment factors are issued. Investors boycott, the market capacity is limited, it may lead to severe regulatory financing issue failed. However the decisive factor issue risk lies in the corporate nature and value itself. The issue of financing risk in mergers and acquisitions decision. If the transaction is emptied of listed companies, or occupy the interests of minority shareholders, so the financing will be resisted by the investors. It is not only the issuance of securities no subscription, existing shareholders will choose to vote with their feet, so that the share price fell. The regulatory authorities of the financing. Strict examination and approval will lead to the issue of risk. Whether for stable market considerations, or for the protection of the interests of small investors, regulators may be harsh. The most effective way to make a hollowing out.
The financing may make enterprises due to financial constraints and the accumulation of financial risk. Therefore the financing of the listed companies involved in a relegation battle ". The controlling shareholders are the biggest beneficiaries of listed companies" Echelon ", but also the most dynamic support for listed companies. It is to provide loan guarantees or internal loans, can solve the listed the company's capital chain tension problems. In the financial crisis of the listed companies" like a badly frightened person, can be slightly wind sways grass so the amplification effect of crisis, largely restricted to large shareholders of listed companies emptied, and at the appropriate time for listed companies to help, such as providing liquidity support and re injection high quality assets.
Tunneling and propping behavior not only exists in the domestic stock market, is also widespread in western developed countries. But due to different legal principles and legal framework, form caused by tunneling behavior varies. Common law countries to maintain fair market as the starting point, to establish the "fair principle" as the core of the legal precedent system, the the actual controller of the listed company has a "duty of diligence" and "duty of loyalty", and once did not fulfill their obligations, it was regarded as a "default", the consequences are huge fines or even jail. Severe law in order to maintain the securities market fair escort, a special mechanism to protect the interests of investors and enhance investor rights strength. So, the tunneling behavior of the common law countries at least on the surface has a reasonable business purpose, and in accordance with the principles of "fairness".
In contrast, domestic tunneling behavior appears more "original", both transactions naked, also have a direct transfer of interest to the issuance of new shares at the behavior of large shareholders. Because of the lack of appropriate legal provisions to punish and ban, many tunneling behavior were covered with a "legitimate coat", and the common law countries there is a big difference. The statute law emphasized the law of predictability, but can not guarantee the maximum "fairness"; and domestic for tunneling behavior punishment is not implemented, the effectiveness of supervision. In addition, the investor rights awareness is weak, and lack of investor protection mechanism, the tunneling and other occupation the interests of the small shareholders wantonly.
The main contribution of this paper: first, based on the research at home and abroad, from the perspective of risk financing, tunneling and propping behavior of Chinese listed companies, can make up for this one theory vacancy. Secondly, according to the listed companies in China the phenomenon of related transactions and private placement preference, real motivation analysis of Listed Companies in mergers and acquisitions behind, thus revealing the nature of the controlling shareholders' tunneling of listed companies. Thirdly, financing risk and tunneling, support behavior can be unified through the analysis of the external reveals the intrinsic reason, through the Department of behavioral assumptions in that external reaction, which is a major innovation of this paper. Finally, from the western developed country governance experience in tunneling and give some policy suggestions to curb domestic securities market tunneling behavior. This article is the lack of empirical data sample size is not big enough, the case is not rich enough, because The evidence is limited; the policy recommendations are not perfect because of the limited knowledge.

【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F271;F832.51

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