股权激励条件下的管理者信息披露博弈模型研究

发布时间：2018-01-18 02:05

本文关键词：股权激励条件下的管理者信息披露博弈模型研究　出处：《辽宁师范大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：股权激励就是一种通过让管理者获得企业的股权，使管理者具有获得一定股权利益的权利，从而能够同股东一样分享到企业的利益，承担企业的风险，使员工利益与企业利益更大程度的保持一致，进而能更加勤勉的为企业的发展考虑。现代企业的所有权与经营权相分离的现象，使企业管理者成为具有信息优势的一方，出于自身利益最大化的动机，管理者可能会进行虚假企业信息披露，从而会对企业本身以及投资者、股东的利益产生危害。企业管理者的这种信息欺诈现象已有很多，例如安然、施乐、世通、安达信等公司，都是因这种问题而最终导致破产。因此对在股权激励条件下企业管理者的信息披露行为进行研究是非常必要的。为此，，本文就管理者信息披露问题的国内外研究现状进行了论述，并结合当今市场经济的现实状况，就股权激励条件下管理者信息披露的问题从以下两方面进行了研究。（1）研究了股权激励条件下管理者与股东之间监督的博弈模型。首先引入管理者的风险偏好，使完全理性的博弈参与人更贴近实际，运用不完全信息静态博弈的理论进行研究，建立了基于不同风险偏好条件下的管理者与股东监督静态博弈模型，得出相应的贝叶斯纳什均衡，经过分析得出具有不同风险偏好的管理者进行信息披露策略的选择不同。其次，运用演化博弈的相关理论进行研究，建立了管理者与股东监督演化博弈模型，经过分析得出管理者与股东之间策略选择的关系，并对影响博弈参与者策略选择的因素加以说明，得出一些控制与减少企业管理者信息欺诈的措施。（2）研究了股权激励条件下管理者与股东之间再投资的博弈模型。首先引入管理者的风险偏好，使完全理性的博弈参与人更贴近实际，运用不完全信息静态博弈的理论进行研究，建立了基于不同风险偏好条件下的管理者与股东再投资静态博弈模型，得出相应的贝叶斯纳什均衡，经过分析得出具有不同风险偏好的管理者进行信息披露策略的选择不同。其次，运用演化博弈的相关理论进行研究，建立了管理者与股东再投资的演化博弈模型，经过分析得出管理者与股东之间策略选择的关系，并对影响博弈参与者策略选择的因素加以说明，得出一些控制与减少企业管理者信息欺诈的措施。文章的最后就本文研究的不足之处加以说明，并结合国内外的研究现状与当今市场经济状况，提出对管理者信息披露问题研究的一些展望。
[Abstract]:Equity incentive is a kind of enterprise equity through the managers to obtain a certain share of the right of interest, so as to be able to share the interests of the enterprise like shareholders, bear the risks of the enterprise. So that the interests of employees and enterprises to a greater extent consistent, and then more industrious consideration for the development of enterprises. Modern enterprise ownership and management rights separated phenomenon. In order to maximize their own interests, managers may make false information disclosure to the enterprises themselves and investors. The interests of shareholders are harmful. There have been many cases of information fraud among corporate managers, such as Enron, Xerox, WorldCom, Andersen and so on. Therefore, it is necessary to study the behavior of information disclosure of enterprise managers under the condition of equity incentive. Therefore, this paper discusses the current situation of managers' information disclosure at home and abroad, and combined with the reality of the current market economy. The problem of manager information disclosure under equity incentive condition is studied from the following two aspects. Firstly, the risk preference of managers is introduced to make the fully rational game participants closer to the reality. 1) the paper studies the game model of supervision between managers and shareholders under the condition of equity incentive. First, the risk preference of managers is introduced to make the fully rational game participants closer to reality. Based on the theory of incomplete information static game, this paper establishes the static game model of manager and shareholder supervision based on different risk preference conditions, and obtains the corresponding Bayesian Nash equilibrium. It is concluded that managers with different risk preferences choose different information disclosure strategies. Secondly, the evolutionary game model of managers and shareholders supervision is established by using the evolutionary game theory. Through the analysis of the relationship between managers and shareholders, this paper explains the factors that affect the strategy selection of participants in the game, and puts forward some measures to control and reduce the information fraud of managers. (2) this paper studies the game model of reinvestment between managers and shareholders under the condition of equity incentive. Firstly, the risk preference of managers is introduced to make the fully rational game participants closer to reality. Based on the theory of incomplete information static game, the static game model of manager and shareholder reinvestment based on different risk preference is established, and the corresponding Bayesian Nash equilibrium is obtained. It is concluded that managers with different risk preferences choose different information disclosure strategies. Secondly, the evolutionary game theory is used to study. The evolutionary game model of reinvestment between managers and shareholders is established, and the relationship between managers and shareholders is obtained through analysis, and the factors that affect the strategy selection of participants are explained. Come up with some measures to control and reduce the information fraud of enterprise managers. At the end of this paper, the shortcomings of this study are explained, and combined with the current research situation at home and abroad and the current market economy situation, some prospects for the study of managers' information disclosure are put forward.
【学位授予单位】：辽宁师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F224.32;F272;F830.91

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