上市公司股权激励对盈余管理影响的实证研究

发布时间：2018-01-16 08:07

本文关键词：上市公司股权激励对盈余管理影响的实证研究　出处：《华南理工大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：自从2006年颁布实施《上市公司股权激励管理办法》以来，中国股权激励获得了快速发展。股权激励日益受到中国证券市场、上市公司和学术界的关注。股权激励有利于倡导价值创造为导向的绩效文化，建立股东与职业经理团队之间的利益共享与约束机制，却也可能导致利益输送、过度激励、激励操纵和盈余管理等问题。中国股权激励还有巨大的成长空间，盈余管理满足了股权激励对象特别是管理层的私人利益，同时影响了中小股东、投资者、债权人、监管部门等利益相关者对上市公司运营状况的判断，损害了资本市场的正常发展。因此发现股权激励过程中的内在规律、有效地抑制盈余管理、促进股权激励进一步健康发展等一系列问题，值得深入研究。本文首先对股权激励和盈余管理的相关文献进行了回顾，并重点回顾了前人对于股权激励与盈余管理相关关系的研究。接着分析了股权激励的内在规律。本文认为，对于任何一个股票期权激励计划或限制性股票激励计划，都可以根据激励计划的具体内容划分为以下三个阶段：基期、考核期和考核期后的行权期/解锁期。在此基础上提出了五个假设，假设的主要观点是“在股权激励不同阶段上市公司盈余管理的方向和程度都有所不同”。然后本文选取2006年初到2010年底、沪深两市实施股权激励的A股上市公司中的84家为样本进行了实证检验。检验的结果基本支持了所提出的假设，证明了这样一个观点：在实施股票期权激励和限制性股票激励的不同阶段，，上市公司盈余管理的方向和程度都有所不同。根据研究的结果，结合中国股权激励发展现状，本文提出了四条促进股权激励的建议，包括公司应科学设置业绩指标和水平、公司应充分发挥财务顾问的作用、政府应完善股权激励法律法规等配套措施、政府应进一步完善上市公司治理结构，等等。
[Abstract]:Since 2006, Chinese equity incentive has been developed rapidly, and equity incentive has been increasingly received by China's securities market. Listed companies and academic attention. Equity incentive is conducive to promoting value-creation oriented performance culture, the establishment of shareholders and professional managers between the interests of the sharing and restraint mechanism, but may also lead to the transmission of benefits. Excessive incentive, incentive manipulation and earnings management have great room for growth. Earnings management not only meets the private interests of the object of equity incentive, especially the management, but also affects the minority shareholders. Investors, creditors, regulatory authorities and other stakeholders judge the operating conditions of listed companies, damage the normal development of the capital market, so find the inherent law in the process of equity incentive. A series of problems, such as effectively restraining earnings management and promoting the further healthy development of equity incentive, are worthy of further study. This paper first reviews the relevant literature on equity incentive and earnings management. Then, the author analyzes the inherent law of equity incentive. This paper believes that the relationship between equity incentive and earnings management is related to equity incentive. For any stock option incentive plan or restrictive stock incentive plan, it can be divided into the following three stages according to the specific content of incentive plan: base period. Five hypotheses are put forward on the basis of the evaluation period and the exercise / unlocking period after the examination period. The main hypothesis is that "the direction and degree of earnings management of listed companies are different in different stages of equity incentive". Then this paper selects early 2006 to end of 2010. A sample of 84 A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets are tested. The results of the test basically support the hypothesis put forward. It is proved that the direction and degree of earnings management of listed companies are different in different stages of implementing stock option incentive and restrictive stock incentive. According to the results of the study, combined with the development of equity incentives in China, this paper puts forward four suggestions to promote equity incentives, including the company should set scientific performance indicators and levels. Companies should give full play to the role of financial advisers, the government should improve the equity incentive laws and regulations and other supporting measures, the government should further improve the governance structure of listed companies, and so on.
【学位授予单位】：华南理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F224

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