大股东控制下的定向增发与长期业绩研究

发布时间：2018-01-09 17:57

本文关键词：大股东控制下的定向增发与长期业绩研究　出处：《湖南大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：自颁布《上市公司证券发行管理办法》以来，定向增发已经成为中国资本市场上股权再融资方式的“新宠”。虽然从表面上看，定向增发是上市公司和认购对象之间自愿选择的结果，但发行门槛低，定价基准日的模糊规范、增发价格的“九折规定”等都给大股东的利益输送提供了操作空间。大股东是否利用定向增发进行利益输送也成为了理论研宄的焦点，本文旨在对这个问题寻找理论及实证依据。以往的研宄多从短期市场层面来探讨大股东是否存在利益输送行为，其结论往往存在争议。而本文在既往研宄的基础上，，探索性的从长期业绩的视角来探讨定向增发中是否存在大股东的侵权行为，既具有创新性也具有更强的说服力。同时对此问题的研宄也为规范定向增发行为，保护中小投资者的利益，促进市场公正、公平等提供决策参考。本文首先从委托代理理论与信息不对称理论出发，分析了大股东利用定向增发掏空上市公司的动机与条件。其次基于隧道挖掘，分析了大股东利用定向增发掏空上市公司的主要途径。接着在前文理论分析的基础上，我们推导出本文的假设，然后通过描述性统计分析、单因素分析，回归分析等实证方法来检验认购对象以及认购比例与上市公司定向增发后长期业绩之间的关系，并得出了如下结论：(1)大股东参与认购，会对上市公司的长期业绩产生负面的影响，包括上市公司的长期市场表现以及长期经营业绩表现，这说明大股东极有可能利用定向增发对上市公司进行了掏空。（2)大股东认购比例与定向增发前持股比例之差越大，上市公司定向增发后的长期业绩越差。这说明定向增发过程中大股东与中小股东利益分离程度越大，即大股东掏空动机越强，上市公司定向增发后的长期业绩越差，进一步证明了大股东利用定向增发掏空上市公司的行为。
[Abstract]:Since the promulgation of the "Management measures on Securities issuance of listed companies", directional additional issuance has become the "new favorite" of equity refinancing in China's capital market, although on the surface. Directional additional offering is the result of voluntary choice between listed company and subscription object, but the threshold of issuance is low, and the fuzzy standard of pricing benchmark date. The "10% stipulation" of the additional offering price provides the operating space for the benefit transmission of the major shareholders. Whether the large shareholders use the directional additional issue to carry out the transfer of benefits has also become the focus of theoretical research. The purpose of this paper is to find a theoretical and empirical basis for this problem. In the past, most of the studies discussed whether the major shareholders had the behavior of conveying interests from the short-term market level, and the conclusions were often controversial. However, this paper is based on the previous studies. Exploratory from the long-term performance of the perspective to explore whether there is a major shareholder in the private placement of tort, is not only innovative but also more persuasive. At the same time, the study of this issue is also to regulate the behavior of targeted placement. To protect the interests of small and medium investors, to promote market justice, fairness and so on to provide decision-making reference. Based on the principal-agent theory and information asymmetry theory, this paper analyzes the motivation and conditions of large shareholders using directional placement to empty the listed company. Secondly, it is based on tunneling. This paper analyzes the main ways for large shareholders to use directional placement to empty the listed companies. Then on the basis of the previous theoretical analysis, we derive the hypothesis of this paper, and then through descriptive statistical analysis, single-factor analysis. Regression analysis and other empirical methods to test the relationship between the target and the proportion of subscription and the long-term performance of the listed companies after the placement, and draw the following conclusion: 1) the majority shareholders participate in the subscription. Will have a negative impact on the long-term performance of listed companies, including the long-term market performance of listed companies and long-term operating performance. This shows that it is very likely that the large shareholders use the private placement to empty the listed company.) the bigger the difference between the subscription ratio of the large shareholders and the proportion of the shares before the directional additional offering. The worse the long-term performance of the listed company after the private placement, which indicates that the greater the degree of separation between the interests of the large shareholder and the minority shareholder, the stronger the motivation of tunneling. The worse the long-term performance of the listed company after the private placement, further proves the behavior of the large shareholders using the directional additional offering to empty the listed company.
【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F275;F276.6;F832.51

【参考文献】