基于契约动机视角的盈余管理治理路径研究

发布时间：2018-01-15 23:15

本文关键词：基于契约动机视角的盈余管理治理路径研究　出处：《大连理工大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：近年来,随着中国市场经济的高速发展和股票市场的不断发展,上市公司的盈余管理问题日益凸显,引起了各利益相关者的广泛关注。现代企业理论指出,企业是一系列契约的联盟,企业的会计盈余在这些契约履行的过程中发挥着重要的作用。研究表明债务契约动机与薪酬契约动机都是上市公司盈余管理的契约动机,而债权人与管理当局之间的问题也属于委托代理问题,上市公司高管为了获得贷款,获得高水平的薪酬均有可能进行盈余管理。基于债务契约的盈余管理动机的存在,作为利益相关者的上市公司债权人,特别是大债权人——银行为了维护其自身的合法利益,将对上市公司的盈余管理行为进行监督。同时有研究表明当银行对上市公司的监管更加严格时,基于薪酬契约动机的盈余管理则会相应的减弱。本文从盈余管理的契约视角出发,在深入的理论研究基础上,建立结构方程,选用2007年到2011年沪深两市共2487个样本公司的相关数据,探索基于债务契约动机的银行监督机制和基于薪酬契约动机的高管薪酬激励机制对上市公司盈余管理程度的治理效果以及治理机制与路径。对进一步完善上市公司的薪酬激励机制、完善贷款制度、规范上市公司的盈余管理行为、提高上市公司会计信息质量具有一定的理论意义和现实意义。研究结果显示,上市公司高管薪酬激励机制对盈余管理有显著的激发作用,银行监督机制对盈余管理有显著的抑制作用,而且银行监督机制的存在会激励高管努力工作,进而达到薪酬水平得以提升的效果,并且能够削弱高管薪酬激励机制对盈余管理的激励作用。基于契约动机的盈余管理行为更偏好采取应计盈余管理方式。企业契约的制定过程中,应全面权衡,综合考虑,制定完善合理的债务契约和薪酬契约,充分发挥薪酬契约机制和银行监督机制对上市公司盈余管理行为的治理作用。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the rapid development of China's market economy and the continuous development of the stock market, the earnings management problem of listed companies has become increasingly prominent, which has aroused the widespread concern of all stakeholders, modern enterprise theory points out. An enterprise is an alliance of contracts. Accounting earnings of enterprises play an important role in the performance of these contracts. The research shows that the motivation of debt contract and salary contract are both contractual motives of earnings management of listed companies. The problem between creditors and management authorities is also a principal-agent problem, listed company executives in order to obtain loans. Earnings management is possible to obtain a high level of remuneration. The existence of earnings management motivation based on debt contract, as a stakeholder creditor of listed companies. Especially, in order to protect their own legal interests, the big creditors will supervise the earnings management behavior of listed companies. At the same time, some studies have shown that when banks supervise the listed companies more strictly. Earnings management based on salary contract motivation will be weakened accordingly. From the perspective of the contract of earnings management and on the basis of in-depth theoretical research, this paper establishes the structural equation and selects 2487 sample data from 2007 to 2011 in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets. This paper explores the governance effect of bank supervision mechanism based on debt contract motivation and executive compensation incentive mechanism based on compensation contract motivation on earnings management degree of listed companies. Division of the compensation incentive mechanism. It is of theoretical and practical significance to perfect the loan system, standardize the earnings management behavior of listed companies and improve the quality of accounting information of listed companies. The results show that the incentive mechanism of executive compensation of listed companies has a significant incentive effect on earnings management, and the bank supervision mechanism has a significant inhibitory effect on earnings management. And the existence of bank supervision mechanism will encourage executives to work hard, and then achieve the effect of salary level can be improved. And it can weaken the incentive effect of executive compensation incentive mechanism on earnings management. Earnings management behavior based on contract motivation prefers to adopt accrual earnings management. Considering comprehensively, we should establish and perfect reasonable debt contract and salary contract, and give full play to the governance effect of salary contract mechanism and bank supervision mechanism on earnings management behavior of listed companies.
【学位授予单位】：大连理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F224

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