金融中介机构声誉与IPO前盈余管理关系实证研究

发布时间：2018-01-12 04:25

本文关键词：金融中介机构声誉与IPO前盈余管理关系实证研究　出处：《哈尔滨工业大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：自上世纪末开始，上市公司盈余管理操纵引起国内外学术界广泛关注。无论是上市前盈余管理还是上市后盈余管理，都起到了美化财务报表的作用，这无疑给外部投资者甄别有价值公司增添了困难，加大了信息不对称，导致逆向选择等恶果。如何限制公司盈余管理操纵成为实业界跟学术界的重要课题。而公司在首次公开募股过程中存在着一支协助它们上市的金融中介机构，主要包括风险投资机构、主承销商和会计师事务所。随着我国资本市场和金融中介机构的不断成熟与发展，，金融中介机构在参与公司上市过程中占有越来越重要的地位，其自身经营利益及所起到的中介作用对我国首次公开发行股票公司的经济行为和决策产生着重要影响。在协助企业上市中，金融中介机构有没有发挥它们尽职调查的义务，有没有起到认证作用，有没有起到监督以抑制公司盈余管理操纵向外部投资者提供公正、中立的价值信号作用。这方面研究还鲜有著述。本文基于金融中介机构在协助公司上市过程中的特殊地位研究它们对公司上市前盈余管理操纵有何影响，以中国创业板市场2009年10月31日开板至2011年9月16日为止上市的264家公司为研究对象，通过定义中介机构声誉来反映它们自身综合实力，同时选择修正jones模型、真实活动盈余管理模型对比测算公司盈余管理水平，考察了金融中介机构在参与IPO过程中在限制公司上市前盈余管理是否有显著的作用。尤其我们检验了上市前的盈余管理行为与主承销商、风险投资机构以及会计师事务所声誉是否呈负相关关系。结果发现：风险资本的参与并没有降低公司盈余管理，而且有声誉的风险资本和有声誉的主承销商均有鼓励公司盈余管理之嫌，而它们的联合作用更是加强了盈余管理水平，而有声誉的会计师事务所则起到了抑制盈余管理的作用。由此我们得出在我国创业板市场刚刚成立，发行、退市制度等还不健全，风险资本及主承销商还是敢于寻找机会铤而走险与公司勾结获得短期利益而并没有体现中介机构独立性身份。
[Abstract]:Since the end of the last century, earnings management manipulation of listed companies has attracted extensive attention in the academic circles both at home and abroad. Both pre-listing earnings management and post-listing earnings management have played a role in beautifying financial statements. This undoubtedly makes it difficult for external investors to identify valuable companies and increases information asymmetries. How to limit the manipulation of earnings management has become an important issue in industry and academia. However, there is a financial intermediary to assist them in the process of initial public offering (IPO). It mainly includes venture capital institutions, principal underwriters and accounting firms. With the development of capital market and financial intermediaries in China. Financial intermediaries play an increasingly important role in the process of participating in the listing of companies. Its own operating interests and its intermediary role have an important impact on the economic behavior and decision-making of China's initial public offering stock companies in assisting the listing of enterprises. Have financial intermediaries played their due diligence obligations, whether they have played a certification role, whether they have served as supervision to curb the manipulation of corporate earnings management to provide justice to outside investors. Neutral value signalling. There are few works in this field. Based on the special status of financial intermediaries in assisting companies in the process of listing, this paper studies how they affect the earnings management manipulation before listing. From October 31st 2009 to September 16th 2011, 264 companies listed in China growth Enterprise Market (gem) were selected as the research objects. By defining the reputation of intermediary institutions to reflect their own comprehensive strength, at the same time choose to modify the jones model, real earnings management model to measure the level of corporate earnings management. This paper examines whether financial intermediaries play a significant role in limiting earnings management before listing in the process of participating in IPO. In particular, we examine earnings management behavior and lead underwriters before listing. The results show that the participation of venture capital does not reduce the earnings management. Moreover, both reputable venture capital and reputable principal underwriters have the suspicion of encouraging earnings management, and their combined role has strengthened the earnings management level. The reputation of the accounting firm has played a role in restraining earnings management. From this we draw a conclusion that the gem market has just been established issuance delisting system and so on is not perfect. Venture capital and lead underwriters still dare to look for opportunities to take risks and collude with the company to obtain short-term benefits and do not reflect the independent identity of the intermediary.
【学位授予单位】：哈尔滨工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F830.42;F832.51

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