上市公司高管薪酬激励对经营绩效影响的实证研究

发布时间：2018-01-11 08:10

本文关键词：上市公司高管薪酬激励对经营绩效影响的实证研究　出处：《沈阳理工大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：随着21世纪知识经济时代的到来，股份制公司和有限责任制公司在我国企业组织形式占据了最主要的地位。我国现代企业制度最显著的特征是所有权与经营权的分离，基于所有权与经营权分离即“委托-代理”关系而产生的高管薪酬激励的治理作用一直是国内外学术界和企业界最关注的话题。 2008年金融危机之后，相比全球，中国经济率先显露复苏迹象，2009年上市公司一季度报告显示，上市公司共实现净利润2037.6亿元，保险、化工、电力、民航、有色等11个行业扭亏为盈，虽然日用品、钢铁等4个行业出现亏损，但是上市公司业绩好转迹象渐显。本文正是基于这样的背景，从理论和实证两个方面探讨了上市公司高管薪酬激励对其业绩影响问题。研究结果显示：上市公司高管货币薪酬、高管持股与经营绩效存在线性正相关；高管货币薪酬、高管持股对经营绩效的影响程度受国有持股比例、行业竞争程度的影响。在结构安排上，，本文首先回顾了国内外相关实证研究，立足于委托代理理论、动机理论、人力资本价值贡献论，对上市公司高管薪酬激励对绩效的影响进行了理论分析，并提出了一系列假设。随后，选取我国沪深两市670家符合要求的上市公司2008-2010年连续3年共2010个样本为研究对象，运用统计软件SPSS17.0进行了实证研究，先整体研究了上市公司高管薪酬对经营绩效的一般影响，然后从实际控制人性质、行业竞争形态两个方面对样本分组，研究不同情况下高管薪酬对绩效的影响程度。最后，针对实证研究结果为完善上市公司治理结构提出对策建议。
[Abstract]:With the arrival of the era of knowledge economy in 21th century. The joint-stock company and the limited responsibility company occupy the most important position in the enterprise organization form of our country. The most remarkable characteristic of the modern enterprise system of our country is the separation of the ownership and the management right. Based on the separation of ownership and management, that is, "principal-agent" relationship, the governance role of executive compensation incentive has always been the most concerned topic of academic and business circles at home and abroad. After the financial crisis in 2008, compared with the global economy, the Chinese economy took the lead in showing signs of recovery. In 2009, the first quarter report of listed companies showed that the listed companies achieved a total net profit of 203.76 billion yuan, insurance. Chemical industry, electricity, civil aviation, non-ferrous industry and other 11 industries turn into profit, although the daily necessities, steel and other four industries show losses, but the performance of listed companies is gradually showing signs of improvement. This paper is based on this background. This paper discusses the influence of executive compensation incentive on the performance of listed companies from both theoretical and empirical aspects. The results show that there is a linear positive correlation between executive monetary compensation, executive stock ownership and operating performance of listed companies; Executive monetary compensation, executive stock ownership on the degree of operational performance is affected by the proportion of state-owned shares, the degree of competition in the industry. In terms of structure arrangement, this paper first reviews the relevant empirical studies at home and abroad, based on the principal-agent theory, motivation theory, human capital value contribution theory. This paper makes a theoretical analysis on the effect of executive compensation incentive on performance of listed companies and puts forward a series of hypotheses. Selected 670 listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in 2008 to 2010 to meet the requirements of a total of three consecutive years of 2010 samples as the research object. Using the statistical software SPSS17.0 to conduct an empirical study, first the overall study of the executive compensation of listed companies on the general impact of operating performance, and then from the actual nature of the controller. The paper studies the influence of executive compensation on performance in different situations from two aspects of industry competition. Finally, the paper puts forward some suggestions for improving the governance structure of listed companies.
【学位授予单位】：沈阳理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.51;F224

【参考文献】