基于代理成本视角下股权结构与多元化影响的实证研究

发布时间：2018-01-22 21:12

本文关键词： 代理成本股权结构多元化经营　出处：《新疆财经大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：公司经营战略一般分为专业化经营战略和多元化经营战略，企业所有者和经营者往往要做出专业化经营或多元化的经营选择。在理论界，对于企业是选择多元化好还是专业化经营好的争论一直没有停止过。目前为止，国内外的文献大多表明，企业选择多元化经营战略往往给企业的价值带来负面影响，即“多元化折价说”，现实的企业的数据证明了上述理论的正确性，如今许多业绩较好的企业多数选择专业化经营，那么既然理论上赞同于企业多元化经营会给企业带来折价，现实的一些数据又证明了企业选择专一化经营往往能够为企业带来更多的企业价值，可是为什么我们常常看到周围很多企业选择的是多元化的经营战略，那么出现这样的一种现象到底是为什么？这就要从企业选择多元化经营其他因素来考虑，而不能简单的考虑企业折价这一个因素。本文从代理成本的角度来解释这一现象。以往传统的代理成本理论考虑的角度只是集中在企业的管理者这一方面，即管理者想从多元化的经营从中赚取更多自身利益，本文在考虑了第一类代理成本后又考虑了第二类代理成本，即从最终控制人的角度出发，考虑控股大股东在股权制衡分离的情况下，系统的研究我国上市公司股权结构对公司多元化的影响。本文以2010年我国的627家上市公司作为样本，基于代理成本的不同，研究股权结构对公司多元化的影响。研究结果说明，上市公司管理者持股比例与企业多元化经营呈现负相关关系，具有掏空动机的企业，掏空动机越强的企业越喜欢多元化经营。尤其民营企业表现更为明显。据此我们提出加强市场监管，完善相关法律法规，保护中小投资者利益，，同时企业所有者应适当提高企业管理者的持股比例，完善经理人股票期权来确保企业利益不受侵犯。
[Abstract]:The company management strategy is generally divided into specialized management strategy and diversified management strategy. Business owners and managers often have to make professional or diversified business choices. For the enterprise is the choice of diversification or a good professional management debate has not stopped. Up to now, the literature at home and abroad shows that the choice of diversification strategy often has a negative impact on the value of the enterprise, that is, "diversification discount theory". The actual data of enterprises prove the correctness of the above theory. Nowadays, most of the enterprises with better performance choose specialized management, so since they agree in theory that diversification will bring discount to the enterprises. Some of the actual data also prove that the choice of exclusive management can often bring more business value for enterprises, but why we often see around a lot of enterprises choose a diversified business strategy. So why is this happening? This should be considered from other factors of diversification. This paper explains this phenomenon from the angle of agency cost. In the past, the traditional agency cost theory only focuses on the managers of the enterprise. That is, managers want to earn more self-interest from diversified management. This paper considers the first kind of agency cost and the second kind of agency cost, that is, from the perspective of the ultimate controller. Considering the separation of controlling shareholders in the separation of equity checks and balances, this paper systematically studies the influence of the ownership structure of listed companies on the diversification of companies in China. This paper takes 627 listed companies in China in 2010 as a sample to study the influence of ownership structure on corporate diversification based on the difference of agency cost. The proportion of managers holding shares in listed companies is negatively related to the diversification of enterprises. The enterprises with tunneling motivation are more likely to diversify, especially private enterprises. Therefore, we propose to strengthen the market supervision, improve the relevant laws and regulations, protect the interests of small and medium-sized investors, and the owner of the enterprise should appropriately increase the proportion of enterprise managers holding shares. Improve the executive stock options to ensure that the interests of enterprises are not infringed.
【学位授予单位】：新疆财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F224

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