创业投资声誉与创业板IPO效应研究

发布时间：2018-01-24 00:07

本文关键词： 创业投资声誉 IPOs初始收益长期业绩信号博弈信息效率　出处：《重庆大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：创业投资机构是培育、筛选优质企业的重要推手，也是中小企业摆脱融资困境的“重磅利器”，尤其是对加速创业企业完成上市计划和加快培育科技创新企业进程“功不可没”。与此同时，优秀的创业投资机构很极可能受创业企业和投资者的“青睐”，成为创业企业创新的“孵化器”、提升创业企业价值的“贴身专家”及外部投资者信号的“传感器”。为此研究创业投资的声誉效应价值匪浅。创业投资声誉既是创业投资机构与交易者重复博弈的结果，也是一种能吸引更优秀创业企业和招募更知名承销商的积淀性因素。基于我国创业投资机构发展日趋成熟的背景，本文结合IPO经典折溢价理论、博弈理论和IPO后企业长期经营业绩状况，以有无创业投资机构参与、创业投资持股及创业投资声誉为研究视角，选取创业板市场IPOs为样本，运用静态和动态博弈理论探析了创业投资机构、创业企业、外部投资者、发审机构之间的博弈关系及对IPO效应的影响，采用了两阶段回归模型实证研究了有无创业投资参与、创业投资持股比例、创业投资声誉对IPO初始收益与长期业绩的影响效应。理论分析发现：第一，创业投资机构参与不能作为甄别优秀创业企业的有效信号，长此以往高质量的创业公司被驱逐出境，为了避免这种情况IPO折价存在；第二，有创业投资机构参与的IPO企业长期业绩优于无创业投资机构参与的IPO后企业长期业绩；第三，创业投资机构的声誉高低可以作为评价IPO创业企业的质量高低的信号之一，因为声誉较高的创业投资机构推荐发行的新股通常定价比较合理，不确定性较小，对外部投资者有潜在的暗示指导作用，从而导致创业企业IPO折价较低，反之IPO折价较高；第四，声誉高的创业投资机构发送高质量的信号，从而提升创业企业的长期业绩，反之，声誉低的创业投资机构选择发送低质量的信号，导致企业的长期业绩不佳；第五，发审机构与创业投资机构、创业企业之间的存在着利益“合谋”，但外部投资者接收不到这种信号，他们之间存在着信息不对称，正是由于这种信息不对称的存在导致了IPO折价和IPO后企业的长期业绩。实证结果表明：（1）有无创业投资机构参与对IPOs初始效应无影响，即我国创业板市场中创业投资核证作用微弱（几乎不存在）；而有创业投资机构参与的IPO企业长期业绩优于无创业投资机构参与的IPO企业的长期业绩，即创业投资机构对创业企业有一定的筛选作用。（2）创业投资持股比例对IPOs初始收益无显著影响，但对IPO后企业的长期业绩影响显著；（3）创业投资声誉对IPOs折价程度无显著影响，即创业投资声誉效应在IPO初始收益中未能体现。（4）创业投资声誉对IPO后企业长期业绩有显著正效应，即高声誉创业投资为企业带来高长期回报IPOs长期业绩有显著正效应，说明创业投资声誉确实提升了IPO后企业的长期业绩。针对博弈分析和实证分析的差异性，本文从创业板市场特性、非理性投资行为视角进行了解释，并提出增强创业投资机构声誉信息效率的相关建议。如：增强IPO审核时创业投资机构声誉信号有效传递，建立与完善创业投资机构声誉评估体系，构筑健全薪酬激励和约束机制以保证创业投资机构“独立性”，减少投资者非理性行为以提升创业投资机构声誉信息效率及制定落实相应法律法规以促进创业投资有序发展。
[Abstract]:VC is an important promoter of cultivation, screening high quality enterprise, get rid of the financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises is the heavy weapon, especially to accelerate the enterprise to complete the listing plan and accelerate the development of the enterprise technological innovation process "contributed". At the same time, venture capital institutions is very outstanding entrepreneurs and investors may be affected by the "favor", become the enterprise innovation incubator, enhance the enterprise value of the "personal expert" and "sensor signal outside investors." the price for reputation effect of venture capital value greatly. The reputation of the venture capital institutions and venture capital is not only the result of the game between traders, is also a kind of attractive more and more outstanding entrepreneurial enterprises to recruit well-known underwriters accumulation factors.
The maturity of the background of the development of China's venture capital institutions based on combining IPO classic premium theory, game theory and IPO enterprise long-term operating performance, with no participation in the venture investment institutions, and the reputation of Venture Investment Holdings as the research angle of view, select the GEM market IPOs as a sample, using the static and dynamic game the theory of venture capital institutions, enterprises, external investors, the game relation between the trial mechanism and influence on the IPO effect, the empirical study has no venture capital to participate in the two stage regression model, venture capital holdings, the effect of venture capital reputation effects on IPO initial return and long term performance.
Theoretical analysis shows that: first, venture capital institutions participate not as effective screening of outstanding entrepreneurial enterprises, if things go on like this high-quality start-up companies were deported, in order to avoid this situation IPO second discount; enterprise IPO is involved in the venture investment institutions for the long term performance is better than the non participation of venture capital institutions IPO enterprise long-term performance; third, venture capital's reputation as one of the high quality signal evaluation of IPO business, because the reputation of venture capitalists recommended higher IPO pricing than usually is reasonable, the uncertainty is small, suggesting the potential role for external investors, resulting in enterprise IPO discount is relatively low, and the discount of IPO high; fourth, the high reputation of the venture investment institutions to send high quality signal, so as to enhance the long-term performance of enterprises, and vice versa, Select the signal sending low quality low reputation of venture capital institutions, resulting in long-term business performance is poor; fifth, the trial organization and venture capital institutions, enterprises exist among the "conspiracy", but the interests of outside investors can not receive the signal, there is information asymmetry between them, because of the information asymmetry due to the existence of the long-term performance of IPO discount and enterprises after IPO.
The empirical results show that: (1) there is no participation in the venture investment institutions have no effect on the IPOs initial effect, namely China's gem venture capital certification role of weak (almost non-existent); and the enterprise IPO participation of venture capital institutions long-term performance is better than the long-term performance of enterprises IPO venture capital institutions involved, i.e. venture capital institutions screening effect on entrepreneurial enterprises. (2) venture capital shareholding ratio has no significant effect on IPOs initial return, but the long-term performance of enterprises after IPO significant effect; (3) the reputation of the venture capital has no significant effect on IPOs underpricing, the reputation of the venture capital effect is not reflected in the initial return in IPO. (4) the reputation of the venture capital on the long-run performance of IPO after the enterprise has a significant positive effect, namely the high reputation of venture capital for enterprises to bring high long-term returns IPOs long-term performance has a significant positive effect, that is the reputation of the venture capital The long-term performance of IPO has been improved.
According to the difference of game analysis and empirical analysis, this article from the GEM market characteristics, from the perspective of non rational investment behavior is explained, and puts forward relevant suggestions to enhance the reputation of the information efficiency of venture capital institutions. Such as: enhanced IPO audit business reputation signal investment institutions to establish and perfect the effective transfer of venture capital institutions to build reputation evaluation system. Perfecting the salary incentive and restraint mechanism to guarantee the venture capital institutions "independence" to reduce the non rational behavior of investors to enhance the reputation of information efficiency of venture capital institutions and formulate and implement relevant laws and regulations in order to promote the orderly development of venture capital.

【学位授予单位】：重庆大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.51;F224.32

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